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ABSTRACT

Snell, Brandon Charles. M. A., Department of International and Comparative Politics, Wright
State University, 2009.
The Origins of Ethno/National Separatist Terrorism: A Cross-National Analysis of the
Background Conditions of Terrorist Campaigns

This study measures the influence that multiple social, political, and economic conditions have
on the development of ethno/national separatist terrorist organizations. It begins by analyzing the
nationalist theories of primordialism, modernism, and ethnosymbolism, and the terrorist theories
of strategic logic and psychology. The nationalist theories consider cultural symbols a powerful
component behind nationalist movements and populations with significant symbolic attachments
especially prone to react aggressively against perceived threats to those symbols. Proponents of
strategic logic and psychological theory also view terrorism as reactive but deviate on whether
this response is conceived rationally. Examining the origins of Basque and Catalan terrorism and
Roma passivity in Spain assists in identifying background conditions that are evaluated using a
logit regression model. The logit model assesses two-hundred ninety-seven minority populations
in one-hundred twenty-six states, primarily between 1945 and 2003. The results show cultural
identity and sensitivity, violent encounters, political freedom, social unrest, underrepresentation,
disproportionate economic privation, and stagnant educational systems and other factors of civil
development correlating significantly with the formation of ethno/national separatist terrorist
organizations. These findings imply an ability to detect populations and environments with
increased potential for producing ethno/national separatist terrorism, and that by addressing those
conditions facilitating its development, it may be possible to reduce the probability of additional
campaigns developing.
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Introduction
This study analyzes the conditions surrounding the creation of ethno/national separatist terrorist
organizations. It begins by examining contemporary theories of nationalism and terrorism in
order to identify common background conditions correlating with the development of these
movements, and then uses a logit regression to test the significance of those correlations among
various minority populations. The objective is to detect common triggers existing throughout the
world that influence an aggressive response from specific populations that then leads to the
initiation of terrorism for gaining national sovereignty. The intent of this paper is to advance the
study of terrorism by understanding why some groups transition into a terrorist organization and
attempt to solidify both the theoretical aspects and development of ideas applicable to future
research in this field.
One of the first challenges in studying terrorism is defining the term. History shows a
tendency of opposition movements and their sympathizers to resist the depiction of terroristic
acts as terrorism to avoid its pejorative connotations, instead preferring to refer to themselves as
rebels, freedom fighters, or liberators (Hoffman, 1998). The result of this difficulty with labeling
is an inability to establish a universally acceptable definition of a terrorist organization. To
provide a common description of these organizations, researchers produce ad hoc explanations
that utilize common concepts and then periodically introduce subtle nuances to the term. Cooper
(1997), for example, describes terrorism as opposition to normal society and its structures.
Hoffman (1998) writes that terrorism is conclusively about power, involving “a planned,
calculated, and . . . systematic act” of violence, or its threat, “designed to have far-reaching
psychological effects” (pp. 15, 44). Laqueur (1999) adds to the definition of terrorism by
describing its political components, and Rimanelli (1992) writes that terrorism is a tactic used by

1

revolutionists for maximizing “systematic and indiscriminate” attacks aimed “at provoking
generalized political instability and tensions to destroy the traditional psychological bonds
between state and society” (p. 127). For the purpose of this study, the definition of terrorism
broadly encapsulates illegitimate hostile acts by oppositionist groups to further their goals and
which manifest the aforementioned characteristics. In addition, the observations in this analysis
have previously been defined by other sources as terrorism, predominately by the Global
Terrorism Database (GTD).
Terrorism is a broad topic with episodes occurring in several forms that go beyond largescale, indiscriminate violence by clandestine groups. These acts range from civil disobedience to
cyberspace attacks, and a myriad of actions between. Often terrorism is seen as a weapon of the
weak and of last resort, committed in areas with higher degrees of civil freedom by organizations
that tend to emerge in authoritarian states with institutional weaknesses or political corruption
(Fox, 2003; Abadie, 2006; Feldmann & Perälä, 2004; Reinares & Jaime-Jeménez, 2000 Laqueur,
1999; Fleming, 1982). Moreover, terrorism occurs sporadically or cyclically, is a primary or one
of several tactics, and is unaided or sponsored, or connected to other movements (Feldmann &
Perälä, 2004; Fox, 2003; Cook, 1982). Walter Reich (1990), in his own quest to understand
terrorism, writes how this “subject is so confounded by problems of diversity, complexity, and
definition that any simplifying approach is bound to tempt one to use it beyond its valid limits”
(p. 2). This broad research by nature overlooks unique cultures, histories, and circumstances,
while the nearest to a universal description of terrorism is of a terrorist type as male and seldom
of a labor class, and for woman terrorists as emotionally driven (Laqueur, 1999). Beyond this,
concepts of terrorism become multidimensional and generally inapplicable to different cases.
The examples of Basque and Catalonian terrorism in Spain further illustrates how geographic
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alignment, resource sharing, and similar hardships are indeterminate predictors of case specific
aggression. This makes the task of uncovering the roots of terrorism especially difficult, although
important, since common traits may exist within the various forms of terrorism. As Laqueur
(1999) explains, there are no typical terrorists, only typical types of terrorism, and by narrowing
research to these specific types, it may be possible to accumulate knowledge that assists in
predicting conditions and environments that promote and facilitate its occurrence. Therefore, by
examining the origins of ethno/national separatist (ENS) terrorist campaigns, this paper seeks to
contribute to a more precise perspective on the ENS form of terrorism.
The aspects differentiating ENS terrorism from other forms of terrorism include moderate
to intense levels of violence in the pursuit of national independence. Hoffman (1998) depicts this
level of violence as between two extremes, which like Marxist-based terrorism is intrinsically
revolutionary but more destructive and less discriminate, although less violent than religiously
motivated groups. Crenshaw (1990) attributes these differences to ENS organizations appealing
broadly along ethnic lines that helps compensate for indiscriminate aggression, whereas leftists
relying solely on ideology have to calculate attacks carefully to avoid turning a populace against
them. Rightwing terrorism, to the contrary, tends to be the least discriminate, which Hoffman
(1998; 1995) argues operates outside dominant political or cultural paradigms and is uninterested
in political or social change, striving only to annihilate a perceived ‘ungodly’ enemy. Therefore,
religious-based terrorism appeals only to those sharing a narrow and extreme ideology, although
in some cases ENS terrorists also integrate leftist or rightwing ideologies into their movement,
and as a result exhibit the characteristics common to those beliefs. Furthermore, ENS terrorism
includes organizations that tend to be the longest lasting and most successful. Most have roots in
the post World War II anti-colonial movements and became commonplace in Europe during the
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Cold War, where especially since the 1960s, Europe has remained among the hottest regions for
terrorist activity (White, 2002; Hoffman, 1998).
Terrorism in its modern sense has plagued Europe for generations. Pluchinsky (1982)
writes that since the 1970s, Europe has been “the most active terrorist environment in the world,”
where Alexander and Myer (1982) note over 200 terrorist organizations have emerged (pp. 689). This neoteric concept of terrorism first arose from the ashes of the French Revolution when
the regime de la terreur used brutal tactics for maintaining order in the early postwar era. In its
beginning, the term terrorism had a positive connotation but quickly became synonymous as an
instrument of torment (Hoffman, 1998). Its meaning later evolved into a method of rebellion in
Italy during the 1870s as an early theory, propaganda by deed, linked it to anarchy, which Errico
Malatesta and Carlo Cafiero developed by arguing how direct and aggressive action could bring
awareness to a struggle. Malatesta and Cafiero promoted developing movements by educating
masses, and advocated violence as the most effective and efficient mode of communication, ideal
for affecting change. They subsequently brought their theory to fruition by inciting a riot in 1877
(Hoffman, 1998; Fleming, 1982). Terrorism again became prominent during the Russian
Revolution, which redefined it as a tactic for waging violent resistance without open conflict.
Narodnaya Volya, the People’s Will, was the first to implement Malatesta and Cafiero’s
propagandist principles, showing that direct action by dispersing information could formulate a
movement of rebellion (White, 2002; Hoffman, 1998; Fleming, 1982). From that period the
meaning of terrorism gradually evolved. The assassinations of Tsar Alexander II in Russia and
Cavendish and Thomas Burke in Ireland further connected terrorism to revolutionist ideology.
Meanwhile, events over time shifted the perceptions of terrorists from anarchistic and expecting
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severe repercussions to those of heroic protagonists forced to use violence, and for whom
punishment would be viewed as unjust (Laqueur, 1999; Hoffman, 1998).
The origins of ENS terrorism are also considered to have begun in Europe and radiated
outward through colonialism and, in its development, gained traction as a contemporary tactic of
resistance. Several European groups including Armenians, Basques, Irish, Kurds, Macedonians,
and Serbs have used terrorism to pursue national independence in regions where its origins stem
back generations (Alexander & Meyer, 1982). The Armenians in Turkey and the Inner
Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) in Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia were
implementing these tactics as early as the 1880s, while parts of the Irish Republican Army (IRA)
date back to 1789, following Wolfe Tone’s rebellion (Hoffman, 1998; Crenshaw, 1990). The
surge of ENS terrorism ceased, however, during both World Wars, while terrorism in the late
nineteenth century primarily espoused Marxism and after World War I, shifted to rightwing
movements (Laqueur, 1999; Alexander & Meyer, 1982). Then, ENS terrorism began to resurge
in the 1940s with anti-colonial revolts around the world that used radical tactics to gain
independence and international awareness (Hoffman, 1998). Concepts of terrorism burgeoned
amid marginalized ethnic populations worldwide who saw advantages in clandestine resistance.
This momentum derived from technological advances and national events such as the birth of
Israel in 1948 (Laqueur, 1999; Alexander & Meyer, 1982). Though many had Marxist roots,
which provided an alternative belief system, these movements were not fundamentally grounded
in communist ideology. Rather, terrorism involves the rejection of mainstream structures and
ideology, and this was an era confronting Western dominance. Foremost, however, these
movements structured themselves around ethnic identity and separatism, and eventually
nationalism grew as their dominant ideology such that by the 1950s, these organizations were
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almost entirely nationalist based. These movements emerged across the world with notorious
organizations beginning in Israel, Algeria, and Spain in the 1950s, were revitalized in Ireland in
the 1960s, erupted in Turkey in the 1970s, and since have continued to upsurge especially as
Marxist terrorism has declined (Laqueur, 1999; Crenshaw, 1990; Pluchinsky, 1982; Alexander &
Meyer, 1982).
In all, the subject of ENS terrorism presents an important topic. ENS terrorism occurs
worldwide, and transpires under a variety of economic, political, and social systems. Although a
universal explanation of terrorism may not exist, the task of studying the various forms of
terrorism, and the conditions in which they occur, may lead to a better understanding of the
background conditions common to these specific forms. The intent of this study is to strengthen
the understanding of ENS terrorism by blending literature on nationalist and terrorist movements
to identify theoretical concepts and measure their significance in relation to the development of
these organizations. The first chapter provides a discussion of contemporary nationalist and
terrorist theories. The second chapter discusses the case of ENS terrorism in Spain from an
historical context, which the literature provides a framework for interpreting and understanding
how to apply the theoretical concepts. The third chapter operationalizes these concepts in order
to perform a logit regression assessing the relationship between the background conditions and
development of ENS terrorist organizations. The final section discusses the overall significance
of this study, identifies weaknesses, and provides suggestions for future research.
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Chapter I
Literature Review
There are a variety of theories covering nationalism and terrorism, some note patterns that occur
as reformist groups intensify in aggression, although few address the transitions to terrorism that
occur within ENS movements. One theory, Gramsci’s war of positions, contends that opposition
networks develop in areas with conflicting hegemonic beliefs and implacable self-interests, with
terrorism occurring as contentious beliefs conflict with mainstream descriptions of reality. This
conflict involves at least one sect feeling victimized while an opposition network exists that is
able to offer those affected an alternative reality. When that network is unable to bring about
alternative structures through peaceful measures, and perceives no alternative method for
affecting change, it resorts to terrorism (Lustick, 1993). Laqueur (1999) finds this is especially
true of ethno/nationalist groups. Pluchinsky (1982) also observes these groups flourishing in
areas ripe with high levels of unemployment and inflation, stagnant educational sectors, weak
judicial and legal systems, entrenched ethnic or religious divisions, or other factionalized
partisanships, in which failed attempts at peaceful political solutions often contribute to
radicalization. What is missing, however, is a description of how these conditions influence the
conversions from nonviolence to terrorism, which the examination of literature on this topic
provides an approach for analyzing.
Theories of Nationalism
Theories of nationalism are important to consider when studying ENS terrorism.
Nationalist ideology is the foundation upon which ENS terrorist campaigns emerge. Though only
a portion of nationalist movements transcend into terrorist organizations, theories of nationalism
have identified several common characteristics regarding both the development of nationalist
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movements and nationalist-based aggression. Those conditions influencing nationalist sentiment
may also play decisive roles in the formation of ENS terrorist organizations or the decisions of
nationalist movements to initiate terrorism. Therefore, nationalist theory may assist in identifying
some of the stimuli encouraging the use of terrorism or assist in identifying which populations
are most vulnerable to producing terrorist campaigns.
Several theories attempt to explain nationalist movements, which in their most basic form
involve a social political force, nostalgia for returning to a golden age, and three themes:
“autonomy, unity, [and] identity” (Muro, 2005; Beiner, 1999; Smith & Hutchinson, 1994, p. 5).
Also inherent in nationalist theories are cultural symbols with the potential to elicit strong
emotional responses. Most of these theories concur that manipulating these symbols can affect
nationalist sentiment and therefore play a key role in nationalist movements. Another common
aspect is that most of these theories rely on a constructivist or biological explanation, or a
combination of both evolutionary and structural forces influencing nationalist movements, while
differing over assumptions of the age of nationalism, and its internal ‘psychological’ and external
‘environmental’ triggers. Researchers often arrange these theories based on those paradigmatic
variances, classifying them as either primordialist or modernist. Primordialism treats nationalism
as enduring, with increasing trends to study its evolutionary and psychological components.
Modernism instead limits the age of nationalism to the formation of nation-states, and relies on
constructivist

explanations that

coincide with structural changes.

A third method,

ethnosymbolism, provides a theoretical bridge that combines aspects of both primordialist and
modernist theories for explaining a long-existing phenomenon while rejecting notions of innate
symbolic value.
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Primordialism
Primordialists share the view that nationalism is an archaic human trait, but diverge over
assumptions about internal behavioral mechanisms. Researchers in this field study the long-held
values that individuals and groups place on kinship, collective identity, and other symbols of
identity, to suggest that behaviors inherent to nationalism are a continuation of an enduring
human practice. They consider nationalism a normative part of the human experience in which
its common traits, such as preferred kinship and quick aversion for unfamiliar persons, have
remained universal communal characteristics for innumerable generations, which makes it a
worldwide-antiquated heritable phenomenon. Essentially, arguing that nationalism has existed
since or before the dawn of man, while the creation of nation-states merely extended its context
and application. The extent to which these perspectives fluctuate draws from diverging cultural
or evolutionary views. Although each is anthropological, culturalists focus on socially inherited
dimensions of behavior, whereas evolutionists try to determine which aspects of behavior are
socially learned and which are genealogical. While each approach views perception as key to
explaining social interaction, evolutionists attempt to extend the understanding beyond structural
components to include the internal mechanisms that make perception vital.
Ozkirimli (2000) identifies Clifford Geertz and Pierre L. Van Den Berghe as influential
scholars of primordialism. Geertz (1995), a culturalist, advocates studying behavior by focusing
on intricate situational details, arguing how symbols of identity are not only multidimensional
but vary among cultures and individuals within a culture. For that reason, analyses should
involve thick descriptions that provide a holistic method for exposing deep roots of case specific
stimuli, which facilitates retracing the perennial aspects of culture and behavior. Van Den
Berghe (1987) in contrast, is a sociobiologist, who addresses the psychological mechanisms of

9

nationalism. Van Den Berghe (1987) relies on genetic, ecological, and cultural reasoning to
argue that engineered behaviors for kin selection, reciprocity, and coercion contribute to all
human interaction. From this view, organisms are vehicles for gene replication wherein
evolutionary processes created survival instincts that influence interaction and reproduction with
those perceived as genetic matches, with nationalism being coercion disguised as kinship.
Modernism
Modernism, in contrast, views nationalism as predominately induced by environment and
a more recent human development. Ozkirimli (2000) writes that most scholars in this field follow
one of three transformationist paradigms: economic, social-cultural, or political. Accordingly, the
economic approach focuses on industrial changes, while social-culturalists view nationalism as a
byproduct of maturing industrial societies, the latter viewing it as the result of evolving political
structures. Each approach is highly constructivist with frameworks assuming that the creation of
nation-states produced nationalism, with a consensus that its primary causes were the mass labor
migrations during the Industrial Revolution and state consolidation. These factors contributed by
establishing common identities within territories, from which recognizable symbols of national
identity could elicit sentimental attachments to those regions. Statehood, in effect, produced
preferred kinships through influencing a heightened sense of fear and antipathy for outsiders,
wherein us-versus-them mentalities consolidate nationalist movements, making modernism a
neoteric and outwardly produced response.
John Breuilly and Eric J. Hobsbawm are both proponents of political modernism who
find economic and political changes to be the underlying causes of nationalist movements during
the mid-twentieth century. Breuilly (1982) argues that prior to this period the general populace of
Europe was neither political nor nationalist. Their issues were unimportant politically and
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therefore many felt unattached to national frameworks within their homelands. Then, tremendous
changes during the Industrial Revolution altered political landscapes. Rivalries over economic
power and world primacy led nations to consolidate, worsening xenophobia. Breuilly (1982)
finds national identity becoming more widespread as states became better established, and finally
becoming a normal characteristic of nations and an exploitable political tool. In Europe,
nationalism incessantly fueled aggression, and during the World War interim period, Hobsbawm
(1994) argues how previously impotent nationalist groups ascended to power, filling the vacuum
left by collapsed regimes by inciting fear against those who did not belong to a narrowly defined
nationality. Subsequently, attributing the rise of Naziism to uniting a collective identity based on
an aggravated mistrust of non-ethnic Germans and ethnic Germans perceived as different.
Ethnosymbolism
Ethnosymbolism observes multidimensional and evolving symbols playing essential roles
in defining identity throughout history. Distinct from the other two paradigms, ethnosymbolism
is in-and-of-itself a theory, which Hale (2004) and Ozkirimli (2000) describe as a fusion of
primordialism and modernism. Like primordialism, this approach illustrates the importance of
enduring symbolic values and studies their historical relevancies not limited to abrupt changes
within a specific chronological domain. At the same time, it emphasizes how people must ascribe
values to those symbols if they are to influence perception. Consequently, it emphasizes the
importance of perennial symbols while acknowledging how their interpretations change (Hale,
2004). Therefore, Ozkirimli (2000) describes ethnosymbolism as a decidedly constructivist
approach, which portrays culture as having ancient and enduring qualities, with symbols whose
definitions constantly change and perpetually influence identity.
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Hale (2004) and Ozkirimli (2004) credit Anthony D. Smith for developing the ethnosymbolist model. According to Smith (2003), national identity derives from the perpetual
reinterpretation “of values, symbols, memories, myths, and traditions,” with nationalism being a
collective phenomenon of those sharing these traits (pp. 24-5). In addition, Smith (2003) argues
how cultural symbols, some from antiquity, pass down through generations and continue
influencing perception. Using religion to illustrate an ancient perennial symbol that established
frameworks for national identity, Smith (2003) describes how Christianity united ancient
civilizations and laid the foundations for modern Armenia, Ethiopia, and Russia. Like statehood,
Smith (2003) argues, religion has unifying qualities that gave historically religious societies the
equivalence of a national identity pre-nation-state. In earlier work, Smith (1994) also argues how
ethnic identity existed prior to the Industrial Revolution by illustrating how each period of
enlightenment gave credence to cultural symbols, which spread a sense of racial identity and
created symbolic heirlooms that continued reinforcing ethnicity throughout generations.
While observing a perpetual and reciprocal relationship between symbolism and cultural
identity, ethnosymbolism also holds that the propensity of a symbol to influence identity depends
on the interpretations of its value. As such, strong symbolic attachments might be less common
in ethnically diverse populations having a vast assortment of insignificant symbols, while Smith
(1991) considers ethnically exclusive groups, like the Basque, to be exceptionally sensitive to
threats against their national identity. Smith (1991) argues how groups with notably close ethnic
ties are more likely to share heritable traits, like gastronomy, language, and folklore. The close
proximity of the population sharing culturally significant traits teaches and encourages members
to place certain sentimental values in them, which shows how learning to recognize and
appreciate values is necessary for symbols to have effective potential.
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Theories of Terrorism
Contemporary views on terrorism vie between strategic and psychological explanations
of its origins. Although each of these models focuses on several components of terrorism, and
views these organizations as being, to a certain extent, homogenous to one another, they disagree
on many of the underlying factors that lead an organization to commit violent acts. Much of this
dispute derives from strategic logic’s emphasis on rational choice by organizations that behave
as single entities. While psychological theory likewise considers these organizations as being inand-of-themselves monolithic, it also focuses on individuals within each organization, especially
the role they play during its development phase. The following offers a discussion about these
methods for studying terrorism, and how they may contribute to understanding the forces behind
nationalist/separatist-based campaigns.
Psychology
The psychological model views terrorism as the result of emotional responses. Terrorism,
according to Sprinzak (1990), derives from a psycho-political process of delegitimation. One
scholar commonly identified with this approach, Jerrold M. Post, argues that, “Individuals are
drawn to . . . terrorism in order to commit acts of violence,” which is the effect of psychological
factors (p. 25). This occurs when external forces affect the psychological frameworks of
individuals that causes trauma and predisposes them to aggression. Terrorist organizations
disproportionately attract these individuals, giving groups a high ratio of members with fractured
identities who seek stimuli through action, are aggressive, and compelled to commit violence. By
joining these organizations, such individuals gain a sense of belonging that helps to heal
emotional damage, while their tendencies toward violence lead them to use groups for payback,
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influencing groups to seek vengeance against those blamed for causing their psychosomatic
trauma, and having an overpowering influence that increases the aggressive nature of the group.
Several authors have written about the psychological traits of terrorists, and how these
traits may provide explanations for terrorism. The psychological model identifies similar
behavioral and emotional traits that contribute to a predisposition to joining a terrorist group.
According to Post (1990), terrorist organizations attract a disproportionately high number of
individuals with troubled pasts, emotional disorders, or psychological damage. Implicitly, the
potential terrorist lacks a well-developed sense of self and feels fundamentally detached from
society. Gibson (1994) depicts many terrorists as perceiving themselves as rogue warriors who
view terrorism as a necessity, while Ross (1999) portrays the terrorist type as being anxious,
thrill seeking, culpable, depressed, antisocial, narcissistic, and lost, and argues that continual
demonstration of such behavioral traits contributes towards the likelihood of becoming a
terrorist. Likewise, Post (1990) describes many terrorists as victims of severe adolescent trauma,
belonging to dysfunctional families, being educational or vocational failures, and social outcasts.
To illustrate, Post (1990) highlights reports by members of the Red Army Faction (RAF) and 2
June Movement, showing how most of these members had divorced parents and unfavorable
paternal relationships. Another example notes the high ratio of mixed Spanish/Basque ancestry
among members of ETA, indicating individuals possibly having difficulty identifying with or
being accepted by either culture, and thus lacking a strong sense of personal identity.
Vital to this theory is the effect that environment has on individual growth. Many cases
point to social detachment facilitating radicalization. Post (1990) and Cook (1982) both illustrate
several instances of individuals living outside mainstream culture for substantial periods before
becoming terrorists. In essence, they believe that enmeshment in counterculturalism can diminish
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normative values or foster new ones, facilitate unrealistic unidimensional views, and decrease
inhibitions for using violence. For some, the cultures in which they were raised are in-and-ofthemselves peripheral to society. For example, simply living under Francoism made Basque
identity countercultural (Shabad & Llera Ramo, 1995). Subcultures might also emerge from
shifting environmental conditions. Cook (1982) contends that living in a newly democratic postfascist Germany prejudiced views of injustice and led to a countercultural subculture in the
1960s when German youth experienced a barrage of new concepts emphasizing rebellion that
evolved from protest movements in the United States. These dynamics inspired a heightened
sense of moral justice and aversion to Germany’s recent political past. Ultimately, however,
financial security allowing excess in adolescent indulgence and political activism, along with
inabilities to cope with new social pressures or identify with their own political system, brought
about adverse views of society and skewed perceptions of reality, eventually leading to the
formation of the Red Army Faction (RAF).
Also important is that some who join terrorist organizations do so due to an emotional
need. According to the psychological model, people seek out groups for healing psychological
fragmentation caused by experiencing severe emotional trauma early in life and later emerging
as a severe psychotic disorder. Post (1990) asserts that narcissism is a frequent terrorist trait,
describing the commonly observed symptoms of splitting and externalization, which involve
projecting inner weaknesses onto others, making them the targets of unsettled inadequacies.
Cook (1982) adds that long held mistrust of society erodes standard reactions to stimuli, and that
groups provide new normative guidance and identity. In Post’s (1990) view, groups are
therapeutic; they offer a sense of belonging and a means for acting out aggression, while those
who lack an adequate personal identity compensate by adopting a collective identity. The group
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identity provides a platform for redressing grievances. Their enemies become the manifestation
of the group’s inner emotional flaws. Groups also institute a sense of identity by establishing
strict moral codes and enforcing homogeneity. They assume a sense of infallibility, and make it
unacceptable to challenge beliefs. Pressure to conform compels submission to extreme views,
while fears of isolation or retribution sustain cohesion.
Within groups, Post (1990) asserts that the already high proportion of psychologically
damaged members have considerable influence over group dynamics. Such mentalities become
the group mindset, and gradually move the collective group from a nonviolent phase of
antisocialism to a phase conducive to terrorism. Sprinzak (1990) details how this process led the
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), which committed itself to nonviolence, to become the
Weathermen within a decade. Sprinzak (1990) describes the stages as moving from a crisis of
confidence, to a conflict of legitimacy, to a crisis of legitimacy. In the initial stages, low-level
nonviolent ideological struggles exist, but once passive tactics for effecting change prove
ineffective, the struggle begins employing greater levels of violence. Justification derives from
believing that existing systems are corrupt and repressive, and that the group is able to provide a
superior alternative. Also included in this process are the unhealed fractured identities, which
progressively turn into stronger shows of narcissism and violence. Ross (1990) claims that
groups reinforce these negative traits and teach ways to increase violence, until eventually, these
traits define the group’s identity. At which point, Post (1990) argues members develop a sense of
invulnerability and superior morality, while viewing their enemies as unidimensional. Moreover,
Post (1990) finds these characteristics pressuring conformity and the use of violence, while
Sprinzak (1990) finds the process of delegitimizing social norms to produce, what he terms,
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“antinomian weltanschauung[s],” meaning they discard conventional morality while holding a
black and white worldview, which ultimately creates the pathway to terrorism (p. 83).
The psychological theory considers terrorism a group choice, typically following failed
peaceful attempts to produce political or ideological reform, and where no conceivable substitute
exists (Sprinzak, 1990). Consequently, the decision by groups to use terrorism derives from the
perception that terrorism is their only option. Cooper (1997) calls this the doctrine of necessity in
which groups share a belief that terrorism is the only effective means for pursuing their goals and
therefore commit these acts believing they must. As Ross (1999) notes, many groups view it as
the most effective and efficient means to pursue their interests. It justifies their existence while
providing a sense of higher purpose, which Post (1990) discusses as the inevitable path to
becoming irreversible monoliths. By illustrating ETA’s continued unwillingness to disarm after
achieving substantial political gains, Post (1990) argues that the ultimate purpose of these groups
is to commit terrorism. Violence gives the members of the organization self-worth and validates
their continuation, while success threatens their survival. For this reason, Post (1990) believes
that a terrorist organization will resist surrendering willingly or completely, essentially making
terrorism a self-perpetuating necessity.
Strategic Logic
The strategic model describes terrorism as a calculated choice by organizations following
a rational decision-making process. It focuses primarily on group logic instead of individual
dynamics by viewing the organization as homogenously ideological and negating individualism.
The scholars identified with this approach include Martha Crenshaw, Bruce Hoffman, and
Walter Laqueur. Crenshaw (1990) argues that a terrorist organization collectively decides to
commit terrorism and justifies its aggression by using an intra-group rationality. This is
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demonstrated in deliberations that include a group’s ideology versus the proportion of the
population sharing similar views, and the degree and potential effectiveness of attacks. However,
while viewing these organizations as having a single identity, this model also considers them
distinct, adept, logical, and deliberate. It applies a broad analysis that includes all forms of
terrorism while providing a paradigm for identifying specific information about each case and
integrating other theories into the analysis. In addition, because it offers a universal approach for
studying terrorism, Crenshaw (1990) advocates this method as being the ideal framework for
research in this field.
The strategic method observes a logical process in the lengthy and divisive development
of a terrorist organization. This process typically begins with passive opposition movements that
over time become more aggressive. According to Crenshaw (1990), the initial decision by a
group to use terrorism tends to follow the protracted buildup of experiences. It entails learning
from current circumstances and past failures. As Hoffman (1998) notes, people grow weary of
ineffective nonviolent methods and turn to terrorism because of its potential to manifest quicker
results. Clark (1984) illustrates this progression in describing ETA’s development, which began
as Ekin, “To do,” having roots with remnants of Euzko Ikasle Alkartuna (EIA), the “Society of
Basque Students, and along with members of Euzko Gaztedi del Interior (EGI), the “Basque
Revolutionary Youth,” whom both parted from the Partido Nacionalisto Vasco (PNV), the
“Basque Nationalist Party,” primarily over the dispute whether to use active resistance. As
Crenshaw (1990) observes, the decision to use terrorism is a divisive issue capable of
destabilizing groups or factionalizing members. Accordingly, some members might view it as an
only option while others might worry about it being counterproductive or too elitist, as some
theories contend that mass participation is necessary to keep people actively engaged. When
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movements do become more violent, the strategic model views this as adjusting tactics from the
standpoint that organizations are being altered while members vie to employ more efficient and
effective strategies.
Therefore, strategic logic does not view terrorism as a precipitous act, but as a strategy
for acquiring notoriety, gains, and resources that involves ideal moments and precise planning in
order to limit the costs to the group while maximizing their results. These calculations for using
terrorism are an important part of the strategic model. Terrorism, according to Crenshaw (1990),
is often a “response to opportunity” where the decisions to commit terrorism involve not only
previously failed strategies but also seizing opportune moments (p. 16). A key factor, Lustick
(1993) claims, is whether a group feels an urgency to act under repressive conditions, especially
if they sense regime vulnerability, which Crenshaw (1990) argues is important for several
reasons. Chiefly, despotic conditions create time constraints to act. Groups need favorable
moments where systems are vulnerable, making it possible to win quick support. Especially in
authoritarian states, where accurate assessments of popular support are difficult to gauge, but
latent underground support could exist; a group might act hoping to create revolutionary
conditions and elicit a following. Furthermore, a group might act believing their actions will
inspire future movements, an aspect that Crenshaw (1990) considers a long-term strategy of
terrorism.
Another aspect of strategic logic underlies the dynamics involved in the initial decisions
to initiate terrorism. According to Crenshaw (1990), the conditions under which terrorism tends
to occur indicate a sense of logic, which Reinares and Jaime-Jeménez (2000) find to involve
circumstances that open doors to unease and unrest, including economic crisis, liberalization, or
frustration felt as one segment of society threatens another segment’s idealist expectations for
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society and government. In these situations, Crenshaw (1990) argues that some want to act but
lack capability. Laws might ban organizing politically, or extreme views lack broad support.
Whichever the case, groups are more likely to use terrorism when they cannot realize their goals
peacefully, and are unable to rally forces sufficient for open confrontation. The case of the
Weathermen illustrates this point. Sprinzak (1990) writes that the Weathermen had wanted to
create a revolution in the United States, but their extreme ideology made them highly selective
over membership, and as a result, the group never had more than four hundred members, and
eventually sought to deliver their campaign through terrorism. This decision Crenshaw (1990)
describes as the last in a succession of options, and often a weapon of the weak for small groups
to compensate for their lack of force. Meanwhile, the media magnified violence endows them
with greater authority, forcing others to take them more seriously than they might have done
otherwise.
The strategic model also holds that organizations consider the costs and benefits of using
terrorism. Crenshaw (1990) argues that terrorist organizations use a logical process of gauging
terrorism based on its potential effectiveness. One of the objectives is to provoke overreactions,
which Laqueur (1999) calls a strategy of provocation where terrorists hope to further their cause
and gain support by revealing governments as either ineffective or unjust. Several examples
demonstrate terrorist organizations applying this logical analysis, which is especially common
among ethno/nationalists and was ETA’s action-repression-spiral theory (Clark, 1984). Hoffman
(1998) and Laqueur (1999) also describe the IRA as masters of using this logic to employ precise
levels of aggression. According to Laqueur (1999), though the IRA was capable of massive
violence, they routinely launched carefully directed and small-scale attacks to prevent estranging
popular support. In addition, even acts foreseeable as destabilizing to terrorist organizations can
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be a deliberate part of strategy. Sandler and Enders (2007) write how the September 11 attacks,
which cost upwards of $100 billion, had the potential to cripple western market stability, which
outweighed the potential damages to Al-Qaeda.
The strategic model also highlights the ability of terrorists to estimate responsive impacts.
When it comes to terrorism, governments and terrorists alike must consider the outcomes of their
actions. If governments respond inadequately to a terrorist attack, the lack of security puts people
at risk and demonstrates an inability to respond to social threats. However, overreactions that
institute repressive conditions risk eroding popular support and validating the terrorist’s position,
giving the terrorist organization considerable power and influence. Even still, responding too
severely can diminish the terrorist organization’s support base. Much of this, Crenshaw (1990)
argues, involves a population’s ability to endure “insecurity and repression” (p. 19). Laqueur
(1999) provides the examples of leftists in Venezuela and the M-19 in Columbia, who
overestimated their support and acted too aggressively, turning public sentiment against them.
Furthermore, Rimanelli (1992) describes how the Red Brigade (BR) in Italy not only
miscalculated its support base and the effects of improved industrial conditions, but also lacked
foresight of historical and ideological trends, while being naïve as to the role of the US and
Italy’s geopolitical importance during the Cold War. These cases illustrate the awareness needed
for a terrorist organization to survive. For organizations to endure, it is essential to recognize
beforehand not only how attacks will directly affect their targets, but also how governments will
respond and how those responses will affect their organization.
These calculations for ensuring longevity are a vital part of the strategic model. Although
this model considers the adoption of terrorism initially based on its potential to foster immediate
results, the majority of terrorist organizations do not achieve their primary goals right away.
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Therefore, success rests not only on an ability to enact initial tactics, but also on the capacity to
consolidate movements and develop long-term strategies for attaining incremental changes,
which Rimanelli (1992) argues hinges on the ability to acquire communication outlets, new
technologies, intra-group and transnational relationships, immunity abroad, and sponsorship.
Crenshaw (1990) adds that organizations must also develop underground networks that can
withstand nearly all repercussions. Fortifying movements, however, is a time consuming and
difficult task. Crenshaw (1990) describes the Shining Path in Peru spending a decade developing
itself clandestinely before its first attack. Meanwhile, Clark (1984) describes how the ferocity
with which EIA was dismantled left an impression about the importance of covertness with the
founders of ETA. As a result, ETA created a complex network, and took advantage of the
Spanish/French border; where for years safe haven and immunity in France enabled ETA to
survive against unrelenting Spanish persecution.
Analyzing the Literature
The following is an analysis of the theories for nationalism and terrorism that offers a critique for
where they assist in explaining the causes of ENS terrorism or lack general applicability. While
none of these theories exhaustively explains the causes of terrorism, each model provides a
useful perspective for studying the origins of ENS terrorist movements. The nationalist approach
indicates that populations with distinct histories are more culturally sensitive, and tend to react
more strongly to threats against their cultural identity. Psychology, although failing to distinguish
between terrorist organizations sufficiently based on their overall goals, recognizes an emotional
component of terrorism, which provides a method for assessing areas unaddressed by strategic
logic, such as emotional contributions to the decision to initiate terrorism, or factors influencing
individuals to join terrorist organizations. Strategic logic, while predominately focusing on active

22

terrorist organizations, also offers the perspective that group behavior is calculated and evolving.
Although each of these theories approaches this subject with a unique perspective, several of
their principles are compatible with one another and collectively create a paradigm for analyzing
ENS movements.
Analyzing Theories of Nationalism
The theories for nationalism contribute to the study of ENS terrorism by observing
precise components of nationalist-based violence. Because nationalist movements are precursors
to nationalist-separatist terrorism, forces leading to nationalist movements conceivably also play
causational roles in the creation of ENS terrorist campaigns. While many terrorist organizations
share similar characteristics, including a high ratio of males and roots in nonviolent oppositionist
movements, motivations for opposition can vary. For nationalists, territorial claims often lie at
the heart of conflicts. Inherently, this involves nostalgia for returning to a golden age that
represents a utopian era of national unity and territorial sovereignty. Though the Roma never had
a golden age in Spain, the Basque and Catalan did. These were the Kingdom of Navarre and the
Catalan-Aragón Empire. These historic territories are central in defining Basque and Catalan
national identity, with members from both populations referencing those eras to describe a once
proud and independent people. Because ancestral land provides a platform for rhetoric that gives
solidity to nationalist movements and influences aggression, it may also play a fundamental role
in ENS terrorism. In addition to the potential significance that territory may have regarding these
campaigns, the approaches to studying nationalism also provide intimations about several other
possible forces behind ENS terrorism.
Primordialism and psychology share the assumption that an emotional component links
aggression to radicalism. Evolutionary psychology especially assumes that internal mechanisms
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contribute to social attachments that manifest as collective identities deriving from evolutionary
processes engineering survivalism in the human psyche (McKinnon, & Silverman, 2005; Van
Den Berghe, 1987). Evolutionary psychologists attribute nationalist movements to an insecurity
exhibited as aggression anchored in these survival instincts. Evolutionary and psychological
theorists agree that nationalist movements form as increasing levels of fear influence the
formation of protective layers of familiarity. Hale (2004) describes, “deeply rooted psychological
mechanisms” dictating this development, which function as social navigators, constantly altered
and conditioned by the environment, and therefore they are easily manipulable and instrumental
in proliferating fears that incite nationalism (p. 481). These assumptions seem compatible with
observations of both nationalism and terrorism, and correlate with Post’s (1990) argument that
environments affect individuals psychologically, leading them to seek out groups for emotional
comfort. They also share the view that aggression is a behavioral proclivity that contributes to a
nationalist movement’s collective hostility. The difference is the extent to which individuals are
considered inclined to aggression. Primordialists consider nearly all prone to violence without a
prerequisite of prior psychological damage. Frans De Waal (1989), for example, finds aggression
to be a heritable and situationally induced reaction, common to all primates thus existing before
man, while Post (1990) sets a specific parameter wherefore terrorism results from psychological
fragmentation.
Modernism and ethnosymbolism emphasize the plasticity of perception, highlighting how
changes in the industrial era influenced perception and drew together social collectives as nationstates, defining the context of modern ENS movements. In fact, many trace the origins of Basque
nationalism to the nineteenth century and the Carlist Wars, an era which Kurlansky (1999)
describes as Basque on Basque warfare (Muro, 2005; Muro & Quiroga, 2005; Garmendia, 1985;
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Clark, 1979). Garmendia (1985) describes how Basque nationalism emerged as Carlists
emphasized a Basque golden age, while promising a return to it. Shabad and Llera Ramo (1995)
write how economic changes as early as the 1890s led to strong nationalism within traditional
Basque society, while drastic population shifts, along with high unemployment rates, mostly
among the youth, during the twentieth century strengthened its fervency and attracted segments
to extremist movements. Conclusively, this period affected Basque nationalism in a way that
directly influences movements today. It commenced a chain of events that sit at the core beliefs
of modern Basque terrorism, but not necessarily marking the birth of Basque national identity.
The divergence of ethnosymbolism from modernism allows for observing nationalist
roots beyond the corridors of the industrial age. This perspective helps to explain how historical
progressions contributed to modern day movements. The conclusion that Christianity laid the
foundation for Armenia, Ethiopia, and Russia, also applies to Spain, which united under
Christianity during the Inquisition. Furthermore, Smith’s emphasis on symbolisms explains why
Spaniards, united by Christianity, remained divided. Spain has an unusual terrain, and even
within the Basque region, solitude gave rise to seven dialects of Euskera (Kurlansky, 1999).
Basque ethnicity, defined by Euskera, the Basque language, is archaic, and ethnosymbolism
implies that this symbol while not constantly uniting Basques, has consistently defined cultural
exclusivity for innumerable generations. Catalan, however, is Latin-based, suggesting shared
ancestral roots with other Spaniards, and in the case of the Roma, the Roma do not inscribe nor
elicit the same symbolic values with Romani as the Basques are observed doing with Euskera.
While notably distinct from Castilian, Romani is rare in Spain, with Caló, the Roma language in
Spain, essentially being a form of improper Castilian. Euskera, to the contrary, delineates Basque
identity. This distinction influences reluctance among Basques to recognize a shared ancestry
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with other populations and explains why ETA views Euskera as key to uniting Euskadi as a
decisively non-Spanish nation (Clark, 1984).
Analyzing Theories of Terrorism
Although psychology and strategic logic disagree about the general purposes for using
terrorist violence, these theories share assumptions that can be applied to the development of
terrorist movements. Post (1990) recognizes that terrorist organizations use a logical decisionmaking process to balance accomplishing levels of success in order to legitimize their existence,
whereas Crenshaw (1990) and Hoffman (1998) agree that terrorism offers emotional benefits.
Hoffman (1998) writes how “the desire for action can lead to an obsession with violence,” which
along with notoriety becomes a necessary fix, encouraging self-aggrandizement and perpetuating
desires for publicity (p. 175). According to Post (1990), the difference between these theories is
the assumption that terrorism is a choice among alternatives. Strategic logic views terrorism as a
decision based on its potential effectiveness, which Post (1990) refutes, arguing that the decision
to use terrorism does not derive from a rational deliberation that weighs it against alternatives,
since black and white world conceptions negate the ability for rational discernment. Instead, Post
(1990) believes that terrorists view terrorism as their only choice, and an end in-and-of-itself, but
not as a method for achieving political goals. However, despite these incompatible assumptions,
it is possible to merge these theories in a way that contributes to this subject by describing an
aspect of terrorism involving emotional reactions that influence rational calculations.
Analyzing Psychology
One weakness of the psychological model is its uniform view of terrorism. The argument
that terrorist organizations exist solely to commit terrorism excludes consideration for the types
of organizations committing it. In his article, Post (1990) frequently cites the Red Army Faction

26

(RAF) to illustrate terrorism’s psychological mechanisms, although Laqueur (1999) and Konrad
(1990) portray this group as dysfunctional and atypical, describing its leadership as mentally
unstable and the entire group as deeply troubled. The founders of the Baader-Meinhof Gang, the
predecessor of RAF, Ulrike Meinhof and Andreas Baader, both had notable emotional damage.
Meinhof, suffered a brain injury as a child, and Baader was a drug addict. Moreover, both
committed suicide. While Konrad (1990) does agree that most terrorists “suffer from deep
psychological trauma and act out what trauma whispers into their conscious minds,” he argues
that, “the German case is unique” (pp. 43, 46). The history of Nazism had an unusual effect on
the perceptions of German youth; an aspect unshared in many regions where terrorism occurs.
Another commonly referenced group, the Weathermen, may also be an aberration. Laqueur
(1999) depicts this group emerging from social unrest that radicalized naïve youth, who suffered
an identity crisis and wanted excitement, but lacked a deep understanding of minority repression
and economic hardship, or economics in general, and came to manifest the licentiousness that
they condemned. Such examples, however, do not accurately depict every terrorist organization,
and repeatedly referencing them demonstrates a selective analysis. As a result, the assumptions
derived by Post may lack general applicability for all cases of terrorism.
Thus, Post’s (1990) assertion that ETA will not freely disarm because it failed to do so
after achieving substantial political gains ignores that ETA has yet to realize its overall goal of
Basque independence. Nor has Madrid ever completely given into ETA’s minimum requirements
for a ceasefire and negotiations, which ETA-militar announced in 1978 with its five-point
Koordinadora Abertzale Sozialista (KAS) Alternative. This involved amnesty for all political
prisoners; legitimating all political parties, even those supporting Basque independence;
withdrawal of Spanish police and military forces from the Basque region; improved working and
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living standards; and autonomy for Euskadi, with Euskera as the national language, law
enforcement under the control of Basque authorities, and unconditional self-rule (Shabad &
Llera Ramo, 1995; Clark, 1984). Some of these goals were less plausible, as granting sovereignty
would require amending Article 2 of Spain’s Constitution, describing Spain as indissoluble
(Cowans, 2003; Kurlansky, 1999). Other aspects were possible however, and in 1978, Madrid
recognized both Euskal Iraultzale Alderdia (EIA), the “Basque Revolutionary Party,” which
grew out of ETA-político-militar, and Herri Batasuna (HB), “Popular Unity,” which grew out of
ETA-militar. Then in 1979, the Spanish Parliament approved Basque autonomy but not
independence, while making Navarre a separate region, leading to contentiousness among
Basque nationalists wanting to restore the entirety of the Navarrean Kingdom, including its
French Provinces (Totoricaguena, 2004; Kurlansky, 1999).
Because Madrid has not entirely given in to these minimal requirements for a ceasefire,
and because País Vasco remains under Spanish jurisdiction, claims that ETA will never willingly
disarm are premature, especially when cases of similar successful movements indicate otherwise.
Hoffman (1998) writes how many such movements fail to obtain their primary goal of national
independence while small gains maintain campaigns of attrition. Konrad (1990) concludes that,
“any such people, so long as they hold on to their convictions, cannot be appeased by anyone or
anything; nor can they be satisfied by any change in conditions—they will fight until they are
killed or caught” (p. 50). Thus, if the ultimate goal is national sovereignty, then assessing groups
based on lesser gains is inadequate for concluding such definitive statements. Moreover, several
examples exist of groups using terrorism in struggles of decolonization and secessionism, and
disbanding after liberation. According to Hoffman (1998), when the Japanese attacked western
colonies in World War II, western rule appeared vulnerable and liberation seemed possible,
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leading to violent and successful uprisings throughout the colonized world. Cases from Algeria
and Israel during this period illustrate effective separatist terrorist campaigns that ceased after
gaining national independence. When Israel became a state in 1948, not only did Jewish
terrorism diminish, but also did members of the Stern Gang legitimately enter the political
process, with Menachem Begin, a Stern Gang leader, becoming Prime Minister of Israel in 1977
(Hoffman, 1998; Lustick, 1993). These cases expose the inaccuracy in claiming that all terrorist
organizations are incapable of voluntarily disbanding, especially ENS movements where history
shows terrorism being used as a means to an end.
The flaw in the psychological model, therefore, is that it fails to discriminate between
organizations based on their overall purpose. ENS terrorists may not use terrorism for the same
reasons as do other types of organizations, and while parts of psychology, such as ideological
reinforcement appear significant in the case of ETA, other aspects appear irrelevant. Ferracuti
(1990), for instance, agrees that “belonging to a group and remaining isolated from society
reinforces” ideology and motivations (p. 61). This might explain why ETA-militar killed
Eduardo Moreno Bergarche, Portell, ETA’s political strategist, in 1978 after Portell attempted to
open dialogue with Madrid (Clark, 1990). However, it is not necessarily the case that Portell was
killed to maintain a never-ending perpetuation of violence. The overall goals of terrorists vary
drastically. Some of these goals, such as territorial sovereignty, are more rational than are others.
They also likely represent an organization’s ideology and membership. Plausible goals with a
history of being achieved illustrate ENS organizations having a greater comprehension of reality
than organizations that pursue unrealistic objectives. Despite nationalist and leftist groups
sharing a revolutionist ideology, leftists tend to establish short-term anarchist goals without
comprehensive post-struggle views (Hoffman 1998; 1995). For example, RAF sought the
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destruction of Germany’s democracy (Konrad, 1990). The Weathermen wanted a revolution in
the US (Sprinzak, 1990). 17 November wanted to cripple capitalism and western alliances in
Greece, and the Red Brigade espoused communism during a period when industrial conditions
benefited the economy and living standards in Italy (Corsun, 1992; Rimanelli, 1992).
This narrow viewpoint of psychological theory weakens its potential to explain terrorism.
For ENS terrorism, the only distinction offered by Post (1990) is a positive and loyal attachment
to family. Although family loyalty is difficult to assess accurately, it seems improbable that all
members of any organization share this trait, or the lack thereof. Laqueur (1999) more accurately
argues that any terrorist profile at best depicts the members of a specific group, at a distinct place
and time. Essentially, psychology appears too overreaching by setting such precise parameters
for terrorist violence. Post (1990) assumes that anarchist, anticapitalist, nationalist, and religious
campaigns each stem from individuals with violent proclivities caused by emotional disturbances
in adolescence that draws them to groups for emotional security, while Porta’s (1995) research
finds, as with most types of political participation, nearly everyone joining terrorist organizations
has personal ties with others in the group. Therefore, the high proportion of etarras with SpanishBasque heritage, which Post (1990) interprets as individuals radicalizing after facing adversity
from a marginal social status, could also imply individuals well acquainted with one another due
to familiar familial ties and a shared mixed-heritage. Even organizations commonly cited as
having shared psychological components, might not. According to Ferracuti (1990), no study has
been able to indentify common psychopathological traits among German or Italian terrorists.
Furthermore, Konrad (1990) points to the flexibility within RAF, and its incoherent post-struggle
view, to illustrate organizations as less rigid, single-minded, ideologues than generally believed,
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altogether making the claims made by Post (1990) appear too generalized and unfitting for many
cases of terrorism.
Analyzing Strategic Logic
The strategic model views terrorist organizations as a reactive, single entity, and although
much of its focus is on active organizations, it contains concepts potentially applicable to the
origins of movements. This approach views terrorism as reactive with traceable relationships
between background conditions and episodes of terrorism. Strategic logic is also flexible for
integrating a psychological component into this theory, which Crenshaw considers necessary for
understanding several of the antecedent and individual intricacies relating to these movements.
Therefore, the rational choice model offers a theoretical bridge for conceptualizing causes of
terrorism, the motivations for launching movements, and how individual perceptions shape
group-dynamics and influence the decision to initiate terrorism.
Strategic logic views terrorism as a decision largely based on its potential effectiveness,
group circumstances, and surrounding conditions. These factors bypass the possible internal and
psychological mechanisms also affecting these decisions. These presumptions are of intentional
design for maintaining broad applicability and stem from observations of active organizations,
particularly political terrorism, which requires a level of preciseness to be effective and endure.
This involves competency in securing arms, planning and watching targets, executing missions,
and acquiring funds that often requires financial backing through either state sponsorship or
independent sources, which delves into an additional aspect of strategizing (Laqueur, 1999).
These barriers are so immense that Hoffman (1998) argues cause the majority of groups to die
out quickly. Those who do endure demonstrate considerable capacity to effectuate strategy. This
leads to an assumption that terrorists logically calculate and evolve strategy, though another
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approach may view attributes contributing to clandestine survival as leading to an entrenchment
of organizations highly adept at devising strategy. Organizations that act rationally potentially
endure and gain a level of notoriety that influences the concept of the terrorist type: middleclass,
educated, and intelligent (Laqueur, 1999). However, in consequence strategic logic may fall
short in linking the factors motivating the continuation of terrorist campaigns to those motivating
the formation of terrorist organizations.
However, Crenshaw addresses these potential pitfalls by viewing terrorism as reactive
and recognizing a need to increase comparative analyses of the background conditions where it
occurs (1990). Extending studies to include these observations assists in conceptualizing its
causes, but alone cannot adequately explain it. As was the case in Franco Spain, identifying with
any non-Castilian heritage or leftist ideology could bring persecution, but only ETA and the
Frente Revolucionario Antifascista y Patriota (FRAP), the “Patriotic Revolutionary Anti-Fascist
Front” retaliated with terrorism (Clark, 1984). Because of examples like these, Crenshaw (1990)
rejects the notion that environmental conditions alone produce terrorism but believes that tracing
associations between background conditions and episodes of terrorism is vital for developing
comprehensive theories, especially with ENS where history and heritage play a decisive role. A
point shared by Laqueur (1999) who writes, the divergent Basque and Catalan response is only
explicable by understanding the “perception[s] of historical, social, and cultural traditions, and of
political calculus” (p. 36). To understand how these structural variations affect people
differently, Crenshaw (1990) suggests utilizing psychology, pointing out that a thorough grasp of
terrorism requires a psychological analysis of those involved, their objectives, and the emotional
responses they receive. This highlights the benefits of using strategic logic. Its reactive approach
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allows researchers to retrace the steps of terrorism for uncovering causational markers, while its
broad design leaves room for interpreting case specific stimuli.
Explaining the causes of individual cases of terrorism requires understanding how a range
of conditions influence perceptions and lead to violence. Crenshaw (1990) and Konrad (1990)
agree that theories of terrorism need to be more specific, which Konrad (1990) explains, requires
taking into account not only the individuals involved but also the political and intellectual forces.
Accordingly, an accurate depiction of ENS terrorism requires understanding all its mechanics.
Some of these characteristics, such as patterns in violence, are common to all forms of terrorism.
Organizations are observed radicalizing as like-minds coalesce, forming a bottleneck effect and
becoming detached from society. According to Sprinzak (1990), terrorism occurs after gradual
experiences with increasing levels of aggression dissipate the mystique of using violence. Cook
finds that organizations gradually become more willing to use violence as isolation, losses of
reality, and peer-pressure move them “from sensitivity to hypersensitivity to hyposensitivity” (p.
177). According to Bandura (1990), the ability to use terrorism ultimately comes from a
powerful and ongoing process of dehumanization, moral detachment, and justification, in which,
Sprinzak (1990) adds, terrorism is the final stage. However, despite this similar process, it is
important to recognize that not every opposition group radicalizes nor do all respond uniformly
to the same experiences. Understanding the causes of terrorism therefore requires understanding
why various groups respond to certain stimuli, for which Crenshaw (1990) believes “psychology
is important in determining such behavior” (p. 7). Implicitly, therefore, merging strategic logic
and psychological theory could assist in creating a comprehensive method for linking external
and internal forces to examine and explain the transitions to ENS terrorism.
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Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to study ENS terrorism by analyzing literature on
nationalist and terrorist theory for developing a perspective on the transitions to terrorism that
occur within nationalist movements. This focus on ENS terrorism highlights an important topic
regarding conflict analyses that supersedes national boundaries and cultural identity. ENS
terrorism transpires under various conditions throughout the world, and stems from organizations
historically enduring far longer than other movements while also being the most successful.
These organizations involve political revolutionists using unsanctioned, systematic, and intense
violence for achieving national sovereignty while leaving an incessantly negative impact on life
and infrastructure. However, despite the detriment caused by ENS terrorism, this subject is often
glanced over as a minor facet as it relates to the general study of terrorism. The lack of coverage
on this subject creates an opening to examine understudied elements associated with terrorist
campaigns, and the regional, cultural, and circumstantial variations in which they occur.
The theories discussed in the first chapter offer a beneficial perspective into the subject of
ENS terrorism. Primordialism and psychological theory highlight the importance of emotion in
hostile movements, primordialism and ethnosymbolism recognize how ethnic symbols influence
national identity and have the potential to elicit powerful and aggressive emotional responses,
and modernism and ethnosymbolism stress the high malleability and potential manipulability of
perception. Furthermore, the theories for nationalism and psychology view aggression as
environmentally induced, thus sharing the view with strategic logic that collective hostility is a
reactive phenomenon. Therefore, each of these theories offers mutually inclusive principles that
are useful for tracing nationalist terrorism to nationalist movements to its root causes. Implicitly,
nationalist aggression derives from aspects of culture that individuals learn to value, which
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include background conditions priming certain responses to various triggers. Because nationalistseparatists in particular are observed using terrorism to achieve the same goals that they pursued
as nonviolent oppositionists, and because these movements must exist before this form of
terrorism can occur, one can draw the conclusion that symbols defining ENS movements also
directly define dimensions of ENS terrorism. Together, these theories describe a paradigm for
tracing the origins of ENS terrorism by looking for the antecedent conditions that lead to
particular responses. This paradigm has the potential to assist in recognizing culturally sensitive
populations, determining which conditions are likely to elicit an emotional response from those
populations, and rationalizing why various individuals react differently.
This chapter widens the perspective on nationalist, separatist, and terrorist movements.
The following chapter describes the history of the Basque, Catalan, and Roma in Spain, which
the literature on nationalist and terrorist theory provides a lens for analyzing and identifying
contributing factors of nationalism and terrorism that may also pertain to other cases of minority
populations and the creation of ENS terrorist organizations elsewhere. The findings from this
analysis are operationalized and measured in the third chapter using a logit regression that tests
their significance regarding the initiation of these movements worldwide. The intent is to add to
the understanding of this subject and terrorism in general, potentially contributing towards an
ability to foresee populations and environments facilitative to the emergence of ENS terrorism.
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Chapter II
Espainetan Abertzaletasuna eta Indarrikarako Edestia: the History of Nationalism and
Terrorism in Spain
In the study of nationalism and ENS terrorism, the Spanish case is significant, not only for the
contributions of studying Basque terrorism, but also for observing the mystery that typifies these
movements. Cases of ENS emerge under various conditions, and although research identifying
common factors has contributed to an increased understanding about these movements, these
indicators neither appear exclusive nor guarantee that they will occur. Even populations sharing
similar traits and experiencing similar circumstances are observed responding differently. This is
the case in Spain, where the Basque, Catalan, and Roma have coexisted precariously at times due
to their unique and non-Castilian heritages. Each of these populations has suffered systematic
discrimination at various periods in Spanish history, and simultaneously faced discrimination
during the Franco era, 1937-1975 (Minorities at Risk, 2004). Despite the parallels between these
populations under Francoism, only the Basque created a sustained terrorist campaign against the
state. This case is similar to other cases of ENS terrorism, with Basque terrorism contrasting
sharply against the nonviolent Roma response and poorly organized and restrained Catalonian
violence. Basque terrorism indicates a reaction to more than cultural persecution or structural
conditions. To understand the forces behind Basque terrorism, this chapter follows the advice of
Laqueur (1999) by examining historical properties. The following discussion places the Basque,
Catalan, and Roma in the context of Spanish history to observe how cultural development led to
distinct intra-group dynamics that influence their various reactions. The discussion attempts to
refine the understanding of terrorism including ENS terrorism in Spain and elsewhere throughout
the world.
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Modern Spain is a coalescence of civilizations descending largely from Iberian natives,
Celts, Greeks, Romans, Visigoths, Franks, Semites, and Mozarabes. Throughout their history, its
diverse inhabitants were frequently isolated by a mountainous geography that augmented various
realms which for most their duration lacked unity to one another (Stanton, 2002; Trend, 1944).
Rome first united Iberia as Hispania in 200 BCE, colonizing the southern and western regions
where terrain was less formidable to conquest. These surmountable geographic features spurred
greater diversity and the south often became the front of occupation. The northern landscape in
contrast was more inaccessible. Its steep terrain posed great difficulty for outside forces
attempting to impose their rule over it. This led to Roman expansion loosely breaching the
Pyrenees, and while Latinization spread through the peninsular interior, the north remained on
the periphery of Rome’s influential sphere (Stanton, 2002; Collins, 1983).
Historically, the mountainous range of the north gave Pyreneans much autonomy where
the Basque and Catalan developed in cultural isolation. The Basque are an ancient civilization of
Iberian indigenes and their ancestral language, Euskera, predates Indo-Europeanism and is the
oldest still functioning language in Europe (Kurlansky, 1999; Hooper, 1995). Euskera owes its
survival to the modicum of Romanization in the north where even Lusitania maintained its
indigenous language until the second century (Collins, 1983). For much of the duration of the
Roman Empire, the Basques were independent from Roman subjugation and also Spanish law
during Spain’s early development, instead ruling themselves through regional fueros
(Totoricaguena, 2004; Kurlansky, 1999). Seclusion also led to physiological distinctions, giving
the Basque a higher ratio of type O blood compared to other Spaniards or the French (Collins,
1983). While this historical detachment distinguishes Basque cultural identity, Catalonian culture
is less antiquated. Cataluña originated as a Frankish outpost during the ninth century to protect
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Charlemagne’s Empire from Moslems in the south (Lalaguna, 2001). Their culture developed
from a mixture of civilizations that inhabited the peninsula, and they speak a Romance language,
which identifies them more closely with other Spaniards (Hooper, 1995). Cataluña’s notable
differences, however, includes an indelibly Frankish rather than Moslem lineage deriving from a
terrain facilitative to spreading French influence (Collins, 1983).
During the Middle Ages, both Basque and Catalan kingdoms controlled the northern
regions of Iberia. The Basque Kingdom of Pamplona arose in 818 under Íñigo Íñiguez, which
developed out of sequential alliances defending against Visigoth and Moslem invaders, and later
became the Kingdom of Navarre around 1087, and lasting until in 1512 at which time war
divided the country (Totoricaguena, 2004; Kurlansky, 1999; Collins, 1983). The new SpanishFrench border bisected the Basque region with France annexing Basse Navarre, Labourd, and
Soule (Kurlansky, 1999). Cataluña also ascended from the ninth century, becoming sovereign
under Wilfred the Hairy, and uniting with Aragón in 1162 to form the Kingdom of Aragón
(Stanton, 2002; Collins, 1983). During its reign, the Catalan-Aragón Empire spread its influence
throughout the Mediterranean. Although once a formidable power, the Catalan-Aragón Empire
began to decline into the fifteenth century following the death of King Martin I in 1410, the last
heir to the Catalonian throne. This led to a succession of rulers of Castilian descent. Then in
1453, Aragón lost its naval supremacy to the Turks, who retook Constantinople, and in 1469, the
marriage between Ferdinand of Aragón to Isabella of Castile united these Kingdoms. Shortly
after the kingdoms united, the revolt of the remensas1 in 1475 irreparably ruined crops and is
attributed to the kingdom’s ultimate demise (Stanton, 2002; Trend, 1944).
The Roma, akin to the Basque, are a remarkably distinct civilization, having neither a farreaching history in Spain nor an historic homeland elsewhere. Traditionally, they lived as
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nomads who theoretically descended from the Rajputs, a people that fled northern India over a
millennium ago to escape Moslem invaders (Lewy, 2000; Lyovin, 1997). This theory is partly
based on their ancestral language, Romani, a form of Sanskrit, and similar to Sinhala, which is
spoken in Sri Lanka (Lewy, 2000; Katzner, 1995). As the migration of the Roma spread
throughout Eurasia, it rarely led to assimilation. In the fifteenth century, Germans believing them
to be Egyptian travelers gave them the name Gypsy (Lewy, 2000). Furthermore, the Roma
diaspora that spread across the continent gradually gained the reputation as thieves, savages, and
witches. This reputation led to their excommunication and expulsion throughout Europe and
influenced their mass migration into Spain during the fifteenth century (Kenrick, 1998; Quintana
& Floyd, 1972).Traveling though Cataluña, the Roma arrived in Barcelona in 1447. While many
continued traveling nomadically, others found refuge in colonies in Andalusia that were
established years earlier by Roma migrating through northern Africa (Quintana & Floyd, 1972).
Persecution followed the Roma as they settled into Spain. Almost as soon as they arrived,
and for centuries to follow, laws were established that targeted their culture. Spanish officials in
1499 banned nomadic lifestyles; in 1633 proclaimed that Roma was not an ethnicity; in 1695
prohibited the Roma from any vocations except farming; in 1746 restricted the Roma to living
within seventy-five cities; and in 1749, Spaniards enslaved the Roma. These persecutive
circumstances for the Roma did begin to improve in 1783, under Charles III who, wanting to
promote integration, made the Roma equal citizens (Kenrick, 1998). However, centuries of
discrimination had taken their toll and the Roma neither assimilated nor kept their historic
identity but instead were left with a limited and vanishing culture that overshadowed its early
identity. Several aspects of Roma tradition were forgotten, including their language, with most

1

The remensas were a French style of serfdom, which attached peasants to the land (Lalaguna, 2001).

39

today speaking Caló, which is also a form of Castilian utilizing fragments of Romani (Lewy,
2000; Kenrick, 1998).
Hispania fractured in the fifth century following the collapse of the Roman Empire and
remained apart until the eleventh century, when the Kingdom of Castile defeated Navarre and
began advancing as a dominant force. By the thirteenth century, Castile was independent, and by
the fifteenth century had reconstituted much of the region, which it developed from a defensive
standpoint (Stanton, 2002; Trend, 1944). Prior to this period, Iberia had become vulnerable to
unified powers, particularly along the French border, thus encouraging King Ferninand and
Queen Isabella to fortify their strength by emulating the stability and power that was the model
within France. This was done by creating a common identity by unifying Pyrenean and
Cantabrian Christians in the Inquisition that sought to Christianize Spain (Stanton, 2002; Trend,
1944). This effort led to the conquering of southern Moslem territories that were resettled by
Christians, runaway slaves, and Jewish and Moslem converts, overall helping to solidify Spain as
a Christian nation (Stanton, 2002; Trend, 1944). However, years of isolation contributed to a
pluralistic ethnic demography that could not be easily undone.
As Spain became a state, it embarked upon a tumultuous path. Despite forging statehood,
its population never adopted a standard identity. Regions held onto their distinct characteristics
that came to define their concept of nationalism. Particularly in the north, the enduring cultures
laid the foundation for ethnic and national stateless identities. These divisions complicated
efforts to homogenize Spanish identity and often led to violent conflicts over issues of identity,
regional autonomy, irredentism, and secessionism. These pluralistic ethnic identities became
especially prominent during the Industrial Revolution, which came to Spain through the Basque
Country (Kurlansky, 1999). This period introduced avant-garde concepts and rapid development
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that hastily altered conventional lifestyles. Traditional Basque industries, like wooden
shipbuilding, became obsolete, and while some adapted, many Spaniards were inundated as the
country fell into an engrossing partition amid bucolic Catholicism verses urbanization,
secularism, liberalism, and centralism; between traditional economies and capitalism; between
absolutism and democracy (Pérez-Agote, 2006). The Catalan and Basque reacted differently to
the changes occurring during this era. As industry grew in Cataluña, the bourgeoisie class was
more effective at tempering the population and maintaining control over it (Bowen, 1999).
Meanwhile, the polarization was ruinous in País Vasco where these positions bitterly divided
Basques and soon culminated as an aggressive movement advocating traditional values and
regional autonomy (Kurlansky, 1999).
The brewing tension ripened as revolution befell France, marking a turning point that
ushered in a new period of liberalism. The violent overthrow of the French monarchy
irreversibly transformed France into a republic, and within Spain worsened contentiousness and
uncertainty about which looming transformations awaited it. The fusion of Basse Navarre,
Labourd, and Soule in France further aggravated instability in the north where the seeds of
Basque nationalism were already being planted. These territories were joined to form Béarn in an
effort to homogenize French national identity. To make matters worse, Béarn was now forced to
pay taxes to the new central government, something that Basques, along with mandatory military
service, had been exempt from in Spain. This inflamed ideological tension among Spanish
Basques who feared an analogous conversion of their own territory, and to which Napoleon’s
invasion into Spain became the harbinger of inevitability (Kurlansky, 1999).
The Spanish mounted no resistance as Napoleon marched his army into Pamplona in
1808. Subsequently, King Charles IV abdicated to his son, Ferdinand VII who then relinquished
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his throne to Joseph Bonaparte, the brother of Napoleon. This heralded a new era within Spain.
Nearly without restraint, Bonaparte imposed policies meant to modernize Spanish society. The
new ruler suppressed religion and attempted to abolish the Inquisition. This swift compulsion
towards progressiveness ignited fuming traditionalists whose fears of change became reality.
Consequently, it was not the crown, but Navarrean Basque traditionalists, who took it upon
themselves to liberate Spain. With Navarre leading the charge, Spaniards rose in rebellion in
what became the Spanish War of Independence, 1808 to 1813 (Kurlansky, 1999). By war’s end,
the Spanish had expelled Napoleon’s forces and restored the monarchy. However, the
reconstituted orthodoxy proved temporary as reformists continued undeterred to liberalize Spain.
Ultimately, these divisions led to a series of civil wars. When King Ferdinand VII died in
1833, he left his throne to his three-year-old daughter, Isabella. However, conservatives wanted
to crown Ferdinand’s brother, Don Carlos, who stood for regionalism and monarchic absolutism.
Theses proponents were known as Carlists, whose staunch support for Carlos led to what became
the First Carlist War in 1833 (Bowen & Alvarez, 2007). This war pitched Catholic-ruraltraditionalism against urban-progressive-capitalism, and was fought primarily in the País Vasco
and Cataluña regions, which endured the bulk of the ensuing conflict (Pérez-Agote, 2006;
Kurlansky, 1999). The fighting stopped in 1839 when Carlists put down their arms in a surrender
lasting until 1846 (Kurlansky, 1999). Then, fighting resumed during the Guerra de los
Madrugadores, “War of the Early Risers,” which began in Cataluña and spread to Galicia where
it ended in 1849 when Carlists conceded and received amnesty (Bowen, 2007). While conflict
tore through Spain, liberal reformation swept the nation. During the second year of the First
Carlist War, Queen Isabella II officially abolished the Inquisition; and in 1869, Spain legitimated
secular marriage and religious freedom. Also in the interim, industrialization swept through the
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mineral rich Basque region, alarming and angering Carlist anticapitalists. Subsequently, the
Spanish Revolution in 1868, and violent elections in 1872, contributed to political instability and
yet another Carlist uprising (Bowen & Alvarez, 2007; Nation Master Encyclopedia, 2005;
Kurlansky, 1999). Thus began the second Carlist War that lasted until 1876, when once more
Carlism was defeated and dealt another blow with the abolishment of foral law that same year, as
fueros had been a requisite of Carlist doctrine (Bowen & Alvarez, 2007; Kurlansky, 1999).
These wars divided Spaniards along class lines but in so doing, embedded new concepts
of regionalist national identity. Carlists built their following by stressing regional distinctions
that transformed traditionalism into ethnic nationalism. In País Vasco, Carlists idealized a
Basque golden age and promised a return to it (Garmendia, 1985). While less effective in
Cataluña where fueros were never fully established, this nationalist propaganda spawned a new
Basque movement, grounded in ethic identity and led by Sabino Arana y Goiri (Bowen &
Alvarez, 2007; Muro, 2005). Arana y Goiri came from a Carlist family made wealthy through
shipbuilding, which had played a prominent role during the Carlist Wars (Kurlansky, 1999).
However, the end of the Second Carlist War had rendered Carlism dead except for in the Basque
region. This stalwartness was interpreted by Arana y Goiri as a distinguishing characteristic of a
people inherently non-Spanish, which led to his advocation for Basque independence and
founding of the Partido Nacionalisto del Vasco (PNV), the “Basque Nationalist Party,” in 1895
(Lecours, 2007). Soon thereafter, Spain lost the Spanish-American War, leading to a heightened
a sense of Basque and Catalan secessionism, which inspired a 1900 law, proclaiming separatism
a crime against the state, and another in 1906, placing secessionism under military jurisdiction.
Although regional nationalism continued its rise, the status quo ante bellum to follow allowed
Spain to democratize for the first time in 1931 (Bowen & Alvarez, 2007; Kurlansky, 1999).
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Civil war again erupted in 1936, led by Generals Mola, Sanjurjo, and Franco against the
nascent Republic of Spain (Clark, 1984). However, one of the significant factors that set this war
apart from the previous wars was the ideological reversal of Basque nationalists. Previously, the
republic had granted regional autonomy to the Basque and Catalan territories, which the
rebellion sought to abolish while advocating Castilian nationalism. By this point, however, the
spirit of País Vasco had altered nationalistic perception. Many Basques now considered
themselves a separate people, and consequently, when war once more pitted liberal-capitalists
against traditionalists, Vizcayan and Guipuzcoan nationalists, favoring self-rule and believing
that an independent Basque state could benefit from their bourgeoisie industrial class, sided with
the republic (Pérez-Agote, 2006).
The decision to side with the republic had a disastrous cost. In 1937, the conservatives
overthrew the state and General Francisco Franco became dictator over Spain. The newly
instilled regime executed two-thirds of its nearly 300,000 prisoners of war, along with 200,000
civilians between 1939 and 1950 (MacDonald, 1987). Upwards of 30,000 children from leftist
families were taken from their parents and permanently placed in state custody (Expatica, 2009).
Thousands of Spaniards also fled into exile, and during Word War II, the Nazis rounded up
nearly 30,000 of those refugees in France, with a majority dying interned in concentration camps
during the war. The era to follow continued to nourish repression with the empowerment of
fascism creating a movement to homogenize Castilian identity (MacDonald, 1987). It began its
reign by banning all non-Castilian culture, which it labeled unchristian. This prohibited regional
languages and cultural symbols like the lauburu2 and Ikurriña. 3 Moreover, registering babies
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without French or Spanish names was forbidden while all existing non-Castilian names had to be
translated into Castellano (Kurlansky, 1999; Clark, 1979).
After the civil war, the regime continued to punish republican loyalty, with the Provinces
of Cataluña, Guipuzcoa, and Vizcaya receiving extraordinary maltreatment for their resistance
during the war. An estimated 21,780 Basque political prisoners received death sentences, while
nearly 150,000 Basque men, women, and children went into exile (Totoricaguena, 2004;
Kurlansky, 1999; Clark, 1984). These regions lost all autonomy and additionally became the
financiers for their own repression, because most of Spain’s wealth had been concentrated in the
north. Vizcaya since 1876, as an example, was 3.5 percent of Spain’s population but produced 15
percent of its energy, one-third of its shipyards, and two-thirds of its steel (Kurlansky, 1999;
Clark, 1984). The northern industrialization remained the backbone of infrastructure, and by
1960, this region had the highest per capita incomes within Spain (Hooper, 1995; Payne, 1985).
However, labor unions were illegal and the local population was forced to compete with
migrants willing to work for lower wages. This caused a large number of foreign workers to
migrate to the north and approximately 20,000 migrated to the Basque region yearly. From 1960
to 1975, the Basque provincial population increased by 45 percent and during the 1970s only 60
percent of the population remained indigenous (Reinares & Jaime-Jeménez, 2000; Kurlansky,
1999; Clark, 1984). This growth was even more dramatic in Cataluña, which absorbed close to
one million migrants during the 1960s alone (Hooper, 1995).
The Cold War also contributed toward repression in Spain. For a short period during and
shortly after the Second World War, the United States provided support for the PNV and other
political exiles while opposing Franco, who was a noncombative ally with Hitler and Mussolini
during the war. Although Spain never officially entered the conflict, both Germany and Italy had
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given aid to the rebellion in Spain during its civil war. The Luftwaffe even carried out air raids
against republican strongholds. However, the post World War II era reshaped policy, and by
1951, US strategy against the Soviet Union altered their relationship with Spain. The US saw an
advantage in establishing a military base on Spanish soil and as a result began financing the
dictatorship of Franco while rescinding support for its exiles (Kurlansky, 1999; Clark, 1984).
During that same year, the Spanish regime clamped down on labor unions in a harsh response
against a labor strike in the Basque region that put an end to all underground unions (Clark,
1984). These experiences contributed to a gradual shift of perception for many repressed
Spaniards who came to view their country as heading down an irreversible course. As the change
in US policy caused hope to fade regarding outside intervention, aggression by the state unsubtly
vanquished optimism for unfettering its tyrannical chains. Those in opposition were now forced
to look inward and rethink their strategy of resistance.
As Francoism stigmatized non-Castilians, Basque movements began focusing on cultural
preservation. In 1945, the PNV established the Euzko Gaztedi del Interior (EGI), the “Basque
Revolutionary Youth,” for clandestinely distributing its propaganda in northern Spain (Zulaika,
1985; Clark, 1984). Then in 1947, students formed the Euzko Ikasle Alkartuna (EIA), the
“Society of Basque Students.” Although headquartered in the Netherlands, EIA promoted
Euskera and Basque culture inside Spain, but in 1950 Spanish authorities arrested, imprisoned,
or expelled its leadership (Clark, 1984). Other associations appeared such as Gaztedi, the “Farm
Youth,” created in the 1950s by Don Jose Maria, a Basque priest from Itziar, Guipuzcoa, for
promoting religious and social ambitions although less rebellious than EGI and EIA (Zulaika,
1985). Each of these movements demonstrated little success at impeding the systematic attempt
to homogenize Castilian identity. The goals of these movements began to shift in 1952 when four
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university students in Bilbao, Jose Manuel Aguirre, Jose Maria Benito Del Valle, Julen
Madariage, and Jose Luis Alvarez Enparanza, a former member of EIA, founded Ekin, “To Do.”
Initially, Ekin worked with EGI and the PNV but were critical of the PNV’s soft-line approach
and perceivably racial subordination to the Spanish and eventually ousted by the PNV for their
radical views. Ekin and dissenting members of EGI went on to revive the teachings of Sabino
Arana y Goiri. Rejecting autonomy and passive resistance, they advocated the creation of a
Euskera speaking independent Basque state of Euskadi, and in 1959 formed Euskadi ta
Askatazuna (ETA), “Basque Homeland and Freedom,” to achieve this goal (Clark, 1984).
As ETA gained traction, so did secessionism within Cataluña. During the 1960s, Catalan
separatists established the Front Nacional Català (FNC), “Catalan National Front.” Although the
FNC began as a liberation movement, Marxism captured its focus by the end of the decade and
in 1969, it factionalized (Birnir, 2007). That same year a breakaway element established the
Partit Socialista d’Alliberament Nacional (PSAN), the “Socialist Party of National Liberation.”
PSAN organized around the principles of separatist militancy that then radiated into two
additional movements: Partit Socialista d’Alliberament Nacional-provisional (PSAN-p), the
“Socialist Party of National Liberation Provisional,” and the Front d'Alliberament Català (FAC),
the “Catalan Liberation Front.” These latter organizations also championed violent resistance for
pursuing national independence and before long were followed by two additional ENS
organizations. The third organization began to surface in 1978 and in 1980 became Terra Lliure
(TL), “Free Land,” and the fourth began around 1987 known as Exèrcit Roja d'Alliberament
Català (CRLA), the “Catalan Red Liberation Army” (Birnir, 2007).
Each movement professed aspiration for violent resistance and national liberation, though
their actions exemplified disparity, with only the Basque demonstrating an immovable resolve.
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ETA began with an action-repression strategy based on the theory of provocation. The objective
was to invoke retaliation against País Vasco in an effort to ignite revolution (Clark, 1984). Their
first attack was in 1961, attempting to derail a train transporting the backers of Franco. While
failing in its goal of derailing the train, this action brought significant notoriety to the group
followed by increased violence. Since that incident, ETA has claimed over eight-hundred lives,
including those of Prime Minister Carrero Blanco, Police Commissioner Meliton Manzanas, and
Supreme Court magistrate Jose Querol (BBC, 2006; Kurlansky, 1999; Clark, 1984). The
proliferation of Basque terrorism did not correlate with the burgeoning in Cataluña of less
aggressive and unsustainable movements. PSAN-p went largely unnoticed while FAC committed
over a hundred nonfatal acts between 1969 and 1971 and claimed responsibility for two deaths in
1979 (Birnir, 2007; Schmid et al, 2005; Bowen & Petersen, 1999; Hooper, 1995). CRLA claimed
responsibility for a bombing in 1987 that killed a Guardia Civil officer and injured others
(Schmid et al, 2005). TL was the most violent, carrying out bombings and abductions during the
1980s but never developed a durable campaign, and ended operations in the early 1990s (Birnir,
2007; Bowen & Peterson, 1999). ETA, however, persisted despite the arrest, torture, and
expulsion of nearly two-hundred members following its first attack and fractionalization
throughout its first decade. Moreover, ETA survived a massive assault as retaliation for the
assassination of Manzanas that led to more than six-hundred arrests in 1968, and almost twothousand in 1969. At this time, José María Ezkubi was the only leader left in Spain that avoided
arrest and eventually escaped to France (Clark, 1984). During this time of massive retaliation,
and during additional attempts, ETA continued to reorganize, and has successfully defied all
attempts to destroy it.
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In an era that gave birth to violent nationalism and separatism in Spain, the Roma share
no similarity in their reaction. Their case contrasts sharply against the paths of Basque and
Catalan nationalists. Despite their comparable cultural disparity, no effort arose among the
Spanish Roma to establish national independence. Instead, they avoided organized oppositional
aggression. Even towards the end of the twentieth century as they became the most discriminated
against group in Spain, the Roma neither protested with violence nor created any known militant
organization (Minorities at Risk, 2004; Cowans, 2003).
Applying the Theories
The theoretical literature on nationalism and terrorism assists in developing an analytical
framework for interpreting the Spanish case. Concerning theories of nationalism, this case does
not offer insight into whether nationalist-based aggression is genealogical but does suggest that
the traits associated with nationalist movements existed before the Industrial Revolution. Basque
identity, for example, has always been defined by culture. Even the Euskera word for Basque,
Euskal, means speaker of Euskera, which defines Basque identity in the context of cultural
symbolization. Moreover, as the kingdoms in Iberia developed around their own distinct cultural
identities, the peninsula shared a common Latin heritage that contributed to consolidating Spain
as a state and a Christian nation. This common Catholic identity influenced aggression against
both the Moslems and the Roma for centuries, and guided Spain into its modernity, while events
linked to the Industrial Revolution merely shifted perceptions of national identity. This case
illustrates a far-reaching history of nationalism in Spain that strengthens primordialism. This
case also supports the shared assumptions of primordialism, modernism, and ethnosymbolism
that describe the roles of cultural identity, symbolic attachments, and the plasticity of perception
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in nationalist movements. In addition, it provides answers for why Basque terrorism proved far
more violent and durable than did the Catalonian movements.
The Basque and Catalan share a similar history. These populations developed culturally
isolated by a mountainous terrain where their kingdoms maintained control though much of the
Middle Ages, hosted the bulk of development during the Industrial Revolution, and continued
consolidating growth in the subsequent era. Following the late civil war, these regions became
targets of abuse for remaining loyal to the republic during the war. This led to an increased desire
among Basque and Catalonian populations to secede from Spain. This period launched a phase
of radicalization that initially began with nonviolent political dissidence for preserving cultural
identity, which Madrid harshly curated by responding to these movements with arrests frequently
correlating with torture. For nearly a decade following the formation of EIA and FNC, both
Basque and Catalonian nationalists experienced severe hostility from the state. During this
period, motivations and strategies for coping with the repression began to shift the members of
oppositionist movements into new directions. In País Vasco and Cataluña, Marxism and ethnic
nationalism competed against conservatism and often against each other. Because fascism was
their foremost ideological rival, movements initially developed with a combination of Marxistnationalist ideology. However, ideological competition was a destabilizing force and consistently
led to factionalism and the reestablishment of organizations with greater intensity and narrower
focus. Many new organizations developed and espoused increased militant ferocity, which also
radiated into additional movements. This splitting predominately grew out of disputes within the
organizations over strategic violence and their central philosophy. Meanwhile, the cultural
differences between the Basque and Catalonian populations affected their ultimate methods of
opposition.
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Despite many linking the rise of Basque nationalism in Spain to the changes during the
Industrial Revolution and Carlist Wars, symbols of Basque ethnicity have passed down through
countless generations. Throughout Iberian history, symbols of Basque identity have influenced
perceptions of cultural exclusion and the desire for regional autonomy. Meanwhile, the changes
during the industrial age threatened those historic Basque symbols and led to a heightened sense
of cultural sensitivity within traditional Basque society. Basque traditionalists became fearful of
the potential changes to their traditional way of life, and they exhibited this insecurity as
aggression expressed as nationalist sentiment. During this period, Pérez-Agote (2006) writes
how a series of conflicts came to define the Basques. Shabad and Llera Ramo (1995) write that
for generations, “numerous segments of Basque society perceived threats to their collective
identity coming from both Madrid and from new groups within the Basque Country itself” (p.
418). Early on, liberal and conservative ideologies were defining and dividing the Basques, such
as during the War of Convention, 1793-1795, when Basque liberals led a secessionist movement
in Guipuzcoa (Pérez-Agote, 2006). However, even amid this ideological divide, the desire for
regional autonomy was a foundation of Basque nationalism. Both Carlist and fascist doctrine
promoted traditionalism, although Basque nationalists consistently fought against centralism.
During the Carlist Wars, Basque nationalists supported Don Carlos, who promoted the
continuation of traditional society and regional autonomy, while they sided with the progressives
during the latter civil war because of the progressive’s support for decentralization. Each time,
regional autonomy was the decisive issue, illustrating how ethnicity dominated Basque identity
and ultimately trumped any shared economic, political, or religious philosophy.
In the period following Franco’s rise to power, avenues for addressing cultural grievances
were lost although nationalism remained a strong part of Basque cultural identity. Subsequently,
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Shabad and Llera Ramo (1995) describe an era where Basques emerged into an atmosphere of
symbolic and physical hostility and oppression. During this period, identifying as Basque was
considered traitorous and criminal, and therefore having Basque ancestral roots added additional
hardships while Spain was already becoming developmentally stagnant and falling economically
behind much of the rest of Europe. To add to this burden, País Vasco suffered disproportionate
economic stress. The economic conditions were reducing the living standards for laborers within
the region while the taxes on Basque industry financed the repression against them. Education in
País Vasco was also being repressed. For example, provincial colleges could only offer scientific
degrees to ensure its industrial base but prevent political enlightenment (Kurlansky, 1999). The
regime made itself irreproachable to these hardships affecting País Vasco by preventing the use
of conventional methods for redressing issues. The regime banned all labor unions and political
parties, which reduced Basque nationalism to a disjoined and illegitimate struggle for preserving
territory and culture (Shabad & Llera Ramo, 1995). This also left a political void that Ekin, and
later ETA, would fill and gain popular support initially by providing an outlet for addressing
cultural and political bereavement.
The adoption of terrorism by ETA appears to have been based on its potential to affect
the relationship between Spain’s central government and Basque society. There is little doubt
whether the founders of ETA were aware of nonviolent alternatives for pursuing their goals, but
instead they chose to use terrorism hoping to create a revolution in País Vasco. These individuals
had each previously belonged to a nonviolent oppositionist movement, and at some point
interacted with the PNV. Their experience working with the PNV meant that many had taken
part in nonviolent political opposition. Ekin, however, wanted to act more forcefully to promote
controversial goals that the PNV considered too extreme, and they eventually divested ties over
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these issues. Furthermore, their decision to use terrorism was not based on a perceived necessity
for individual survival, as many of the original members of ETA were college students coming
from middle-class families. Had they not adopted terrorism and continued with their education,
the founders of ETA would have had the potential to live with a standard of living relative to that
of other middle-class Spaniards. Instead, ETA’s decision to adopt terrorism grew out of a
heightened sense of Basque nationalism, which may have been based on a perceived urgency for
protecting Basque cultural identity. The underground promotion of Basque cultural heritage and
imposition of Castilian assimilation may have reinforced a cultural hypersensitivity that led to
perceptions of cultural victimization and contributed to radicalizing the struggle for preserving it.
In Spain, Basque terrorism thrived from an ability to spread nationalism while Catalonian
movements failed largely over an inability to do so. Hooper (1995) writes how Cataluña in the
1960s could not integrate immigrant populations, and therefore lacked national unity. ETA, on
the contrary, was ethnically inclusive. They redefined Basque identity, and grew largely as a
labor movement. Before ETA emerged as the defining symbol of Basque nationalism, Basque
ethnicity was ancestrally based. In the late-nineteenth century, Sabino Arana y Goiri wrote that
to be Basque, all four grandparents must have been born in the Basque Country, having Basque
surnames. ETA broadened this definition to include anyone who spoke Euskera or lived within
the region (Kurlansky, 1999; Collins, 1987; Clark, 1984). Moreover, ETA espoused Marxism,
and drew broad support from the labor class (Clark, 1984). Adopting Marxism was a common
practice of nationalist-separatist movements during this period, and according to Laqueur (1999),
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the IRA, and ETA all used leftist
rhetoric at a time when liberation movements correlated with concepts of communist revolution.
However, Laqueur (1999) considers ETA exceptionally gifted at developing itself in between
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extreme nationalism and classism. Reinares and Jaime-Jeménez (2000) attribute ETA’s success
in joining class struggle and nationalism to the unsteady economic conditions in País Vasco that
made leftist ideology popular for integrating new classes and gaining broad support, such that by
the 1970s, nearly sixty percent of ETA was of non-Basque heritage (Clark, 1984).
The different reactions of the Catalan and Roma to the repression under Francoism may
also be because these populations lack several of the elements contributing to ENS terrorism.
The historical context of Spain shows how Basque identity interacted with experiences during
the Industrial Revolution, civil wars, and Franco era, influencing a totality of circumstances that
gradually disintegrated the social fabric of Basque society (Shabad & Llera Ramo, 1995).
Distinct Basque cultural symbols and identity continuously reinforced one another and led to
strong symbolic attachments and an intense need for preserving them. Euskera and ancestral
territory are two such archaic symbols that play a fundamental role in Basque nationalism, which
advocates Euskera proliferation, secession from Spain and France, and irredenta of the historic
Basque homeland. Conversely, Catalonian ethnicity is less discriminating and shares significant
French and Spanish cultural roots, which Hooper (1995) and Stanton (2002) stress reduces
secessionist sentiment, and, together with demographic shifts during the mid-twentieth century
that racially diluted its population, kept Catalonian nationalism out of the mainstream. In the case
of the Roma, conditions propagating nationalism are nonexistent. Alexander and Myer (1982)
argue that territorial roots are an essential part of nationalist movements, and while remaining
among the most discriminated against populations in Spain, the Roma diaspora are largely
detached from one another and lack a territorial claim. These factors are considered vital
antecedents for organizing separatist movements, because they center on the nostalgic drive to
restore or preserve perceived cultural identity. As a result, Roma passivity derives from its lack
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of what many consider essential for nationalist movements, a basis for demanding territorial
autonomy, and because these movements are a prerequisite for ENS terrorism, it is unlikely that
any area will ever manifest a Roma ENS terrorist campaign.
This research indicates that ENS terrorism stems from group dynamics and a shared
perception of events. These organizations, like all activist organizations, integrate like-minded
individuals who often share similar heritabilities that place them within a greater historical
struggle. ENS organizations share a perceived history of colonial subjugation in which the drive
for resistance derives from sensitivity over a putative privation imposed upon them by the
illegitimate occupiers of the disputed territory. This brand of rhetoric grows movements for
generations, as the philosophy of us-versus-them imbues the society’s ideological framework.
Subsequently, nationalist rhetoric shapes generations until changes in structural mechanisms
trigger reactions among the affected populace. Abrupt sociological changes lead to increased
oppositionist sentiment by offsetting previous equilibriums that kept bereaved sectors from
demanding substantial change. When this ideology has mainstream support, it is more likely to
be influential thus burgeoning opposition. Freedom to assemble also assists group formation,
while circumstances determine the means of resistance. When changes are not possible through
legitimate channels, oppositionist movements tend to intensify as members tire from seemingly
ineffective tactics for stimulating change, while the leap to terrorism occurs when organizations
assume it will manifest quicker results and be the ideal method for their struggle.
This leads to the conclusion that conditions catalyzing the transitions to ENS terrorism
involve a distinct national identity, territorial claims, distinct cultural markers, degrees of social
agility, tumultuous social conditions, a desire to produce immediate change, an inability to
influence changes peacefully, access to knowledge about revolution and clandestinity, and access
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to resources. Nationalism is the core ideology of ENS terrorism. This involves a culture teaching
its members to invest in and defend symbolic attachments of their national identity. An historic
homeland is one such marker and a seemingly essential part of demanding territorial sovereignty.
Other cultural markers are essential in delineating the minority and mainstream populations that
show unambiguous differences to justify secession. The adoption of terrorism for achieving this
goal seems to follow unsteady social, political, and economic conditions that contribute to social
unrest and discontentment. At least in Spain, political conditions appeared to have allowed
enough freedom for individuals to congregate but were insufficient for those individuals to affect
change through legitimate political channels, which influenced their decision to circumnavigate
direct channels by using violence. Cumulatively, this led to the development of several tactics
that gradually became more violent, while the affluence in País Vasco helped to fund the
continuation of mounting tactics against the state. In all, these variables appear to play a
fundamental role in the conversion from nationalist movement to ENS terrorist campaign. The
next step is to operationalize these findings and measure the relationship that they share with the
formation of ENS terrorist organizations throughout the world.
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Table I
Summary of Expectations
Variable

∆

Distinct
Culture

→

Distinct
Culture

←

Weakens: Cultural
identity less relevant

Hostile
Conditions

→

Strengthens:
Violence targeting
ethny

Hostile
Conditions

←

Political
Freedom

→

Political
Freedom

←

Alternatives to
Violence

→

Alternatives to
Violence

←

Social Unrest

→

Social Unrest

←

Economic
Resources

→

Economic
Resources

←

Access to
Education

→

Nationalist Theory
Strengthens: Threats
against cultural
symbols & identity

←

Psychological Theory
Strengthens: Violence
integrated into cultural
identity

Strengthens: Strategy to
gain notoriety amid
hostile conditions

Strengthens:
Psychologically
conditioned for violence
Weakens: Less likely
diminishing inhibitions
against using violence
Strengthens: Detached
from reality & rejection
of social norms
Strengthens: Repressive
conditions having a
psychological effect
Strengthens: Having
alternative methods for
pursing interests

Freedom of assembly &
strengthens if ethny is
politically repressed
Strengthens: Ethny
politically repressed

Strengthens: A lack of
alternatives to violence

Strengthens: Ethnic
identity is
vulnerable

Strengthens: Lacking
alternative methods for
pursuing interests
Strengthens: Terrorism
used to maximize results
Strengthens: Terrorism
less likely used to
maximize results

Strengthens: Ethny
economically
repressed

Strengthens: Ethny
educationally
repressed
Increasing units →; decreasing units ←
Access to
Education

Strategic Logic

Strengthens: Able to
fund the buildup of
tactical resistance
Strengthens: Terrorism
determined by available
resources
Strengthens: Greater
access to information for
clandestinity & rebellion
Strengthens: Repressive
conditions tactically
influencing rebellion
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Strengthens: Repressive
conditions having a
psychological effect
Strengthens: Social
expectations leading to
psychological damage
Strengthens: Repressive
conditions having a
psychological effect

Chapter III
Statistical Model: Method and Variables
This chapter uses a logit regression model to assess nationalist, strategic, and psychological
theory in relation to the development of ENS terrorist campaigns by using the following formula:

1*x12*x2 3*x3 4*x4 5*x5 6*x6 7*x7 8*x8

e

The first chapter reviewed three paradigms for studying nationalism: primordialism, modernism,
and ethnosymbolism, and two theories for terrorism: strategic logic and psychological theory.
This study draws on the shared assumptions of the nationalist models that emphasize the role of
collective identity, cultural symbolization, and plasticity of perception in nationalist movements,
and highlights both shared and competing concepts between strategic and psychological theory.
The second chapter discussed the case of terrorism in Spain from an historical context while
applying the nationalist and terrorist theories as an analytical framework for identifying elements
contributing to Basque and Catalan terrorism and cases of ENS terrorism elsewhere. From this
case, the relevant factors appear to be an enduring and distinct ethno/national identity, threats
against cultural symbols, volatile and hostile conditions, freedom to assemble, a desire to affect
change without a legitimate method to pursue it, and access to information and financial sources.
Chapter 3 operationalizes these findings to perform a measurement of the background
conditions that may play a fundamental role in the origins of ENS terrorism. The cases observe
two-hundred ninety-seven minority populations in one-hundred twenty-six states,4 and span
primarily from 1945 to 2003, with the exception of Ireland, which was observed from 1946 to
2003 and also in 1922. 5 The independent variables assess cultural sensitivity, exposure to
4
5

This paper treats the Soviet Union as a country
Some modifications occurred in MAR to adjust incorrect data due to interpolation and inaccurate data filing.
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violence, political freedom, political transitions, economic conditions, representation/alternative
options, educational stagnation, and developed educational systems. The data combines statistics
from Minorities at Risk (MAR) 6 World Bank (WB), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Polity
IV, Global Terrorism Database (GTD), International Labor Organization (ILO), and United
Nations (UN) along with several other sources to fill in missing data points.
This model evaluates nationalist theory by combining indicators for cultural differentials,
group concentration, separatist beliefs, and ancestral territory. The nationalist approach argues
that the presence of these indicators contributes to nationalist based aggression, which should
also correlate with the formation of ENS terrorist organizations. The remaining variables are
used to evaluate strategic logic and psychological theory. Strategic logic considers the initiation
of terrorism to be a logistical decision influenced by financial and political restrictions, and
transient conditions that open moments of opportunity. If the strategic model is accurate, ENS
terrorist campaigns should develop in correlation with moderate levels of political freedom,
underrepresentation, a lack of tactical alternatives, periods of instability, economic conditions
limiting the scope of rebellion, and an educated population. Whereas these variables potentially
influence a strategic response, the psychological model considers terrorism an irrational and
emotional response driven by internal mechanisms shaped by traumatic experiences throughout
life. From this view, structural conditions affect the decision to initiate terrorism when those
conditions are psychologically damaging. If accurate, campaigns should develop in correlation
with educational stagnation, an exposure to violence, and social instability relating to repressive
and antagonistic conditions. These results should assist in determining whether it is possible to
link nationalist theory to ENS terrorism and whether these campaigns develop in response to
strategic or psychological forces.
6

See Appendix C for populations and countries
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The data on minority populations comes from MAR, which it classifies as ethno/national,
indigenous, ethno/class, communal contender, religious sect, or national minority, and does not
use multiple classifications for the same group within a state. This definition of ethno/national
excludes such populations as the Catalan in Spain, indigenous populations in multiple countries,
and Russians within post-Soviet states. However, examples of ENS terrorism emerging from
among each of these populations illustrates that violent ENS movements are able to transcend
these various classifications. Therefore, this study uses all but those labeled as a religious sect,
due to the drastic differences thought to exist between ENS and religious based terrorism.
This study excludes using populations labeled as a religious sect because some may lack
the archaic ethnic traits that distinguish them from mainstream populations. As Hoffman (1998;
1995) explains, religiously motivated terrorists are nonpolitical, monolithic, indiscriminately
violent, and exist only to harm those not belonging to a narrow interpretation of their faith, while
ENS terrorist campaigns tend to embrace both political and nationalist ideologies, gain broad
support through cultural associations, are revolutionary with post-struggle aims, and use violence
more discriminately. Though religion is one of several elements of cultural identity, the variance
between these forms of terrorism implies disparate antecedent conditions. The societies united
primarily by religion may lack other cultural denominators that provide a basis for ENS and
therefore be peripheral to this subject, although this study does not discount the role of religion
in ENS terrorism entirely. This study neither excludes all for whom religion provides a common
identity nor does it ignore the impact that religion might have on them. ENS terrorist campaigns
often develop in populations that share a common religion, and this dataset incorporates several
religious groups not coded as a religious sect, including Jews in several countries, Catholics in
Ireland, Maronite Christians in Lebanon, Chechens in Russia, and Muslims in France, who as
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collectives share multiple communal traits leading to a non-religious ethno-political status. The
excluded populations include Shiite and Sunni Muslims, who, coded as a religious sect, may lack
several distinguishing components of national identity.
The dependent variable is a dichotomous measurement for the formation of ENS terrorist
organizations, 7 primarily from GTD. Because this study focuses on the period that organizations
establish themselves as terrorist networks, terrorist organizations that began as a nonviolent or
non-terrorist movement are indicated in the year that they initiated their first attack, marking the
transition from nationalist to terrorist organization. Meanwhile, organizations that developed in
order to commit terrorism are indicated during the year that the group began. The organizations
fitting this profile use terrorism to achieve national liberation, which does not include autonomy,
a status where the parent state maintains its legal authority over the region. Secessionism, in
contrast, involves gaining absolute sovereignty, an action that is potentially more consequential.
In addition, while this study focuses on separatist movements, the lack of information on several
organizations often impedes discerning between goals of liberation and separation. Although
strictly speaking, separatism defines the emancipation of geographically connected territories,
literature on this subject frequently references separation, liberation, and anti-colonialism as the
same. Such movements view themselves in a struggle against territorial privation and illegal
occupation, fighting to separate from dominant powers and gain national sovereignty regardless
of the geographic proximity to the central base of opposition. Therefore, by defining separatism
broadly it becomes analogous to national liberation and the parameter for this study.
The first variable assesses the general concepts of nationalist theory that consider national
identity influenced by heritage, communal behavior, symbolisms, and the manipulation of those
symbols while viewing condensed minority populations as particularly reactive against perceived
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cultural threats. Smith (1991) describes these populations as sharing distinct ethnic ties and
placing stronger value in cultural symbols and therefore more sensitive to perceived threats
against those symbols. Cultural sensitivity is measured using a categorical variable that averages
MAR’s indices for separatist ideology sepx, cultural differences culdfxx, group concentration
groupcon, and historic homeland gc8. The separatist index (0-3) assesses whether secessionism
had an historic role in group dynamics or exists latently, played an active role in movements
between the 1940s and 1980s, or has a recent or active role in group-consciousness. The cultural
index (0-4) measures the disparity between minority and mainstream populations based on
ethnicity and nationality, language, historical origin, religion, social customs, and residence. The
categories range from no differences, to minor, significant, major, and acute differentials. For
example, in 1999, Basques in Spain had substantial cultural differentials because their
nationality, language, and historical origin are substantially different from the mainstream
population of Spain. The index for group concentration (0-3) categorizes the geographic
dispersion of populations ranging from wide dispersion, such as the Roma, to mostly urbanized
or marginally concentrated; a majority living within close proximity; and all concentrated to a
single region. Lastly, the variable for historic homeland (0-4) indicates the existence of ancestral
lands and the extent of which a group still inhabits that territory. The coding for ancestral lands is
reordered to indicate respectively: the absence of ancestral lands; ancestral lands within another
state; ancestral lands not exceeding the group’s provincial base; ancestral lands exceeding the
group’s provincial base but not state; or ancestral lands exceeding both the group’s provincial
base and the state.
The cultural variable attempts to encapsulate internal and external influences on cultural
identity to assess whether nationalism is a response to threats against enduring cultural symbols.
7

See Appendix B for descriptions of terrorist organizations included in the dependent variable.
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Smith (1991) argues that concentrated and unique populations tend to be more sensitive to and
react more strongly against such threats. A common symbol, territory, is a central theme of
liberation movements and when historically attached to a people, territory becomes a potent
component of identity. Because Smith (1991) argues that nationalist based aggression derives
from threats against cultural symbols, the existence and degree of control that a population is
able to exercise over its historic homeland represents a cultural symbol and measures the threat
against it. The expectation is that waning control over a fatherland jeopardizes the preservation
of national identity, in which case a minority group living only within a fraction of its historic
homeland should prove most volatile. Separatist ideology, cultural disparity, and geographic
clustering are each considered contributory to cultural sensitivity and therefore their presence is
expected to further the potential for volatility. For these reasons, high scores should indicate
elevated cultural sensitivity and correlate strongly with the formation of ENS terrorist
organizations. One of the drawbacks in using this variable however is that is does not provide a
determinant between primordialism and modernism. It incorporates presumed factors that
contribute to nationalist based aggression without assessing heritability for cases only occurring
in the postindustrial era.
The second variable assesses psychological theory by measuring the relationship between
violence and the formation of ENS terrorist organizations. Psychological theory argues that
personality traits, anti-socialization, and violent experiences lead to terrorism. The expectation is
that frequent aggression will lower inhibitions against using violence, leading to a radicalization
process wherefore individuals in hostile regions are more willing to commit violence, thus
increasing the probability that terrorist organizations will emerge. To assess this argument, this
study measures the influence that an exposure to violence has on the development of terrorist
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campaigns by combining each of the aggression indices in MAR. The rebellion indices,
"Quinquennial Rebellion Scores, 1945-1999,” rebel (0-8), and “Annual Rebellion Scores, 19852000,” reb (0-8), record the most severe levels of violence occurring between minority groups
and the central regime. And, the intercommunal indices, “Decennial Indicators of IntraCommunal Conflict, 1940s to 1990s,” comcon (0-6), and “Annual Indices of Intercommunal
Conflict, 1990-2000,” comco (0-6), record the most severe levels of violence between minority
groups and other antagonistic groups. This model utilizes the highest score from among each of
these variables, lagged to avoid endogeneity, and indicating respectively: no conflict; individual
nonfatal intergroup attacks or political banditry against the state; intergroup political agitation or
terrorist campaigns directed against the state; periodic factional violence or local rebellions;
large-scale anti-group protests or small-scale insurgency against the state; rioting and intergroup
attacks or intermediate insurgency; prolonged communal warfare or extensive insurgency; and
civil war. Consequently, high scores indicate severe levels of violence, and a positive statistically
significant relationship between this variable and the formation of ENS terrorist organizations
would support Post’s (1990) argument that an exposure to violence contributes to a radicalization
process that then leads to terrorism.
The third variable assesses strategic logic by measuring the association between levels of
democracy and the formation of ENS terrorist organizations. Democratic freedom is measured
using Polity2 (-10-10); the data is constructed with Eugene (3.203), and assesses a state’s
democratic freedom on a range from absolute autocracy to absolute democracy. Although
strategic logic describes terrorism being used when no viable substitute exists, the literature on
this subject frequently correlates terrorism with democracy attributed to social agility and less
severe prosecution (Laqueur, 1999; Abadie, 2006; Feldmann & Perälä, 2004; Reinares & Jaime-
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Jeménez, 2000; Fox, 2003; Fleming, 1982). However, endurance is one of the defining
characteristics of ENS terrorism, and the forces influencing the continuation of violence
potentially diverge from those motivating the initial reasons for developing an organization.
ETA, for example, began under a fascist system with moderate freedom but survived over 50
years, becoming most violent during and after Spain’s democratization. The implication is that
repression encouraged dissident Basques to organize covertly while liberalism emboldened them
to act. If this case is similar to other cases of ENS, then organizations should develop most often
in areas with restricted freedom. Therefore, interpreting the results of the democratic variable
requires a different approach than with the other variables. A positive statistically significant
relationship would strengthen the aspect of strategic logic that considers the freedom to assemble
essential for formulating campaigns. However, these same results correlating with a negative
relationship between the variable for nonmilitant organizations and the dependent variable would
indicate the presence of legitimate political channels and weaken the argument that terrorism is a
strategy used in areas void of legal alternatives.
The fourth variable uses the number of nonmilitant organizations for comparing the
competing concepts between strategic logic, which considers terrorism a tactic when no viable
substitute exists, and psychological theory, which attributes terrorism to irrational and emotional
forces. Although the psychological model also describes the decision to use terrorism based on
the perception that it is the only available option, its purpose is to achieve radical goals that
develop during a period of social detachment. These goals are developed by antisocial and
antinomian groups, and by their origin lack mainstream support, but are pursued regardless of
public opinion or political conditions. The motivation behind this violence is to avenge those
perceived as responsible for causing their psychological fragmentation, a view less supported by
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strategic logic. The difference between these concepts is that strategic logic describes terrorist
organizations as more politically versed, with goals, in this case national liberation, that are more
rational. The expectation in strategic logic is that terrorists have a better grasp on reality than
described by psychological theory, and, therefore, the formation of ENS terrorist organizations
should correspond with measureable limits on political freedom, which this study determines by
the number of nonmilitant organizations within the state that represent the interests of the
minority population.
The variable for nonmilitant organizations measures both political representation and
alternatives to terrorism and is built using the number of nonmilitant organizations recorded by
MAR. This study quantifies these groups, reverses the results from positive to negative, 8 and lags
to the year following their formation in consideration of the time needed to consolidate and to
become known. Nonmilitant organizations represent an aspect of political freedom different from
what the variable for democratic freedom measures. The nonmilitant variable offers an analysis
of the political circumstances directly affecting the minority population. It represents both
associations directed at addressing several specific needs and advantageous freedoms decreasing
the likelihood of repressive conditions. Despite the occasion of central regimes using proxy
agencies claiming to represent the interests of the minority population to further their own
interests, a greater number of organizations would decrease the probability of state puppeteering.
Moreover, it would open channels for addressing cultural grievances and pursuing political
aspirations. This offers insight into whether a minority population and terrorist organization
shares similar goals while assessing the roles of logic and emotion. Although the strategic and
psychological models agree that terrorism is conceived as a last resort, they diverge over the

8

Reversing the variable for groups is for visual preference that has no effect on the results of the logit regression
model.
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underlining causes that motivate groups and influence their goals. Post (1990) argues that
terrorist organizations result from grouping people with violent proclivities in which terrorism
derives from an emotional necessity whereas for Crenshaw (1990) it is a strategic necessity due
to the lack of tactical alternatives. Therefore, a statistically significant negative relationship with
the dependent variable would indicate an emotional choice despite having alternatives, with a
positive relationship implying tactical disadvantages that strengthens the strategic model.
The variable for political transitions compares strategic logic and psychological theory by
noting changes that occur in a state’s political freedom to measure the relationship between
social instability and the formation of ENS terrorist organizations. The transition variable is a
dichotomous indicator that represents changes in political freedom determined by changes in
Polity2 and includes instances of political transformation varying from democratization and
autocratization to slight gains or losses of liberty. Though both strategic logic and psychological
theory consider terrorism a response to accumulating events, they diverge on which factors
ultimately lead to its initiation. Psychological theory argues that terrorism follows a failure of
alternative peaceful attempts at reform, consequently making it prone to stagnant environments
that continuously block change. Strategic logic, in contrast, considers shifting political and
structural conditions more likely to encourage violence, as clandestine organizations have a
tactical advantage during periods of unease and unrest. Consequently, while both paradigms
view terrorism as a replacement for an absence of legitimate channels, the latter describes the
leap to violence as a reaction to moments where terrorist organizations can maximize their
results. These moments of opportunity involves rapid change that leads to social uncertainty and
regime vulnerability, including not only periods of democratization but also illiberalization and
other notable transitions. Therefore, a positive statistically significant relationship between

67

political transitions and the dependent variable would strengthen strategic theory, while the
opposite results would support psychological theory.
The economic variable assesses strategic logic by measuring the relationship between
economic conditions and the formation of ENS terrorist organizations. This categorical variable
combines MAR’s economic differential index, ecdifxx, and state unemployment rates. Strategic
logic considers terrorism a weapon of the weak compensating for a lack of resources and
describes two factors that significantly influence the scope of rebellion. The first factor relates to
organizations like the IRA, which are capable of committing attacks on a larger scale but
deliberately limit their magnitude to prevent igniting adverse public sentiment. However, groups
like the IRA are an exceptional case as Crenshaw (1990), Laqueur (1999), and Hoffman (1998)
illustrate by describing the primary factor being a group’s financial capacity, while emphasizing
the difficulty in funding clandestinity. Laqueur (1999) and Crenshaw (1990) describe this
capacity involving a position between an ability to acquire funds sufficient for underground
rebellions without enough for large-scale assaults. This generally requires access to affluent
regions or state sponsorship. However, ENS movements typically develop around a regional
identity unaffiliated with a global ideological network and are therefore limited in acquiring
financial support internationally. Consequently, these movements are more likely dependent on
domestic economies, implying that the dependent variable ought to occur infrequently in affluent
regions among economically advantaged people who can choose between terrorism and open
rebellion. Meanwhile, the least likely scenario involves indigent populations in impoverished
states, while terrorist organizations are most likely to develop between these two extremes.
To measure the validity of this hypothesis, the economic index ecdifxx is combined with
unemployment rates in order to analyze the economic status of the minority population. The
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economic index, ecdifxx (-2-4), categorizes economic standing based on income, land and
property, higher education, presence in commerce, presence in professions, and presence in
official positions, scaling from economically advantaged to extreme disparity. It is recoded from
one to seven to remove zero to permit the construction of interactive variables. This new value is
multiplied with unemployment rates resulting in low scores that indicate the most economically
affluent populations and regions, and high scores indicating the most impoverished. From this
variable, there are two possible approaches for assessing whether economic conditions influence
the decision to use terrorism. The first method is to perform a two-tailed test around the mean
with spacing corresponding to the standard deviation. However, the mean is 54 percent and
standard deviation is 63 percent, therefore using this method to test for economic affluence
requires selecting values that could be interpreted as being selected for their results.9 Instead, this
study divides the economic variable into five categories corresponding with the standard
deviation. The first category consists of all values above the fourth standard deviation from zero,
based on the assumption that extreme economic hardships substantially reduce the probability of
the dependent variable. The second category comprises the first standard deviation from zero,
based on the assumption that well-financed organizations are able to decide between large and
small-scale confrontation, leaving terrorism as a choice among other tactics. The third, fourth,
and fifth categories comprise the second, third, and fourth standard deviations from zero
respectively, indicating gradations where wealth and economic opportunity become more limited
wherein the final category is considered illustrative of hardships incapable of sustaining
movements larger than clandestinity, leaving terrorism the only conceivable choice for those
determined to rebel by using violence.

9

See Appendix A for economic results using a 2-tailed test
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The final indicators assess the relationship between education and terrorism. Strategic
logic and psychological theory equally consider education to be a contributing factor of
terrorism. From one aspect, Post (1990) describes the potential terrorist as being a social outcast,
typically involving educational failure, although Laqueur (1999) refutes this notion by describing
several campaign organizers as being middleclass and having an educated background. Though
contradictory, both concepts are potentially valid. Evidence suggests that numerous elements of
education contribute both directly and indirectly to terrorism. Traits differentiating terrorists
from other criminal networks include the organizational use of violence guided by political
ambition that requires moderate knowledge of underground structuralization and violent
resistance. In the case of ETA, literature commonly depicts its founding members as more
intellectual than later generations, but while intelligence and sophistication are attributably
fundamental in developing durable networks and successful missions, equally characteristic of
ETA, movements are also complex. Terrorist organizations potentially rely on variously skilled
individuals for different aspects of logistics and violence, and whose educational experiences are
potentially uniquely influential within the organization. Even educational restrictions under
Franco are considered relevant where both education and its repression are seen as contributing
to ETA’s formation.
The intimation is that both access to education and the lack thereof contribute in several
important ways regarding terrorism. This leads to a bifurcated approach for analyzing the role of
education in which the first variable comprises underdeveloped educational systems determined
by literacy rates under ninety-eight percent and measures educational stagnation. The second
variable measures the significance of highly developed systems by assessing states with literacy
rates at and above ninety-eight percent. Despite the twentieth century being witness to growing
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populations with decreasing illiteracy rates worldwide, few states have achieved full literacy.
Literacy rates have a direct relationship with educational systems and are a strong indicant for
human development used by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to track
progress in developing states. These rates measure literacy among those aged fifteen years and
older and therefore educational stagnation is measured by comparing the growth rate of the
literate portion of the population to changes in its actual size. When the number of persons aged
fifteen and over increases at a rate higher than the literate population, educational systems are
considered more stagnant, but when literacy rates increase at a higher rate it indicates that
educational systems are expanding and therefore less stagnant. A benefit of this approach is that
it observes a direct correlation between education and demographics most prone to terrorism
which tend to be young males slightly past the age of formal education and less affected by
current educational structures. In addition, it compares systems with drastically disparate literacy
rates, although it is ineffective for highly literate populations.
The measurement for educational stagnation is relevant for areas with suboptimal literacy
rates but not for countries like Australia, Canada, Great Britain, France, Switzerland and the
United States that report literacy rates in the 98th percentile or higher. These states provide full
access to education with estimates representing a generally educated populace where illiteracy is
no longer a common social barrier. Meanwhile, illiteracy remains an epidemic in several
locations throughout the world. Nearly ninety percent of the cases in this analysis have literacy
rates under ninety-eight percent and some lower than three percent. In order to incorporate each
case, this study develops a dichotomous variable to test the significance of literacy rates at and
above ninety-eight percent, which controls against inaccurately reporting stagnant educational
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systems while measuring the significance that highly developed educational systems have on the
development of terrorist organizations.
Literacy rates correlate with several components of societal development, and therefore
the educational variables may produce several inferences. Although statistical significance would
strengthen several theoretical concepts, insignificant correlations would weaken neither strategic
logic nor psychological theory. While none of the variables in this study necessarily reflects the
specific reality of the individuals forming a terrorist organization, this fact is especially important
to consider when interpreting these latter variables. Accordingly, a positive statistically
significant relationship with educational stagnation could indicate psychologically damaging
conditions but would not retract from strategic logic, as it provides no indication about the
educational attainment of those creating the terrorist organization. Moreover, stagnation could
correlate with a multiplicity of factors that influence a strategy of resistance utilizing terrorist
violence. Alternatively, a positive statistically significant relationship with literacy rates above
98 percent increases the probability that those individuals are educated and have access to
information for learning about clandestine resistance. Furthermore, it could indicate education
contributing to social expectations in which educational failure reduces social status and
contributes to forces influencing antisocialism and aggression.
By integrating these eight variables into the logic model, the formula appears as follows:

e

  1*culture   2 *violence  3 *democracy
  4 *represenation / alternatives   5 *transitions   6 *economy
  7 *education ( stagnation )  8 *literacy  98%
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Results of Logit Regression
TABLE II
Logit Analysis of Environmental Conditions during the Formation of Ethno/national Separatist
Terrorist Organizations
Ind. Variables

Creation of ENS Terrorist
Organization
1.245***
.143
.296***
.035
.134***
.014
.237***
.071
.485**
.216
.216**
.099
-5.009**
2.004
.345
.233

Culture
Exposure to Violence
Political Freedom
Nonmilitant Groups
Political Transitions
Economic Conditions
Educational Stagnation
.98+ Literacy Rates

Constants

-3.422
2.062

Log Likelihood
-695.70947
Pseudo-r squared
0.196
Number of
9321
Observations
*p<.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.00

TABLE III
Change in probability of ENS terrorist organization developing as a function of unit change in
the independent variables
Prob. of ENS

Culture

Violence

Democracy

Groups

Transition

Economy

Education

(dy/dx)
.78%
.18%
.08%
.15%
.38%
.13%
-3.13%
1 unit increase .63%
1.41%
.81%
.71%
.78% 1.01% .76%
-2.5%
Total units
.63%
3.36% 2.07% 2.31% 1.83% 1.01% 1.15% -5.44%
Dy/dx = proportional change in ENS formation per unit change in independent variable
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Analysis of Logit Results
These findings offer important insights into the study of ENS terrorism. Table 1 describes
the results of the logit model, which measures the relationship between possible contributors of
nationalism and terrorism and the formation of ENS terrorist organizations. It includes 9321
observations of minority populations throughout the world with 174 cases of the dependent
variable, indicating that ENS terrorist organizations have a 1.9 percent probability of forming
within these populations. The independent variables represent cultural sensitivity, exposure to
violence, political freedom, political representation/alternatives to violence, political transitions,
economic conditions, educational stagnation, and developed educational systems, with all except
developed educational systems showing a significant relationship with the dependent variable.
Educational stagnation is the only variable showing a negative correlation, and Table 2 and the
graphs illustrate the probability in relation between the dependent and independent variables.
GRAPH I
Correlation of cultural identity and creation of ethno/national separatist terrorist organization
Cultural Sensitivity
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The association with cultural sensitivity in Table 1 supports concepts of nationalist theory
and connects ENS terrorism to cultural symbolization and distinct ethnic identity. Table 2 shows
this propensity increased by 0.78 percent per unit increase in the cultural indicant where the most
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sensitive populations increase the probability of the dependent variable by approximately 3
percent. In addition, Graph 1 shows a nonlinear relationship with a sharp curvature in the
dependent variable at 2.5 units. This signifies importance within each of the four cultural indices,
which individually correlate considerably with the dependent variable. These four indices are
illustrated in Table 3 (see below), which shows cases occurring most frequently among
geographically clustered populations with 69 percent among the most concentrated and 21
percent where the majority lived within close proximity, and only 2.7 percent occurring among
widely dispersed populations. Separatist ideology was present in 82 percent of the cases, and
although only 44 percent occurred among the most culturally distinct, zero cases occurred when
no notable differences existed between mainstream and minority populations. The results for
historical homeland vary somewhat from the expectation that volatility would increase when
minority populations have less control over ancestral lands. Although 41 percent of cases did
occur where ancestral lands surpassed provincial and state boundaries, 40 percent also occurred
where territory did not exceed the provincial base, though only 1.5 percent occurred when
ancestral lands were inexistent. However, the symbols of cultural identity are innumerable and
the cases where ancestral territory remained completely within a population’s domain do not
imply that no other cultural symbols were under threat.
TABLE IV
Correlations between indices of cultural sensitivity and the formation of terrorist organizations
Culture
Sepx
Groupcon
Culdifxx
gc8 (recoded)
no. occur
%
no. occur
%
no. occur
%
no. occur
%
0
0
0
5
.03
0
0
3
.02
1
18
.1
18
.1
21
.12
18
.1
2
16
.1
38
.21
29
.16
66
..37
3
143
.81
116
.66
45
.25
18
.10
4
X
X
X
X
82
.46
72
.41
Total
177
100
177
100
177
100
177
100
X = no observations; sepx=separatist ideology; groupcon=group concentration;
culdifxx=cultural differentials; gc8=historic homeland with reordered categories
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GRAPH II
Correlation between violence and creation of ethno/national separatist terrorist organization
Exposure to Violence
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Levels of violence between minority populations and the state or other antagonists are
shown in Table 1 to have a positive relationship with the formation of ENS terrorist campaigns.
Table 2 describes this relationship involving a unit probability of 0.2 percent indicating a 3.4
percent probability of the dependent variable in extreme conflict, such as civil war, although no
cases in the data appear at this point. In addition, 15 percent of the cases occurred when no
violence was reported whatsoever. The lack of violence in some cases indicates that hostility
potentially contributes towards the decision to use terrorism but is not definitive that terrorism
will occur and consequently provides inconclusive results regarding psychological theory. The
role of increased frequencies of violence could be as much psychological as tactical. To validate
the psychological argument that a radicalization process precedes the initiation of terrorism, the
cases that show an absence of violence would require the presence of either undocumented
violence or borderline and antisocial personalities, although equally possible, violence could
factor in strategically if populations are conditioned to extreme violence and therefore less
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responsive to moderate tactics. Just as violence could contribute to a psychological breakdown
that encourages aggression, people living amid hostility might also be encouraged to employ
aberrant violence in order to gain notoriety, in which case these findings support both strategic
logic and psychological theory.
GRAPH III
Correlation between democracy and creation of ethno/national separatist terrorist organization
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Political environments appear to have a multidimensional relationship with the creation
of ENS terrorist organizations. In accordance with the assumption that terrorism occurs most
often in democracies, democratic freedom is shown in Table 1 to have a significant positive
relationship with the dependent variable, with nearly every case occurring where some degree of
political freedom, however sparse, was present. Graph 3 describes this relationship becoming its
most pronounced in the positive range of Polity2, with a sharp increase in the dependent variable
towards the highest levels of political freedom. Nearly 72 percent of the cases correlated with
democratic scores of 8, 9, and 10, while only one case occurred where autocracy was valued at 10. Moreover, Table 2 shows political freedom having a unit probability of 0.08 percent thereby
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leading to a 2.1 percent probability of the dependent variable in the democratically freest states.
These findings support assumptions about the relationship between democracy and terrorism,
primarily the need for the right to organize in order to integrate movements. However, despite
this positive correlation, ENS movements do not appear to be a byproduct of endowed liberty.
GRAPH IV
Correlation between representation and creation of ethno/national separatist terrorist organization
Nonmilitant Organizations
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Movements often transpire in correlation with political freedom allowing social mobility
but lacking sufficient milieus for addressing many social, political, or economic concerns. The
analysis suggests that while these movements tend to emerge within liberal environments, the
minority populations comprising them lack equal status or access to political society. Not a
single case occurred among minority populations categorized by MAR as politically advantaged
while nearly 85 percent occurred where at least moderate levels of political deprivation were
present. Moreover, Table 1 shows nonmilitant organizations correlating significantly with the
dependent variable. Nearly half the cases took place where no peaceful organizations were
shown to represent the interests of the minority population, with nearly 93 percent of cases
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occurring where fewer than three nonmilitant organizations were present. This suggests that the
freer environments providing agility for organizing movements are not allocating freedoms
equally, are potentially relegating members of the minority population to a lower sociopolitical
status, and as a result supports the theory that terrorism is a tactic used when viable alternatives
are unavailable for legitimately pursuing political goals.
Furthermore, Table 1 shows the variable for political transitions having a positive and
significant relationship with the formation of ENS terrorist organizations. Although fewer than
14 percent of the observations contain these transitions, almost 18 percent of cases occurred
during these periods, with nearly 80 percent occurring in areas where terrorist organizations had
previously been established, 75 percent of which the minority population responsible had already
produced a terrorist organization. Although this variable includes various changes in political
freedom, its general presence increases the probability of the dependent variable by 3.7 percent,
nearly doubling its probability. Therefore, political instability and social insecurity appear to play
important roles in the development of terrorist organizations. Even among cases not occurring
during these periods, less than a quarter took place in areas where the level of political freedom
had remained constant for a decade or longer. These correlations support the assumption that
social unrest contributes to terrorism although transitions primarily appear factoring in locations
where terrorism is already a common practice. In this case, impoverished, unsafe, and unstable
environments potentially function as an opportunistic backdrop for discontent persons who view
terrorism as a normative tactic to mobilize and act by using terrorism to maximize their results.
These findings point to both a logistical methodology and psychological forces facilitating the
use of extreme violence, which supports psychological theory while reinforcing ideas of strategic
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logic that consider terrorism a reaction to opportunity influencing not only acts of terrorism but
also the initiation of campaigns.
However, the political environment may be less decisive in the development of ENS
terrorist campaigns in comparison to the dynamics of the population itself. Several populations
repeatedly create new terrorist organizations despite changes in political freedom. Albanians in
Yugoslavia, Basques in Spain, Hill Tribes in Bangladesh, Malay-Muslims in Thailand, and
Moros in the Philippines each share a protracted pattern of producing new terrorist campaigns
long after gaining substantial levels of political freedom. These populations reflect the behavior
of the Ijaw in Nigeria and Karens in Burma, who first created campaigns during liberal periods
and then during autocracy, and Corsicans in France, Palestinians in Israel, Irish in Great Britain,
and Kurds in Turkey, who continue producing new movements amid greater political stagnancy.
This legacy of renewing terror campaigns possibly shows views on using terrorism developing as
an integral part of a cultural identity. This association between culture and terrorism indicates a
cultural inclination for using terrorism that surpasses several structural conditions, in which case
nationalism, strategy, and psychological forces may each function in the initiation of terrorist
organizations.
The model shows economic factors also play a significant role in the formation of ENS
terrorist organizations. Table 1 shows the economic variable having a positive relationship that
Table 2 reports as having unit probability of 0.13 percent, leading to a 1.2 percent probability of
the dependent variable within the highest category. These findings support the assumption that
financial resources influence levels of rebellion, which also appear important in considering
which type of organization to develop. The analysis further provides insight into correlations
between a country’s economic circumstances and a population’s position within that economy,
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also indicating that factors of privation may contribute to a psychological component leading to
terrorist violence. These results highlight an aspect of terrorism that unemployment rates alone
cannot explain. The majority of cases in this study correlated with lower unemployment rates
with nearly 70 percent of cases occurring when unemployment rates were at or below 10 percent,
over half occurred below 5 percent, while only 13 percent occurred above 20 percent, the highest
at 36.7 percent. However, only one percent of cases occurred amongst populations considered by
MAR as economically advantaged whereas nearly 85 percent correlated with disadvantages, with
nearly half occurring amid severe economic disparity. These results strengthen strategic logic by
indicating that economic conditions do influence the scope of rebellion, and further show that an
economic system can contribute to the initiation of terrorism based on a combination of national
prosperity and economic repression within that system.
GRAPH V
Correlation between economy and creation of ethno/national separatist terrorist organization

Economic Conditions
0.025
0.02
0.015
0.01
0.005
0
0

1

2

3

4

Economic condition based on unemployment rate and economic disparity p(ENS)

Table 1 shows stagnant educational systems having a significant negative relationship
with the formation of ENS terrorist organizations, implying a strong relationship between factors
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relating to civil development and terrorism. Educational stagnation is shown in Table 2 to have a
-3.13 percent unit probability, which shares a nonlinear correlation with the dependent variable.
Illustrated in Graph 6 (see below), the probability of the dependent variable decreases
substantially as the proportional variation in annual literacy growth rates nears those of the
population aged fifteen and over. When literacy rates increase at 30 percent the rate of the
population, the probability of the dependent variable is 7.4 percent, and as this variation
approximates 90 percent, the probability of the dependent variable decreases to less than one
percent and becomes virtually nonexistent as growth in literacy rates begins to surpass the
demographic. Illustrated in Table 4 (see below), nearly 100 percent of the cases, not including
those where literacy rates were above 98 percent, occurred before the variance between literacy
and population growth rates reached 102 percent with no observations shown above 108 percent,
and by the maximum variation, 224 percent, the probability of the dependent variable decreased
by 5.4 percent.
GRAPH VI
Correlation between educational and creation of ethno/national separatist terrorist organization
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TABLE V
The annual proportional changes in literate population divided by annual proportional change in
population aged 15 and over.
Proportion variation
75.4%
94.5%
97.6%
99%-- 100%
-- 101%
-- 102%
-- 103%
-- 104%
-- 105%
-- 106%
-- 107%
-- 108%
Total

Including 98%+ Literacy rate
No. Occur
%
1
.5
1
.5
1
.5
42
21.9
58
30.2
51
26.6
30
15.6
5
2.6
2
1
1
.5
0
0
1
.5
192
100

<98% Literacy
No. Occur
%
1
.6
0
0
1
.6
19
11.7
53
32.5
51
31.3
29
17.8
5
3.1
2
1.2
1
.6
0
0
1
.6
163
100

Table 1 does not show developed educational systems having a significant relationship
with the formation of ENS terrorist organizations. These results, along with those for nonmilitant
organizations and educational stagnation point to a complex relationship between democracy and
the dependent variable. Illustrated in Table 6 (see below), the majority of observations with
literacy rates at and above 98 percent correlate with higher levels of democratic freedom.
Implicitly, if liberalization alone led to an increase in the development of terrorist organizations,
the expectation would be that high literacy rates also correlate with their development. However,
the higher literacy rates are not shown to be a significant factor. Instead, the data shows ENS
terrorist organizations developing most often in less-developed educational systems. Nearly 90
percent of the cases occurred in states with literacy rates below 98 percent, with more than half
occurring where literacy rates were below 60 percent, the lowest being 11.6 percent. Because
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numerous aspects of human development correlate with literacy rates, including infant mortality,
the contributions to terrorism could develop from multiple stimuli associated with these findings,
and in which case expanding educational systems likely indicate progressive polices aggressively
addressing a variety of social needs and therefore reducing motivations to rebel. These findings
show the roles of education and civil development as multidimensional, and while liberalization
correlates with the dependent variable, the motivations behind ENS terrorism appear to originate
from repressive conditions.
TABLE VI
Distribution of democratic freedom and observations of literacy rates at and above 98 percent
Dem.
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Obs.

67

2

349

11

3

16
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2

5

8

2

94

39

58

104

124

114

715

1730

%

4

.1

20

.6

.2

.9

1

.1

.3

.5

.1

5
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41

100

In conclusion, the purpose of this study is to learn more about the background conditions
that influence the development of ENS terrorist organizations. Analyzing this aspect of terrorism
requires understanding several elements of both nationalist and terrorist movements. Although
theories of nationalism disagree about the age of nationalism and structural versus biological
mechanisms, they share concepts about cultural identity, symbolisms, and the plasticity of
perception. Other than viewing the case of terrorism in Spain from a historical context, this
analysis did not attempt to compare the competing views of nationalist theory. Rather, it set out
to determine whether the concepts of nationalist-based aggression also apply to terrorism, and
can be used to explain cases of ENS terrorism, by measuring the relationship between cultural
sensitivity and the formation of ENS terrorist campaigns. However, this study does compare two
theories of terrorism: strategic logic and psychological theory. These two theories are evaluated
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using variables that assess experiences with violence, levels of democracy, changes in political
freedom, economic conditions, representation, and stagnant and developed educational systems.
The results of the logit model connect ideas of nationalist, strategic, and psychological
theory to the origins of ENS terrorism. Except for developed educational systems, each variable
is shown to have a significant relationship with the creation of ENS terrorist campaigns. The
variable for cultural sensitivity strengthens theoretical assumptions about factors that lead to an
aggressive response from some populations to threats against their cultural identity. These results
bridge the theories of nationalism to ENS terrorism by showing an association between elements
of cultural identity deriving from a manner in which a minority population perceives its status
relative to the status of the mainstream population. The variables for an exposure to violence,
nonmilitant organizations, and educational stagnation suggest that repressive and volatile
conditions may contribute to a psychological breakdown facilitating an acceptance of violence as
a means of resistance, although by organizations that have a logical grasp on reality somewhat in
harmony with the consciousness of the majority of the minority population. The variables for
political freedom, nonmilitant organizations, and economic conditions suggest that ENS terrorist
campaigns tend to emerge in politically freer states from among minority populations who are
more repressed than the mainstream population. The variables for political transitions and
educational stagnation also support strategic logic and psychological theory. These variables
show terrorism being initiated during periods of social unrest that are potentially psychologically
damaging, but more important, provide an opportunity for terrorist organizations to maximize
their results. Moreover, this suggests that violent conditions may strategically encourage the use
of terrorism in order to gain notice.
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DIAGRAM I
Forces influencing the creation of ethno/national separatist terrorist organizations
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The results of this project show that the theories of nationalism and terrorism each assists
in explaining aspects of ENS terrorism. Anthony D. Smith thoroughly integrated concepts of
primordialism and modernism to create an accurate depiction of several elements of nationalistbased aggression. Crenshaw (1990) accurately explained several forces motivating organizations
to use terrorism as a strategic response, and appears correct in suggesting that psychology plays
an important role in developing terrorist organizations, while the contributions of psychological
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theory appear more subjective. This study suggests that psychological forces influencing the
creation of terrorist organizations predominately contribute to an acceptance of violence as a
method of resistance. However, while this study cannot assess whether ENS terrorist campaigns
develop in response to long-term emotional damage, Post (1990) appears too overreaching in so
precisely defining the role of psychology in terrorism. Although psychological forces may factor
in as they relate to cultural identity, social instability, and repression, the conditions under which
ENS terrorist organizations tend to develop demonstrates a strategic response driven by several
factors. These findings put the formation of ENS terrorist organizations inside a strategic realm
that shows a strong association between cultural identity and conditions influencing the scope of
rebellion. Therefore, the ideas offered by nationalist and strategic theory seem to fit compatibly
within the focus of this analysis, while the role of psychology appears more subtle. As a result,
nationalist theory and strategic logic appear to offer the most valid explanations for the origins of
ENS terrorist organizations.
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Conclusion
This paper examines several social, political, and economic conditions that potentially influence
the development of ethno/national separatist (ENS) terrorist organizations. Terrorism is a critical
subject around the world, and concerns over this issue continue to grow as the cases of terrorism
become more frequent while having a continuously devastating impact on society. The subject of
terrorism covers a broad spectrum of aggression and ideology that limits the potential to develop
a theory that can precisely explain every case of terrorism. While terrorist organizations typically
share several common characteristics, such as using violence or the threat of violence to achieve
recognition, many distinguishing traits exist between these organizations that primarily derive
from the forces motivating their adoption of violence. The threats posed by terrorism increase the
need to understand more about these specific forms of terrorism and the conditions that increase
their potential to occur. To address this need, this study examines the ENS form of terrorism by
focusing on the origins of ENS terrorist campaigns.
The approach taken for studying the ENS form of terrorism begins by analyzing literature
on nationalist and terrorist theory. These theories describe a paradigm for studying the origins of
ENS terrorism, which involves organizations that begin as ethno-political movements established
around a goal of achieving national sovereignty. These movements tend to develop within certain
populations that the theories for nationalism explain to result from an increased sense of cultural
sensitivity based on perceived threats against their cultural identity. This heightened sensitivity
tends to correlate with condensed populations who share a unique ethnic identity and cultural
symbols that reinforce their distinctiveness. As it relates to ENS terrorism, an historic homeland
is often seen as a powerful symbol of a cultural identity, and ENS campaigns tend to correlate
with populations who share a strong attachment to their ancestral territory. Furthermore, the
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approaches for studying terrorism portray this subject as a reactive phenomenon committed by
organizations that behave as a single entity. The theories for terrorism describe several possible
forces motivating oppositionist movements to transition from a phase of nonviolence to an active
terrorist campaign, while sharing a view that assists in retracing episodes of terrorism to their
root causes for identifying case specific stimuli.
The areas where the theories for nationalism and terrorism come into disagreement relate
to the manner in which individuals are considered inclined towards aggression. Primordialism
and psychological theory point to an emotional element linking individual aggression to hostile
movements, and while some primordialists argue that the associations between aggression and
nationalism are evolutionary inheritable traits, modernists and ethnosymbolists view nationalistbased aggression as stemming from populations being taught to interpret structural conditions. In
addition, the theories for terrorism disagree on the underlying forces influencing an organization
to adopt terrorism, deviating on whether this decision is conceived rationally. Strategic logic
views the adoption of terrorism as a tactic for maximizing gains. However, psychological theory
considers this an irrational decision by antisocial groups that have a unidimensional worldview.
Moreover, while strategic logic considers psychology playing a central role in the development
of a terrorist organization, psychological theory views these organizations as the manifestation of
the personality disorders of emotionally damaged individuals within the groups.
After analyzing the theoretical literature, this study examines the examples of Basque and
Catalonian terrorism and Roma passivity in Spain. This case illustrates how certain background
conditions may have influenced the development of ENS terrorism in Spain. These conditions
appear to involve an enduring and distinct ethno/national cultural identity, threats against cultural
symbols, volatile and hostile conditions, levels of social agility, desires to affect change without
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lawful methods to pursue it, and access to information about underground rebellion and financial
resources. These conditions may also play a central role in the development of ENS terrorist
organizations elsewhere, and this study operationalizes these findings and uses a logit model to
evaluate their relationship with the development of ENS terrorist organizations throughout the
world. The results of this study show that it is possible to identify populations and environments
that have an increased potential for producing ENS terrorist organizations.
TABLE VII
Expected Results

Cultural
Sensitivity
Violent
Environment

Nationalist Theory
Strengthens: threats
to cultural symbols
leading to violence
Strengthens:
violence targeting
ethny

Political
Freedom
Alternatives to
Violence

Educational
Stagnation
Access to
education

Strengthens: a strategy
to gain notoriety amid
hostile conditions
Freedom of assembly &
strengthens if ethny is
politically repressed
Weakens: violence is
used despite having
alternatives
Strengthens: terrorism
used to maximize results

Social Unrest
Limited
Financial
Resources

Strategic Logic

Strengthens: ethny
is economically
repressed

Strengthens: terrorism
determined by available
resources
Strengthens: repressive
conditions influencing
rebellion
Strengthens: greater
access to information for
clandestinity & rebellion

Psychological Theory
Strengthens: violence
integrated into cultural
identity
Strengthens:
psychologically
conditioned for violence
Strengthens: detached
from reality & rejection
of social norms
Strengthens: violence is
used despite having
alternatives
Weakens: terrorism
used for tactical
advantage
Strengthens: repressive
conditions having a
psychological effect
Strengthens: repressive
conditions having a
psychological effect
Strengthens: social
expectations leading to
psychological damage

The example of terrorism in Spain also shows the dispute in nationalist theory concerning
the age of nationalism being a semantical debate. The behaviors that correlate with nationalistbased aggression are observed existing in Iberia long before Spain became a modern nation state.
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Foremost, the Roman Empire introduced a common identity to the Peninsula that formulated a
common Latin identity around which the Kingdom of Castile later reunited the region, and
contributed to distinguishing Basque and Catalonian identity. Furthermore, Castilian identity led
to xenophobia against both Roma and Moslem populations for centuries before the industrial
age. The changing perceptions of Basque national identity following the Industrial Revolution
and civil wars merely illustrated the plasticity of perception, which strengthens the concepts of
ethnosymbolism that highlight the enduring qualities of national identity and their continued
alteration by perceptions of reality. Furthermore, strategic logic and psychological theory explain
how a progression of increased propensities for violence ultimately resulted in the emergence of
Euskadi ta Askatazuna and Terra Lliure. These terrorist organizations followed a process that
moved Basque and Catalonian oppositionist movements between Marxism and nationalism, and
eventually led to jingoist struggles for achieving Basque and Catalonian national independence.
The logit regression model offers an assessment of the nationalist and terrorist theories by
measuring the relationship between the findings from the Spanish case and the origins of ENS
terrorism throughout the world. The cases in this model observe two-hundred ninety-seven
minority populations from one-hundred twenty-six states, including the Soviet Union, with
observations spanning primarily between 1945 and 2003. The independent variables assess the
role of cultural sensitivity, encounters with violence, political freedom, representation/alternative
options, transitioning levels of political freedom, economic conditions, educational stagnation,
and developed educational systems. The dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator for the
development of ENS terrorist organizations among these populations. The analysis shows ENS
terrorist organizations having a 1.9 percent probability of developing, with cultural identity,
encounters with violence, political freedom, social unrest, underrepresentation, disproportionate
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economic privation, and stagnant educational systems and other factors of civil development
increasing this probability. This implies an ability to detect the conditions contributing to the
development of ENS terrorism, including the populations and areas where organizations are
likely to develop, the personality and background of those involved, their individual and
collective goals, and other motivating forces, therefore implying the potential to improve policies
for effectively confronting this issue.
The results of this study also show several concepts of national theory being compatible
with strategic logic and psychological theory, suggesting that each of these theories may assist in
explaining the origins of ENS terrorism. The cultural variable strengthens the general concepts of
nationalist theory by measuring nationalist sentiment, distinct cultural markers, and the degree of
threat against national identity. The remaining variables contribute to both strengthening and
weakening the concepts of strategic logic and psychological theory. The variables for political
freedom and nonmilitant organizations that measure the social agility and legitimate channels for
pursuing political change show terrorism used to compensate for a lack of alternatives. The
variables for violence, transitions, and education assess the effects of unstable social conditions,
showing both strategic and psychological forces potentially influencing the use of terrorism. The
variable for economic conditions shows economic privation influencing the scope of rebellion,
indicating a strategic response while also implying conditions that are potential psychologically
damaging. Finally, the variables for education assessing civil development and access to
information indicate conditions that are potentially psychologically damaging but also contribute
to a rational basis for employing clandestine rebellion. These findings show unstable conditions
potentially contributing to a psychological breakdown of inhibitions against using violence.
However, it appears that terrorist organizations, at least initially, maintain a logical grasp on
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reality, and develop in populations that are more repressed than mainstream populations. These
organizations tend to emerge in moderately liberal climates while the most fertile environments
involve a history of terrorism and political instability; consequently, indicating a psychological
conditioning for using terrorism when it is strategically beneficial for maximizing results.
There are weaknesses to this study however. The variables analyzed in this model lack
specific indications about the individuals forming terrorist organizations. The absence of a direct
observation of these individuals impedes the ability to assess accurately several psychological
forces considered to contribute to the decisions to initiate terrorism. Psychology potentially plays
a multidimensional and intrinsic role in the development of ENS terrorist organizations, but this
study is limited in its ability to assess the full scope of those emotional components. The best
conclusion that this study can offer regarding the role of psychology in the development of ENS
terrorism is how similar background conditions correlate with the creation of campaigns, and the
pattern among specific populations who continue developing additional terrorist movements,
seems to imply a socially learned or situationally induced psychological state that facilitates an
acceptance of violence. However, future research aimed at addressing the psychological aspects
of terrorism may strengthen the understanding about the role of psychology with ENS terrorism.
This paper provides a starting point for new research. Currently, there may be more than
two-hundred active ENS terrorist organizations around the world, although research in this field
tends to focus disproportionately on notorious organizations such as the IRA, PKK, and ETA.
Advancing knowledge in this field requires expanding beyond these already well-documented
cases. There is a significant amount of untapped knowledge regarding this subject, and future
studies should expand the range of observations to include several other populations and terrorist
organizations. Furthermore, research should continue studying the biological components of
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aggression while continuing to combine concepts of nationalist and terrorist theory. Additional
analyses should observe concepts that this paper was unable to assess, such as organizational
splitting or the intrinsic parts of nationalism. Studying specific organizations or innate individual
characteristics, however, may require utilizing case studies or measuring a smaller number of
observations, since precise details about many movements or the individuals involved are hard to
obtain. Another important step would involve analyzing ENS organizations, such as Movimiento
Estudiantil de Chicanos de Aztlán (MECHA), which have not initiated terrorism for furthering
their goals. These suggestions illustrate the ample space for advancing the study of terrorism,
especially ENS terrorism, which has the potential to become an increasingly common tactic for
marginalized populations worldwide.
The threats from terrorism are likely to remain a growing concern around the world and a
major security challenge for most states. As globalization brings the world closer together and
transforms once rural areas into hubs of modernity, threats from terrorism are likely to increase.
Concerns over this issue will continue expanding the need to develop policies that prevent or
reduce its destructive results. These policies should focus on the underlying causes of terrorism,
and to have the greatest impact, they should address those forces initially motivating individuals
to become terrorists. This study has demonstrated that several social, political, and economic
forces have a direct and significant correlation with the creation of ENS terrorist organizations.
These results show that it is possible to detect, even predict, populations and environments with
increased potential for producing terrorism. While psychology may assist in identifying those
individuals within a population who are more prone to becoming terrorists, policy change offers
the most effective approach for confronting this issue. Terrorism is a form of rebellion, and
rebellion is a common human response; consequently the potential for terrorism may always
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exist in the midst of desires to affect change. Nevertheless, steps can be taken that reduce the
motivations for violent rebellion. Developing civil infrastructure and promoting social equality
and human rights can significantly reduce its potential. Furthermore, such steps offer a variety of
benefits, not only lessening the threats that terrorism poses on a population but also providing
opportunity for improving lives. Most important, preventative measures can thwart the beginning
of a movement that once active is nearly impossible to stop.

95

APPENDICES

96

APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL TABLES
TABLE VIII
Logit results using the two-tailed test economic variable
Ind. Variables
Culture
Exposure to Violence
Political Freedom
Nonmilitant Groups
Political Transitions
Economic Conditions
Educational Stagnation
.98+ Literacy Rates

Constants

Creation of ENS Terrorist
Organization
1.245***
.143
.295***
.035
.133***
.014
.237***
.071
.491**
.216
.297**
.181
-4.961**
2.004
.33
.233
-3.261
2.065

Log Likelihood
-696.6197
Pseudo-r squared
0.195
Number of
9321
Observations
*p<.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.00
This table shows the results when using a dichotomous economic variable. These results are
similar to the results from using a categorical economic variable, which uses the same logic. The
first standard deviation from zero is coded zero. The next three standard deviations are coded
one, and the remaining values are coded zero. This slightly decreased the coefficients of the
variables for violence, democracy, and educational stagnation, and decreased the pseudo rsquared. This also slightly raised the coefficients for transitions and economic conditions. The pvalue for the economic variable rose from 0.029 to 0.1. Because the economic variable is twotailed, however, its p-value is considered .005; therefore, remaining significant.
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TABLE IX
Relationship between cultural sensitivity and the development of ethno/national separatist
terrorist campaigns
Culture Sensitivity
0
.5
.75
1
1.25
1.5
1.75
2
2.25
2.5
2.75
3
3.25
3.5
Total

Total
Cases
3
149
808
754
579
1,423
871
1,323
1,186
1,975
1,485
1,003
696
642
12,909

No.
Occur
0
0
3
10
0
0
5
2
8
33
29
34
47
23
194

%

Total

0
0
1.5
5.2
0
0
2.6
1
4.1
17
15
17.5
24.2
12
100

3
149
811
764
579
1,423
876
1,325
1,194
2,008
1,514
1,037
743
665
13,091

TABLE X
Relationship between political representation and the development of ethno/national separatist
terrorist campaigns
Nonmilitant Groups
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Total

Total
Cases
7,121
3,101
1,463
849
305
197
68
22
21
12,960

No.
Occur
89
66
24
9
2
1
1
2
0
194

98

%

Total

46
34
12.4
4.6
1
.5
.5
1
0
100

7,123
3,113
1,459
844
305
197
68
24
21
13,154

TABLE XI
Distribution of violent encounters and development of ethno/national separatist terrorist
campaigns
Exposure to Violence
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Total

Total
Cases
7,592
858
623
983
557
697
601
414
5
12,960

No.
Occur
29
19
18
20
29
36
27
16
0
194

%

Total

15
10
9.3
10.3
15
19
14
8
0
100

7,621
877
641
1,003
586
733
628
430
5
13,154

TABLE XII
Distribution of economic and political differentials and development of ethno/national separatist
terrorism campaigns
Economic
Terrorist Campaign
0
1
Advantaged
774
1
Some advantages
605
1
No major disparity
2,500 26
Slight disparity
1,552 28
Substantial disparity 1,363 30
Major disparity
1,513 37
Extreme disparity
4,336 70
Total
12,643 193

%
0
6.1
4.8
19.8
12.3
10.8
12
34.3
100

Total
Political
1
0
1
.5
775
557
0
.5
606
341
2
13.4 2,526 2,282 28
14.4 1,580 2,755 48
15.5 1,393 2,692 44
19.1 1,550 2,403 36
36.1 4,406 1,824 36
100 12,836 12,853 194

99

%
0
4.3
2.7
17.8
21.4
20.9
18.7
14.2
100

Total
1
0
557
1
343
14.4 2,310
24.7 2,803
22.7 2,736
18.6 2,439
18.6 1,859
100 13,047

TABLE XIII
Distribution of literacy and unemployment rates and development of ethno/national separatist
terrorist campaigns

0 – 5%
-- 10%
-- 15%
-- 20%
-- 25%
-- 30%
-- 35%
-- 40%
-- 45%
-- 50%
-- 55%
-- 60%
-- 65%
-- 70%
-- 75%
-- 80%
-- 85%
-- 90%
-- 95%
--100%

Literacy Rates
No. Occur
%
0
0
0
0
3
1.5
2
1
2
1
3
1.5
6
3.1
9
4.6
7
3.6
13
6.7
16
8.2
13
6.7
13
6.7
4
2.1
6
3.1
2
1
19
10
11
5.7
20
10.3
45
23.2

98-98.9%
99-100%

(7)
(21)

Total

194

Unemployment Rates
No. Occur
%
66
37.3
50
28.2
28
15.8
10
5.6
7
4
7
4
5
2.8
4
2.3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

(3.6)
(10.8)

100

100

0
0

177

(0)
(0)

100

TABLE XIV
Distribution of political freedom, total observations, and development of ethno/national
separatist terrorist organizations
Political Freedom
-10
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Total

Frequency
212
1,044
529
3,017
661
369
268
312
197
308
415
219
226
168
603
403
395
473
805
866
1,531
13,021

Percent
1.63
8.02
4.06
23.17
5.08
2.83
2.06
2.40
1.51
2.37
3.19
1.68
1.74
1.29
4.63
3.10
3.03
3.63
6.18
6.65
11.76
100

Terrorist Group
1
8
2
20
5
3
2
3
2
2
6
0
3
1
6
3
7
9
43
42
25
193

Percent
.5
4.1
1
10.4
3
2
1
2
1
1
3.1
0
2
.5
3.1
2
4
5
22.3
21.8
13
100

TABLE XV
Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Culture
Exposure to Violence
Non-militant Groups
Political Freedom
Political Transitions
Economic Conditions
Educational Stagnation
Literacy Rate > .98
Dichotomous economics
Terrorism in logit model
Total cases of terrorism

Obs
13091
12524
13190
13021
13189
9969
12748
13181
9969
9321
13154

Mean
2.155
1.437
-.873
-.35
.137
1.354
1.015
.135
.26131
.019
.015
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Std. Dev.
.778
2.158
1.27
7.128
.343
.748
.035
.341
.44
.121

Min
0
0
-8
-10
0
0
.302
0
0
0
0

Max
3.5
8
0
10
1
4
2.24
1
1
1
1

APPENDIX B: ENS terrorist organizations forming in the period of 1945 to 2003
Abu al-Rish Brigades: also known as Fatah
Hawks, Abu al-Reesh Brigades, Ahmed
Abu al-Rish Brigades, al-Reish
Brigades; founded in 1993 as a militant
faction of al-Fatah, active in Gaza, its
goal is the liberation of Palestine.
Abu Nidal Organization (ANO): see Fatah
al-Qiyadah al-Thawriyyah
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG): also known as
Abu Sayyaj Moro, and al-Harakat alIslamiyah, “Bearer of the Sword;” an
Islamic Moro separatist organization
founded in 1991 by dissenting members
of MNLF, active in the Philippines and
Malaysia, its goal is to establish an
independent Islamic state in Mindanao
in the southern Philippines.
Abu Sayyaj Moro: see Abu Sayyaf Group
Accolta Nazinuale Corsa: also known as
Resistenza Corsa: a Corsican separatist
organization founded in France in 2002,
in response to a ceasefire by FLNC, and
merged with FLNC in 2003.
Aceh Merdeka: see National Liberation
Front of Acheh Sumatra
Adivasi Cobra Force (ACF): also known
Adivasi Militant Force; formed in India
in 1996 by Santhal nationalists and other
tribal natives of Assam following violent
incursions with Bodos. Its goals include
seeking reparations for damages caused
to Santhals during the conflict. The ACF
is currently working towards becoming a
legitimate political party.
Adivasi Militant Force: see Adivasi Cobra
Force
Afwaj al Muqawama al Lubnaniya
(AMAL): also known as Lebanese
Resistance Detachments and Movement
of Hope; founded by Imam Musa Sadr in
Lebanon in 1975 as a Shiite protectionist
organization, pursuing Shiite interests
and supporting Palestinians during

Israel’s 1978 invasion, it eventually
fused with Hezbollah.
Ahmed Abu al-Rish Brigades: see Abu alRish Brigades
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades: founded by
members of al-Fatah in the West Bank
and Gaza in 2000, its goal is the
liberation of Palestinians.
Al-Asifa: see Al-Fatah
Al-Badar: see Al-Badr
Al-Badhr Mujahidin: see Al-Badr
Al-Badr: also known as al-Badhr Mujahidin,
and al-Badar; original established in
1971 by Pakistani Inter Services
Intelligence, it was reestablished in 1998
under Kashmiri leadership, its goal is the
establishment of an independent Islamic
Kashmir.
Albanian National Army (ANA): founded in
2002 in Macedonia following incursions
with Macedonian troops in 2001, its goal
is to establish an ethnic Albanian state
comprised of Albanian populations
throughout the Balkans.
Al-Faran: formed in India in 1995, possibly
by Kashmiri separatists from JeM and
HuA, its goal is to establish an
independent state of Kashmir but has
been inactive since 1995.
Al-Fatah Intifada, “Fatah Uprising:” also
known as Fatah Abu Musa; formed in
1983 by factionalized members of Fatah
and PLO. It has links with Hezbollah
and is committed to liberating Palestine.
Al-Fatah: also known as al-Asifa, Harek atTahrir al-Wataniyyeh al-Filastiniyyeh,
and Fateh; founded by Faruk Qaddumi,
Khalid al-Hasan, Salah Khalaf, Khalil
El-Wazir, and Yassar Araft in the West
Bank and Gaza in 1959. Originally,
Fatah was a secularist organization
seeking the violent removal of Israelis
from Palestinian territory. Following the
Oslo Accords in 1993, Fatah became a
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legitimate political group, renouncing
terrorism and recognizing Israel’s right
to exist.
Al-Hadid: founded in 1994 in India as a
Kashmiri separatist organization,
although its purpose is questionable with
suspicions of it being an Indian military
scheme, it has been inactive sine 1994.
Al-Harakat al-Islamiyah: see Abu Sayyaf
Group
Al-Jabha al-Dimuqratiyya li-Tahrir Filastin:
see Democratic Front for the Liberation
of Palestine
Al-Jabha ash-Sha'abiya li-Tahrir Falastin,
“Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP):” founded by George
Habash in 1967 following the ArabIsraeli War, its goal is the destruction of
Israel and creation of a Marxist
Palestinian state.
Al-Jabhah al-Islamiyah litahrir Filastin,
“Islamic Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (IFLP):” formed by
factionalized PLO members in Lebanon
in 1986, its goal was to establish a
sovereign Palestinian state. IFLP has
been inactive since 1990.
All Tripura Bharat Suraksha Force
(ATBSF): a Tripura separatist
organization and splinter of NLFT,
possibly founded during the 1990s, its
goal was the liberation of the tribal areas
in northeastern India and creation of an
independent state of Tripura, although
rumored as having more to do with
organized crime. ATBSF is no longer
active.
All Tripura People’s Liberation
Organization (ATPLO): founded in India
in 1980 by Blinada Jamatia and other
former members of the TNV, flowing
Hrangkhawal’s orders for the TNV to
disband, its goal was the liberation of the
tribal areas in northeastern India and
creation of an independent state of
Tripura but was neutralized by 1983.

All Tripura Security Armed Force
(ATSAF): a Tripura separatist
organization and splinter of NLFT,
possibly founded during the 1990s, its
goal was the liberation of the tribal areas
in northeastern India and creation of an
independent state of Tripura, although
rumored as having more to do with
organized crime. ATSAF is no longer
active.
All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF): a Tripura
separatist organization founded in India
1990 by Ranjit Debbarma and other
dissenting members of TNV as the All
Tripura Tribal Force, its goal is to
liberate the tribal areas in northeastern
India and establish a sovereign state of
Tripura. ATTF is also anti-Bengali.
All Tripura Volunteer Association (ATVA):
a Tripura separatist organization and
splinter of NLFT, possibly founded
during the 1990s, its goal was the
liberation of the tribal areas in
northeastern India and creation of an
independent state of Tripura, although
rumored as having more to do with
organized crime. ATVA is no longer
active.
All Tripura Volunteer Force (ATVF): a
Tripura separatist organization and
splinter of NLFT, likely founded during
the 1990s, its goal was the liberation of
the tribal areas in northeastern India and
creation of an independent state of
Tripura, although rumored as having
more to do with organized crime. ATVF
is no longer active.
Al-Madina Regiment: also known as alMadinah; founded in 2002 as an Islamic
Kashmiri separatist organization, its goal
is to establish an Islamic state in
Malaysia.
Al-Madinah: see Al-Madina Regiment
Al-Mansoorain: founded in 2003 as a branch
of LeT, its goal is to liberate Kashmiris

103

from India and establish an independent
state of Kashmir.
Al-Qassam: see Saraya al-Quds
Al-Quds Battalions: see Saraya al-Quds
Al-Quds Brigades: see Saraya al-Quds
Al-Reish Brigades: see Abu al-Rish
Brigades
Al-Saiqa: founded by Syrian Ba'athists in
1966 as a Syrian branch of al-Fatah and
PLO, its goal is the liberation of
Palestine, mostly providing support
beneficial to Syrian policies.
Apocu Genclik Intikam Mufrezeleri, “Apo's
Youth Revenge Brigades:” founded in
Turkey around 1999 by Kurd separatists
in retaliation to the apprehension of
Abdullah Ocalan, the founder of the
PKK, and has been inactive since 1999.
Apo'nun Intikam Sahinler, “Revenge Hawks
of Apo:” a Kurdish separatist
organization founded in Turkey around
1999 in retaliation to the apprehension of
Abdullah Ocalan, the founder of the
PKK, and has been inactive since 1999.
Apo's Youth Revenge Brigades: see Apocu
Genclik Intikam Mufrezeleri
Arab Liberation Front (ALF): also known as
Jabhat al-Tahrir al-'Arabiyya; founded
by Iraqi Ba'athists in 1969 as an Iraqi
branch of al-Fatah and PLO, its goal is
the destruction of Israel and liberation of
Palestine.
Arab Organization: see May 15
Organization for the Liberation of
Palestine
Arab Revolutionary Brigades: see Fatah alQiyadah al-Thawriyyah
Arab Revolutionary Council: see Fatah alQiyadah al-Thawriyyah
Arab Revolutionary Expansion Movement:
see Harakat al-Madd al-Thawri al-Arabi
Arab Revolutionary Resurgence Movement
(ARRM): see Harakat al-Madd alThawri al Arabi
Arab Revolutionary Surge: see Harakat alMadd al-Thawri al-Arabi

Armata Corsa, “Corsican Army:” founded
by factionalized members of FLNC,
Jean-Michel Rossi and Francois Santoni,
in 1999, deterred by FLNC’s links to
organized crime, but still shares the goal
of establishing an independent Corsican
state.
Armata di Liberazione Naziunale (ALN):
formed by Corsican separatists in France
around 2002 but has been inactive since
although its existence is questionable.
Armed Commandos of Liberation: see
Comandos Armados de Liberacion
Armed Forces of National Liberation: see
Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion
Nacional
Armee Revolutionnaire Bretonne (ARB),
“Breton Revolutionary Army:” also
known as Emgann; formed in France in
1971as the militant branch of the Front
de Liberation Breton (FLB), which has
links with ETA, and seeks to establish an
independent state of Brittany.
Army of Mohammed: see Jaish-eMohammed
Army of the Prophet: see Jaish-eMohammed
Army of the Pure: see Lashkar-e-Toiba
Army of the Righteous: see Lashkar-e-Toiba
Arteshen Rizgariya Gelli Kurdistan
(ARGK), “People's Liberation Army of
Kurdistan:” also known as Kurdistan
National Liberty Army, and People's
Defense Force; founded in 1984 as a
militant branch of the PKK, its goal the
liberation of Kurdistan from Turkey.
August 23 Movement: possibly arose in
Lebanon in 1982 from Palestinian and
Lebanese leftists, although its existence
is questionable.
Babbar Khalsa International (BKI): a Sikh
separatist organization founded in India
around 1978, its goal is to establish an
independent state of Khalistan in the
Punjab Province of northern India.
Badr Force: see Quwat Badr
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Baganda Youth Movement: founded in 1994
by Bagandans in Uganda, its goal is to
achieve an independent Buganda state.
Baloch Liberation Army: see Baluchistan
Liberation Army
Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA): also
known as Baloch Liberation Army;
founded between 2000 and 2003 by
Baloch separatists in Pakistan. Its goal is
to gain sovereignty for Baluchistan.
Barisan Bersatu Merdeka Pattani, “United
Front for the Independence of Pattani:”
also known as Bersatu, “Solidified,” Ber
Satu, and Payong Organization; founded
Thailand in 1989 by members of
Mujahadeen Pattani, BRN, and PULO,
active in northern Malaysia and southern
Thailand, its goal is an independent
Malay state of Pattani.
Barisan Nasional Pembe-Basan Pattani
(BNPP), “National Liberation Front of
Pattani:” founded first in 1947 and
reorganized in 1960, its goal was the
establishment of an independent Pattani
state in southern Thailand. BNPP has
been inactive since the 1980s.
Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Pattani
(BRN), “National Revolutionary Front:”
founded by Ustaz Karim Haji Hassan in
1963 as a breakaway sect of BNPP,
active in Malaysia and Thailand, its goal
was to create an independent Malay
state, Pattani. Losing strength during the
1970s, BRN may have merged into
Bersatu.
Basque Homeland Freedom: see Euskadi ta
Askatazuna
Bayelsa Youths Federation of Nigeria
(BAYOF): a militant Ijaw organization
founded in Nigeria in 1960, the Ijaw are
pursuing an independent state in the
Niger-Delta of Ijawland.
BdSF: see National Democratic Front of
Bodoland
Bearer of the Sword: see Abu Sayyaf Group

Belier Party: a Jura or Jurassian separatist
organization operating in Switzerland,
possibly formed prior to 1985, its status
is currently unclear.
Bhindranwale Tiger Force of Khalistan
(BTFK): a Sikh separatist organization
founded by Gurbachan Singh Manochal
in India in 1984, its goal was the
establishment of an independent Sikh
state of Khalistan in the Punjab Province
of northern India. Its status is currently
unclear.
Birsa Commando Force (BCF): founded by
Santhal separatists in India in 1996, its
goal was the establishment of an
independent Bodo state. The BCF has
recognized a ceasefire since 2004.
Black Liberation Army (BLA): founded by
former members of the Black Panther
Party in the United States in 1971 for
violently pursuing the self-determination
of African-Americans. The BLA is no
longer active.
Black Panthers (West Bank/Gaza): founded
in Israel in 1988, funded by al-Fatah for
violent resistance and Israel, it appears
to have been inactive since 2005.
Black September Organization (BSO):
founded in 1971 as a splinter of al-Fatah
in retaliation of Jordan removing the
PLO. BSO is no longer active.
Black Widows: see Chyornyye Vdovy
Bodo Liberation Tiger Force (BLTF): see
Bodo Liberation Tigers
Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT): also known
as Bodo Liberation Tiger Force (BLTF)
and Terrorist Group of Assam: founded
by Prem Singh Brahma in 1996 in
Assam, India, its goal was to establish a
sovereign Bodo state. In 2003, BLT
negotiated a ceasefire and disbanded.
Bodo Security Force (BSF): see National
Democratic Front of Bodoland
Borok National Council of Tripura (BNCT):
a Tripura separatist organization founded
India in 2000 as a breakaway of the
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NLFT due to tribal factionalism; its goal
is the liberation of the tribal areas in
northeastern India and creation of an
independent state of Tripura.
Bosnian Serb Armed Militia (BSA):
established in 1991 as a splinter of the
Yugoslav Peoples Army (JNA),
comprising Bosnian Serbs, the BSA
fought along side the JNA during the
Bosnian-Kosovo conflict. As a loose
collaboration of Chetnik militias, it
launched a terror campaign pursuing an
ethnic Serbian state of Srpska.
Boys of the Ijaw god of War: see Egbesu
Boys
Breton Revolutionary Army: see Armee
Revolutionnaire Bretonne
Catalan Liberation Front: see Front
d'Alliberament Català
Catalan Red Liberation Army (CRLA), also
known as Exèrcit Roja d'Alliberament
Català: a Catalan separatist organization
possibly founded during the late 1980s.
Its status is unknown.
Catholic Reaction Force (CRF): founded in
1983 in Northern Ireland as a branch of
the INLA. CRF shares INLA’s goal for
establishing an independent Irish state.
Chikoko Movement: a pan-Niger Delta
militant organization founded in 1997 as
a coalition of IYC and Egbesu,
comprising Andonis, Ijaws, Ikwerres,
Ilajes, Iteskiris, Ogonis, and Urhobos,
led by Oronto Douglas, it seeks
protection and self-determination for the
ethnic groups of southern Nigeria.
Chin National Front: a Zomi (Chin)
separatist organization founded in
Burma in 1967, its purpose is to
establish an independent Chin state.
Chittagong Hill Tracts United People’s
Party: see Parbatya Chattagram Jana
Sanghati Samity
Chyornyye Vdovy, “Black Widows:” began
in 2000 in Russia with Chechen widows
becoming suicide bombers after being

taught that their husbands died in clashes
against Russian forces as punishment for
their sins, and subsequently becoming a
burden on Chechen separatists.
Clandestini: see Clandestinu
Clandestinu: also known as Clandestini:
founded in France by Corsican
separatists around 1999, although
inactive, elements Clandestinu may have
merged with Clandestini Corsi.
Comandos Armados de Liberacion (CAL),
“Armed Commandos of Liberation:”
founded in 1968 by Puerto Rican
separatists, its goal was to establish a
sovereign state of Puerto Rico. CAL
disbanded by 1972, with some members
creating FALN in 1974.
Continuity Army Council: see Continuity
Irish Republican Army
Continuity IRA: see Continuity Irish
Republican Army
Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA):
also known as Irish Continuity Army
Council (ICAC), Continuity IRA, and
Continuity Army Council: founded in
Northern Ireland in 1968, its goal is to
reunite north and south Ireland as a
sovereign state.
Corsican Army: see Armata Corsa
Corsican Patriotic Front (FPC): formed in
1999 by Corsican nationalists and
members the FLNC and other Corsican
terrorist organizations, in 2002 it
negotiated a ceasefire, remaining
inactive since.
Corsican Revolutionary Armed Forces
(FARC): see Front Armi
Revolutionnaire Corse
Dagestan Liberation Army: founded in 1999
by Dagestan separatists, its goal is to
establish a sovereign Islamic Republic of
Dagestan, but has not been a violent
threat since 2004.
Dagestani Shari'ah Jamaat: also known as
Islamic Jamaat of Dagestan and
Dzhennet, “Paradise;” founded in 2002

106

in northeastern Russia by Chechen
separatists. Its goal is to establish an
independent Islamic state of Chechnya.
Darfur Liberation Front (DLF): founded in
2002 by members of the Fur tribe in
Sudan, its goals was to liberate Darfur
from Sudan and create an independent
state. In 2003, DLF became the SLM.
Daughters of Faith: see Dhtaran-e-Millat
Daughters of the Nation: see Dhtaran-eMillat
Democratic Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (DFLP): also known as
Popular Democratic Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP), and alJabha al-Dimuqratiyya li-Tahrir Filastin:
founded by Nayaf Hawatmeh in 1969
based on Marxist philosophy, its goals
are the destruction of Israel and creation
of a socialist Palestinian state.
Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA):
also known as Progressive Buddhist
Karen National Organization, and
Democratic Karen Buddhist Association;
a Karen separatist organization, DKBA
is the militant branch of the Democratic
Karen Buddhist Association, a
breakaway element of the KNU.
Founded in 1995, it violently opposes
the KNU and seeks to establish a
sovereign Karen state known as Kayin in
the northern regions of Burma.
Democratic Karen Buddhist Association: see
Democratic Karen Buddhist Army
Dhtaran-e-Millat (DeM), “Daughters of the
Nation:” also known as Daughters of
Faith; founded by Asiya Andrabi in 1987
as a Kashmiri Islamic women’s
organization, its goal is to liberate
Kashmir from India although supporting
annexation by Pakistan.
Dima Halam Daoga (DHD): founded by
Jewel Garlossa in 1996 as a breakaway
sect of the Dimasa National Security
Force (DNSF). DHD aspires to carryon
DNSF’s goal of gaining Assamese

independence from India. Currently,
DHD is recognizing a ceasefire.
Dogu Turkistan Kurtulush Orgutu: see
Sharq azat Turkistan
Dzhennet: see Dagestani Shari'ah Jamaat
East Turkistan Liberation Organization
(ETLO): see Sharq azat Turkistan
Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation
Front (EPRLF): founded by Sri Lankan
separatists in 1980, EPRLF worked as a
terrorist organization throughout the
1980s seeking to establish independence
for Tamil Eelam, after which it began
reestablishing itself and is now a
political party.
Eelam Revolutionary Organization of
Students (EROS): also known
Revolutionary Eelam Organization;
founded in 1975 by Tamil separatists in
Sri Lanka and was the first Tamil
separatist terrorist organization, its goal
was to establish an independent Tamil
state known as Tamil Eelam, comprised
of pre-colonial Tamil territory on the
island of Ceylon (Sri Lanka).
Egbesu Boys, “Boys of the Ijaw god of
War:” also known as Egbesu Cult, and
Warring Ijaw Youths; possibly founded
in 1999 in Nigeria as a militant branch
for either the Ijaw National Congress or
the Ijaw Youth Movement, used as a
militant force, it supports the Ijaw
movement pursuing self-determination
and sovereignty over Ijawland the NigerDelta.
Egbesu Cult: see Egbesu Boys
Ein Tyrol: a South Tyrolean separatist
organization founded in Italy in 1960, its
status is currently unclear.
Ejercito Popular de Boricua (EPB): also
known as Macheteros: founded in 1978
by Puerto Rican separatists, its goal is to
establish a sovereign state of Puerto
Rico.
Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF): founded in
Egypt in 1960 by Eritrean students, its
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goal was to achieve Eritrean
independence from Ethiopia. In 1970,
ELF split and EPLF emerged as the
dominant force. In 1991, Eritrea gained
its independence.
Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF):
founded in Ethiopia in 1970 by Isaias
Afewerki following a split in ELF, its
goal was to liberate Eritrea from
Ethiopia, in 1991 defeated Ethiopian
forces, and secured Eritrean sovereignty.
ETA militar: resulted from ETA
factionalizing in 1974, and reclaimed
ETA’s title following ETA p-m’s
dissolution in 1982.
ETA politico-militar: resulted from ETA
factionalizing in 1974, strongly
influenced by communist ideology, it
sought a sovereign socialist Basque
state, Euskadi. In 1982, ETA p-m
negotiated a ceasefire and disbanded.
ETA-V: formed in 1971, when ETA
fractured over the dispute between
Marxism versus ethnic struggle. Focused
more on ethnicity, ETA-V united with
Euzko Gaztedi del interior (EGI)Batasuna, “United Basque Youth,” in
1972 to reemerge as ETA.
ETA-VI: formed in 1971, following a split
in ETA over a Marxist versus ethnic
dispute, more interested in Marxist
struggle, ETA-VI merged with the
Revolutionary Communist League
(LCR) in 1973.
Euskadi ta Askatazuna (ETA), “Basque
Homeland and Freedom:” founded in
Spain in 1959 by Jose Manuel Aguirre,
Jose Maria Benito del Valle, Julen
Madariage, and Jose Luis Alvarez
Enparanza, and is a breakaway group of
the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV).
Active in Spain and France, ETA is
among the longest lasting and most
destructive terrorist groups. Its goal is to
establish an independent Basque,
Euskadi, comprising the historic Basque

lands in northern Spain and southern
France.
Exèrcit Roja d'Alliberament Català: see
Catalan Red Liberation Army
Falcon: see Shahin
Fatah Abu Musa: see Al-Fatah Intifada
Fatah al-Qiyadah al-Thawriyyah, “Abu
Nidal Organization (ANO):” also known
as Revolutionary Organization of
Socialist Muslims, Arab Revolutionary
Council, Fatah Revolutionary Council,
and Arab Revolutionary Brigades;
founded in 1974 as breakaway group
from the PLO, its goal is the liberation
of Palestine but has been in decline since
the 1980s.
Fatah Hawks: see Abu al-Rish Brigades
Fatah Revolutionary Council: see Fatah alQiyadah al-Thawriyyah
Fatah Uprising: see Al-Fatah Intifada
Fateh: see Al-Fatah
FLNC du Mai 1996: founded in 1996 by
members of Corsica Viva, formerly
belonging to FLNC-canal habituel, its
goal was the establishment of an
independent Corsican state. In 1999, it
fused with canal historique, Fronte
Ribellu, Resistenza, and Clandestinu to
reestablish FLNC.
FLNC-canal habituel, “usual channel:”
founded in France in 1990 after
factionalism led to a split in FLNC, its
goal was to establish a sovereign Corsica
state. In 1996, canal habituel was
disbanded by its public front,
Movimentu pá l’Autodeterminazione
(MPA). Many members joined the
Rinnovu Naziunale Party (RN), others
created Corsica Viva, which later
became FLNC du 5 Mai 1996.
FLNC-canal historique, “historic channel:”
founded in France in 1990 after
factionalism led to a split in FLNC, its
goal was to establish a sovereign Corsica
state. Between 1998 and 1999, canal
historique fused with FLNC du Mai
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1996, Fronte Ribellu, Resistenza, and
Clandestinu to reestablish itself as the
FLNC Union des combatants.
Free Aceh Movement: see National
Liberation Front of Acheh Sumatra
Free Land: see Terra Lliure
Free Papua Movement: see Organisasi
Papua Merdeka
Free People of Galilee: also known as the
Galilee Liberators; founded by Israeli
Arabs in 2003. It has no known terrorist
links and no longer considered a violent
threat.
Front Armi Revolutionnaire Corse (FR):
also known as Corsican Revolutionary
Armed Forces (FARC): founded by
Corsican separatists in France in 1992,
its goal is to establish a sovereign
Corsican state.
Front d'Alliberament Català (FAC),
“Catalan Liberation Front:” a Catalonian
separatist organization founded in 1969
in Spain as a breakaway sect of the
Catalan National Front (FNC). Its goal
was to liberate Cataluña but dissolved in
the mid 1970s.
Front de Liberation Nationale de la Corse:
see Fronte di Liberazione Naziunale di a
Corsica
Front for Mauritanian Armed Resistance:
see Front Uni pour la Resistance Arm^e
en Mauritanie
Front for the Liberation of the French
Somali Coast (FLCS): also known as
Somali Coast Liberation Front; founded
around 1962 in French colonized
Djibouti, comprised of Issaq Somalis, it
fought to liberate the French colonies.
Successful in its struggle, Djibouti
became independence in 1977.
Front Uni pour la Resistance Arm^e en
Mauritanie (FURAM), “Front for
Mauritanian Armed Resistance:” a
Kewri resistance organization founded in
Mauritania in 1990, although waging
open rebellion, FURAM also used

terrorism as a tertiary tactic; its status is
currently unclear.
Front Unifié pour la Libération des Races
Opprimées (FULRO): a Montagnard
resistance movement founded in
Vietnam around 1960 to resist the
Vietcong and establish an independent
state in the highlands of Vietnam.
Fronte di Liberazione Naziunale di a Corsica
(FLNC), “National Liberation Front of
Corsica:” also known as Front de
Liberation Nationale de la Corse;
established in 1976 as fusion of GP and
FPCL, its goal is to gain Corsican
independence from France.
Fronte Paesanu Corsu di Liberazione
(FPCL): founded in 1973 by Corsican
separatists in France, its goal was to
establish a sovereign state of Corsica. In
1976, FPCL fused with GP to form
FLNC.
Fronte Ribellu: founded in 1996 by Corsican
separatists in France and in 1999 fused
with FLNC du Mai 1996, FLNC-canal
historique, Resistenza, and Clandestinu
to establish the FLNC Union des
combatants
Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional
(FALN), “Armed Forces of National
Liberation:” also known as Fuerzas
Armadas de Liberacion Nacional
Puertoriquena; founded by remnants of
CAL in 1974, operating in the United
States and Puerto Rico, its goal was to
establish a sovereign state of Puerto Rico
but has been inactive since the mid
1980s.
Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional
Puertoriquena: see Fuerzas Armadas de
Liberacion Nacional
Fuerzas de Liberación Africanas de
Mauritania (FLAM): a Kewri separatist
organization founded in Mauritania in
1983, it fought for Kewri independence
throughout the 1980s but suffered
significant losses. Since the 1980s,
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FLAM has worked through legitimate
political channels.
Galilee Liberators: see Free People of
Galilee
Gazteriak, “Youth:” founded in 1994 in
France. Its goal is to reunite the historic
Basque land in northern Spain and
southern France as a sovereign Basque
state.
Gerakan Aceh Merdika (GAM): see
National Liberation Front of Acheh
Sumatra
Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Pattani (GMIP),
“Islamic Mujahidin Movement of
Pattani:” founded by Nasoree Saesaeng
in Thailand in 1995 as Malay-Muslim
separatist organization, its goal is to
establish an independent Pattani state.
Ghjustizia Paolina (GP): founded in 1974 in
France by Corsican separatists, its goal
was to establish a sovereign state of
Corsica. In 1976, GP fused with FPCL
to form FLNC.
God's Army of the Holy Mountain: a Karen
separatist organization founded by
Luther and Johnny Htoo in 1997 as a
KNU splinter group, its goal was to
establish a sovereign Karen state known
as Kayin in the northern regions of
Burma. God’s Army suffered significant
losses during the early 2000s and now
appears inactive.
Gora Euskadi Askatuta, “Long Live a Free
Basque Homeland:” founded in 2002 by
Basque nationalists in France. Its goal is
to gain an independent Basque state of
Euskadi, comprising the historic Basque
lands in northern Spain and southern
France. Currently, its members may be
working with other Basque terrorist
organizations.
Hamas: also known as Islamic Resistance
Movement, and Harakat alMuqawammah al-Islammiyya; formed in
Israel in 1987 as a splinter of the Muslim

Brotherhood. Its goal is to destroy Israel
and establish a Palestinian Sunni state.
Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami Fi Filastin,
“Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ):” formed
around 1979 as a splinter organization of
the Muslim Brotherhood, a fusion of
Palestinian nationalism and Sunni Islam,
small but active throughout the Middle
East, PIJ seeks the destruction of Israel
and liberation of Palestine.
Harakat al-Madd al-Thawri al-Arabi, “Arab
Revolutionary Resurgence Movement
(ARRM):” also known as Arab
Revolutionary Surge, Revolutionary
Outburst Movement, and Arab
Revolutionary Expansion Movement;
founded around 1993 in Lebanon as a
pro-Palestinian organization. ARRM has
been inactive since 1993.
Harakat al-Muqawammah al-Islammiyya:
see Hamas
Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM): founded in
Pakistan in 1985, HUM is an Islamic
terrorist organization linked to Al-Qaeda
and al-Faran, of its goals include
supporting Kashmiri separatism in India.
Harek at-Tahrir al-Wataniyyeh alFilastiniyyeh: see Al-Fatah
Harkat ul-Ansar (HuA): founded in India in
1993 as a Kashmiri separatist
organization, supported by Pakistani
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and
thought to be a militant branch of
Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islami (JUI), a
Pakistani Islamic political party, HuA
has been inactive since 1996.
Hezbollah, “Party of God:” also known as
Revolutionary Justice Organization,
Organization of the Oppressed on Earth,
The Islamic Resistance, Islamic Jihad,
and Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of
Palestine, founded by Shia clergyman in
Lebanon in 1982, following the Israeli
invasion. Its goals include the
destruction of Israel, liberation of
Palestine, eradication of Western
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influence from the Middle East, and
establishment of a Lebanese theocracy.
Hizb ul-Mujahidin: see Hizbul Mujahideen
Hizbul Mujahideen (HM): also known as
HM of the Jamaat-e-Islami, and Hizb ulMujahidin; founded in 1995 as a militant
branch of Jamaat-i-Islami, a Pakistani
Islamic political party, HM is the biggest
Kashmiri militant organization,
supporting Kashmir liberation from
India although favoring irredentism to
Pakistan.
HM of the Jamaat-e-Islami: see Hizbul
Mujahideen
Holy War Warriors: see Laskar Jihad
Iduwini Youths: see Ijaw Youth Movement
Ijaw National Congress (INC): founded in
1992 as an amalgamation of multiple
Ijaw groups in the Niger-Delta, its goals
include the creation of a sovereign Ijaw
state in southern Nigeria known as
Ijawland
Ijaw Youth Movement: also known as
Iduwini Youths: possibly organized in
1999 in Nigeria as the militant branch of
the Iduwini National Movement for
Peace and Development (INMPD), its
goal is to liberate Ijaw territory in NigerDelta.
Ijaw Youths Council (IYC): founded in
Nigeria in 1998, its goal is to unite the
Ijaw and pursue self-determination in the
Niger Delta.
Independent Armed Revolutionary
Movement (MIRA): a Puerto Rican
separatist organization founded Filiberto
Ojeda Rios in 1967, its goal was to
secede from the United States and
establish an independent state of Puerto
Rico. MIRA has been inactive since the
1970s.
International Islamic Battalion: see Islamic
International Peacekeeping Brigade
International Islamic Brigade: see Islamic
International Peacekeeping Brigade

Internet Black Tigers (IBT): founded around
1997 as a cyber militant branch of
LTTE, its goal is to establish an
independent Tamil state known as Tamil
Eelam, comprised of pre-colonial Tamil
territory on the island of Ceylon (Sri
Lanka). Offensives by Sri Lankan forces
in 2009 seriously crippled LTTE, and its
ability to continue is in question.
Iparretarrek (IK), “Northerners:” founded in
1973 by Basque nationalists in France
following an industrial dispute in BeheNafarroa. IK is a splinter organization of
ETA, seeking to reunite the historic
Basque lands in northern Spain and
southern France as the sovereign Basque
state of Euskadi.
Iraqi Liberation Army: see Jaish al-Tahrir
al-Iraqi
Irish Continuity Army Council (ICAC): see
Continuity Irish Republican Army
Irish National Liberation Army (INLA): also
known as the People’s Republican Army
(PRA) and People’s Liberation Army
(PLA), formed by Seamus Costello in
Northern Ireland in 1974 as a militant
arm of the Irish Republican Socialist
Party (IRSP), its goal was to establish an
independent Irish state. Although no
longer a terrorist organization, INLA
remains involved with organized crime.
Irish Republican Army (IRA), also known
as Provos and Provisional Irish
Republican Army (PIRA); founded in
1922 following the Anglo-Irish Treaty.
Its goal was to establish a sovereign Irish
state. In 2005, the IRA officially
declared a ceasefire.
Islamic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(IFLP): see Al-Jabhah al-Islamiyah
litahrir Filastin
Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade
(IIPB): also known as International
Islamic Brigade and International
Islamic Battalion: founded by Shamil
Basayev Ibn al-Khattab in Chechnya in
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1998, its goal is to create a Chechen
theocracy, strictly prescribing to Sharia
law.
Islamic Jamaat of Dagestan: see Dagestani
Shari'ah Jamaat
Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine:
see Hezbollah
Islamic Jihad: see Hezbollah
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU):
also known as Islamic Party of
Turkistan: an Islamic separatist
organization founded in 1998 and
connected to Osama bin Laden, it works
with Uyghur separatists to establish an
Islamic state across Central Asia.
Islamic Mujahidin Movement of Pattani: see
Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Pattani
Islamic Party of Turkistan: see Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan
Islamic Resistance Movement: see Hamas
Jabhat al-Kifah al-Sha'bi, “Popular Struggle
Front (PSF):” also known as Palestinian
Popular Struggle Front; formed in 1967
as a splinter of al-Fatah. Its goal was the
liberation of Palestine and since the
1990s evolved into a nonviolent political
organization.
Jabhat al-Tahrir al-'Arabiyya: see Arab
Liberation Front
Jaish al-Tahrir al-Iraqi (ILA), “Iraqi
Liberation Army:” founded by Kurdish
separatists in 1980, its goal was to
liberate Kurds from Turkey and Iraq and
establish a sovereign state of Kurdistan.
ILA has been inactive since 1981.
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM): also known as
Mohammed, Army of Mohammed,
Tehrik Ul-Furqaan, Army of the
Prophet, Mohammed's Army, National
Movement for the Restoration of
Pakistani Sovereignty and Army of the
Prophet, and Jaish-e-Muhammad
Mujahideen E-Tanzeem: founded by
Maulana Masood Azhar, a member of
HuA, in 2000. Thought to have links
with Al-Qaeda and Pakistani Inter-

Services Intelligence (ISI), it seeks the
liberation of Kashmir from India and
favors irredentism with Pakistan.
Jaish-e-Muhammad Mujahideen ETanzeem: see Jaish-e-Mohammed
Jamiat ul-Mujahedin (JuM): founded in
1990 in order to liberate Kashmir and
Jammu from India, its goal is to annex
these territories with Pakistan
Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Front (JKIF):
founded by Pakistani Inter Services
Intelligence (ISI) in 1994 as a splinter of
the JKLF, its goal was to liberate Jammu
and Kashmir from India but is now
inactive.
Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front
(JKLF): founded in India in 1976 by
Kashmiri separatists, its goal was to
liberate Jammu and Kashmir from India;
originally, JKLF had a large following
although decreasing as Pakistani Inter
Services Intelligence (ISI) recruited its
member to form JKIF in 1994.
Javhadda Waddaniga Xoreynta Ogaddeenya,
“Ogaden National Liberation Front
(ONLF):” founded by Ogaden and
Darood separatists in 1984, linked to
OLF, it seeks to create an independent
Somali state in the Horn of Africa.
Jenin Martyr's Brigade (JMB): founded by
Mahmoud Nashbat in Israel in 2003,
comprised of breakaway elements of
several Palestinian terrorist groups, its
purpose is to protect and liberate
Palestinians.
Jerusalem Battalions: see Saraya al-Quds
Jerusalem Brigades: see Saraya al-Quds
Jordanian National Liberation Movement:
founded in 1972, it has been inactive
since failing to hijack a Jordanian flight
that same year. Although little
information about them is available, it
likely consisted of Palestinians,
motivated by Palestinian liberation and
defiance against Israel and Jordan.
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Justice and Equality Movement (JEM):
founded on or after 2000 as Darfur
separatist organization, led by Khalil
Ibrahim and linked to SLM/SLA. In
2006, JEM fused with SLM to create the
Alliance of Revolutionary Forces of
West Sudan.
KADEK: see Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan
Kamtapur Liberation Organization (KLO):
formed in 1995 by Rajbongshi students
in northeastern India, its goal is to
establish a sovereign Kamtapur, and
receives support from ULFA.
Karen National Union (KNU): also known
as Kayin National Union: a Karen
separatist organization founded in 1959,
it is Burma’s biggest and oldest
insurgent group. Its goal is to establish a
sovereign Karen state known as Kayin in
the northern regions of Burma.
Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP):
a Karen separatist organization founded
by Saw Mah Rew in 1955, although
often acting as a political channel, KNPP
at times commits terrorist acts. The
KNPP recognized a ceasefire in 1995 but
remains a threat against the Burmanese
government.
Khalistan Commando Force (KCF): a Sikh
separatist organization founded by
Sukhdev Singh in India around 1984, its
goal was the establishment of an
independent Sikh state of Khalistan in
the Punjab Province of northern India.
Active throughout the 1980s and early
1990s, it remains active but
factionalized.
Khalistan Liberation Force (KLF): a Sikh
separatist organization founded by
Shaheed Aroor Singh in India in 1986;
its goal was to establish an independent
state of Khalistan in the Punjab Province
of northern India. Its main activity
occurred during the 1980s and early
1990s.
KHK: see Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan

Kongra Gele Kurdistan (PKK/KONGRAGEL), “People’s Congress of
Kurdistan:” established in 2003 as the
title to replace the PKK in an effort to
shed its communist origins but
maintained its goals of Kurdish
independence. PKK/KONGRA-GEL
reassumed the name PKK in 2005.
Kongra-Gel (KGK): see Partiya Karkeran
Kurdistan
Kongreya Azadi u Demokrasiya Kurdistan:
see Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA): also
known as Ushtria Clirimtare E Koseves
(UCK); formed in 1992 in Macedonia
for uniting segments of Albania,
Kosovo, and Macedonia as an ethnic
Albanian nation. Since 1999, KLA has
remained nonviolent.
Kurdish Democratic Party: see Partiya
Demokrat a Kurdistanê
Kurdish Islamic Unity Party: founded in
Turkey in 1995 as a Kurdish separatist
organization, it has been inactive sine
1995 although its existence is
questionable.
Kurdish Patriotic Union (PUK): founded in
1994 as a splinter group of the PKK, its
goals included Kurdish separation from
Turkey. In 1997, PUK merged with the
Kurdistan Allied National Forces.
Kurdistan Freedom Democracy Congress:
see Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan
Kurdistan People's Conference: see Partiya
Karkeran Kurdistan
Kurdistan Workers' Party: see Partiya
Karkeran Kurdistan
Lashkar-e-Taiba: see Lashkar-e-Toiba
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT): see Lashkar-eToiba
Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), “Army of the
Righteous:” also known as Lashkar-eTaiba, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT), and
Army of the Pure; founded in 1984 as a
militant branch of MDI, linked to
Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence
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(ISI), MDI is a Kashmiri separatist
organization in favor of irredentism with
Pakistan.
Laskar Jihad: also known as Holy War
Warriors; founded in 2000 based on
Salafist Islam on Indonesia’s Maluku
Islands. Its nationalist sentiment extends
influence over Acehnese, Sulawesi, and
West Papuans who share the goal of
establishing an Asian Pacific panIslamic state.
Lebanese Resistance Detachments: see
Afwaj al Muqawama al Lubnaniya
Liberation Front of Quebec (FLQ): also
known as Quebec Liberation Front:
founded by Québécois national socialists
in Canada in 1963, its goal was to
establish a sovereign Quebecer state.
FLQ has been inactive since the 1970s.
Liberation of Tripura Tribal Force (LTTF): a
Tripura separatist organization and
splinter of NLFT, possibly founded
during the 1990s, its goal was the
liberation of the tribal areas in
northeastern India and creation of an
independent state of Tripura, although
rumored as having more to do with
organized crime. LTTF is no longer
active.
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE):
founded in 1976 by members of the
Tamil New Tigers, it is Sri’ Lank most
notorious terrorist group, fighting to
establish an independent Tamil state,
Tamil Eelam. Offensives by Sri Lankan
forces in 2009 seriously crippled LTTE,
and its ability to continue is in question.
Long Live a Free Basque Homeland: see
Gora Euskadi Askatuta
Macheteros: see Ejercito Popular de Boricua
Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad (MDI):
founded in 1989 as an Islamic Kashmir
separatist organization, linked to
Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence
(ISI), it favors liberating Kashmiris from

India and favors of irredentism with
Pakistan.
Martyr Abu-Ali Mustafa Brigades: also
known as Red Eagles; began in 2001 as
a militant branch of the PFLP, its goal is
the liberation of Palestine and creation of
a Marxist Palestinian state.
May 15 Organization for the Liberation of
Palestine: also known as Arab
Organization of May 15: formed in 1979
as a breakaway element of the PFLPSpecial Operations Group (SOG),
operating from Iraq, its goal was the
destruction of Israel but disbanded
during the 1980s; several members
joined Fatah.
Milliyetci Kurt Intikam Timleri, “Nationalist
Kurdish Revenge Teams:” founded in
Turkey around 1999 by Kurd separatists
in retaliation to the apprehension of
Abdullah Ocalan, the founder of the
PKK, and has been inactive since 1999.
MNLF Lost Command: founded in 1988,
this group is likely a breakaway group of
MNLF, which seeks to establish an
independent Moro Islamic state in the
southern Philippines.
Mohammed: see Jaish-e-Mohammed
Mohammed's Army: see Jaish-e-Mohammed
Mong Tai Army (MTA): establish in 1963
as a Shan militant organization in
Burma, although its primary purpose
was drug trafficking, segments of MTA
also pursued Shan independence. MTA
is no longer active; some members
refuse to surrender while others went
onto form the Shan State Army (SSA) in
1983.
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF): a
Moro separatist organization founded in
1978 as a breakaway of MNLF, its goal
was to establish an independent Islamic
state in the Philippines. Since 2005,
MILF renounced terrorism, although it
may still be active.

114

Moro Liberation Front (MLF): see Moro
National Liberation Front
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF):
also known as Moro Liberation Front
(MLF); founded by Nur Misuari in the
Philippines in 1968, its purpose was to
establish an autonomous Islamic state in
the Philippines. Throughout the 1970s,
the MNLF had several breakaway
organizations, and in the 1990s entered
peace talks, although Nur Misuari
remains a committed terrorist.
Movement of Hope: see Afwaj al
Muqawama al Lubnaniya
Movsar Baryayev Gang: founded around
2002, is an amalgamation of SPIR and
IIPB. Its goal is to establish an
independent Chechen Islamic state
Mujahideen al-Mansooran: founded in 2002
in India as a Kashmiri separatist
organization, it has been inactive since
2002.
Mujahideen Pattani Movement (BNP):
founded in 1985 by Pattani separatists,
based in Malaysia, BNP sought the
liberation of Pattani territory and
creation of an independent Pattani state.
The BNP is no longer active in Thailand
and works in Malaysia as a political
party.
Naga National Council (NCC): founded in
1946 in India to represent Naga interests,
since its formation, NCC has worked as
both a political and terrorist
organization.
National Democratic Alliance (NDA):
founded in 1994 by Bagandans in
Uganda, although little information on
them is available, a prominent separatist
ideology among Bagandans likely
influences NDA ideology, which has
been mostly inactive since 1995.
National Democratic Front of Bodoland
(NDFB): also known as Bodo Security
Force (BSF) and (BdSF); founded by

Ranjan Daimary in India in 1988, for
achieving a sovereign Bodo state.
National Liberation Front of Acheh Sumatra
(NLFAS): also known as Aceh Merdeka
and Gerakan Aceh Merdika (GAM),
“Free Aceh Movement;” formed in 1976
by Hasan di Tyro based on Suku Aceh
ethnicity and Islam, active in Indonesia,
Malaysia, and Sweden, its goal is to
establish a sovereign theocracy in
Indonesia’s Aceh Province of Sumatra.
National Liberation Front of Corsica: see
Fronte di Liberazione Naziunale di a
Corsica
National Liberation Front of Pattani: see
Barisan Nasional Pembe-Basan Pattani
National Liberation Front of Tripura
(NLFT): a Tripura separatist
organization founded in India in 1989 by
Dhananjoy Reang, a former leader of
TNV; its goal is the liberation of the
tribal areas in northeastern India and
creation of an independent state of
Tripura.
National Movement for the Restoration of
Pakistani Sovereignty Army of the
Prophet: see Jaish-e-Mohammed
National Revolutionary Front: see Barisan
Revolusi Nasional Melayu Pattani
National Socialist Council of Nagaland
(NSCN): founded by Thuingaleng
Muivah, Isak Chisi Swu, and S.S.
Khaplang in India in 1980, its goal was
to establish an independent Nagaland in
northeastern India. In 1988, NSCN
fractured into NSCN-IM and NSCN-K.
National Socialist Council of NagalandIsak-Muivah (NSCN-IM): founded by
Thuingaleng Muivah and Isak Chisi Swu
following a split in NSCN in 1988, its
goal is to establish an independent
Nagaland in northeastern India
National Socialist Council of NagalandKhaplang (NSCN-K): established
following a split in NSCN in 1988 by
S.S. Khaplang, a cofounder of NSCN; its
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goal is to establish an independent
Nagaland in northeastern India.
Nationalist Kurdish Revenge Teams: see
Milliyetci Kurt Intikam Timleri
New Pattani United Liberation Organization
(New PULO): founded in Thailand in
1995 by factionalized members of
PULO, active in northern Malaysia and
southern Thailand, its goal is the
creation of an independent Malay state,
Pattani.
Northerners: see Iparretarrek
Odua People's Congress (OPC): also known
as Yoruba O'odua Peoples' Congress;
founded originally by Frederick Fasehun
founded in Nigeria in 1995 to advocate
for Yoruba rights; however in 1999,
Gani Adams led a breakaway militant
faction to establish Yoruba
independence.
Official IRA (OIRA): founded in 1969 in
Northern Ireland, its goal was to
establish a Marxist based independent
Irish state. In 1972, OIRA declared a
ceasefire, remaining inactive since.
Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF):
see Javhadda Waddaniga Xoreynta
Oglaigh Na hEireann, “Real Irish
Republican Army (RIRA):” also known
as True IRA and Real IRA; founded in
1998 as a splinter group opposing a
ceasefire and negotiations between IRA
and British forces. RIRA remains active.
Omega-7: established in 1974 in the United
States as a Cuban liberation movement,
although unsuccessful in its endeavor
Omega-7 turned to drug trafficking, and
subsequently neutralized by the FBI in
the early 1980s.
Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM), “Free
Papua Movement:” founded in 1963 as a
liberation movement, it became an
insurgent group in 1969. OPM operates
in Papua New Guinea and Indonesia, its
goal is to create a independent state in

western New Guinea known as West
Papua.
Organization of the Oppressed on Earth: see
Hezbollah
Oromo Liberation Front (OLF): an Oromo
separatist organization founded in 1973,
linked ONLF, its goal is to secede the
historic Oromo homeland from Ethiopia,
comprising more than half Ethiopia’s
territory. OLF has been inactive since
2002.
Our Kashmir: see Panun Kashmir
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO):
founded by Yassir Arafat during the
Palestinian Congress in 1964, connected
to al-Fatah, its goal was the liberation of
Palestine. Following the Oslo Accords in
1993, many Arafat loyalists renounced
terrorism and now pursue Palestinian
sovereignty through legitimate political
channels.
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ): see Harakat
al-Jihad al-Islami Fi Filastin
Palestinian Popular Struggle Front: see
Jabhat al-Kifah al-Sha'bi
Palestinian Revolution Forces General
Command: founded in 1985, possibly as
a branch of the PLO, its goal was the
liberation of Palestine but has been
inactive since 1987.
Panun Kashmir, “Our Kashmir:” a Kashmiri
separatist organization founded in India
in 1990, its goal is to increase rights for
Kashmiri Hindus and establish an
independent Kashmir state.
Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity
(PCJSS), “Chittagong Hill Tracts United
People’s Party:” founded in Bangladesh
in 1975 by Chittagong separatists, its
goal is to gain independence in the
Chittagong Hill Tracts and expel the
Bengali Muslims from the region.
Partit Socialista d’Alliberament Nacionalprovisional (PSAN-p), the “Socialist
Party of National LiberationProvisional:” a Catalonian separatist
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organization founded in 1969 as a
breakaway group from the Catalan
National Front (FNC). PSAN-p is no
longer active.
Partiya Demokrat a Kurdistanê (KDP),
“Kurdish Democratic Party:” founded in
Kurdistan in 1946 to pursue Kurdish
autonomy from in Iraq. After the fall of
the Saddam regime, KDP assumed a
legitimate role in Iraqi politics.
Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (PKK),
“Kurdistan Workers' Party:” also known
as Kurdistan People's Conference, the
People’s Congress of Kurdistan,
Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy
Congress, KADEK, Kongreya Azadi u
Demokrasiya Kurdistan, KHK, KongraGel (KGK): founded by Turkish Kurds
in 1974 based on Marxist ideology. Led
by Abdullah Ocalan, it sought an
independent Kurdish socialist state. The
PKK has since denounced communism
but continues pursing Kurdish liberation.
Party of God: see Hezbollah
Patriotic Union of Kurd: see Yaketi
Nishtimani Kurdistan
Pattani United Liberation Organization
(PULO): founded in 1968 by Pattani
separatists, active in Thailand and
Malaysia and more moderate or
secularist than other Malay-Muslim
separatist groups, active in northern
Malaysia and southern Thailand, its goal
is to separate from Thailand and create
an independent Malay state of Pattani.
People’s Congress of Kurdistan: see Kongra
Gele Kurdistan
People’s Congress of Kurdistan: see Partiya
Karkeran Kurdistan
People’s Liberation Army (PLA): founded
by Bisheswar Singh and other Meitei
separatists in Manipur, India in 1978, to
India’s northeastern tribes and liberate
Manipur.
People’s Liberation Army (PLA): see Irish
National Liberation Army

People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil
Eelam (PLOTE): founded in 1979 by
Uma Maheswaran, a former leader in the
LTTE, and remnants of the People’s
Liberation Front (JVP), a Sri Lankan
communist resistance group founded in
1967, PLOTE sought independence for
Tamil Eelam. PLOTE began declining
during the 1980s from incursions with
LTTE.
People’s Republican Army (PRA): see Irish
National Liberation Army
People's Defense Forces (HPG): founded by
Turkish Kurds in the 1990’s as the
militant branch of the Kongra-Gel, its
goal is the establishment of a sovereign
Kurdish state.
People's Liberation Army of Kurdistan: see
Arteshen Rizgariya Gelli Kurdistan
People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak
(PREPAK): founded in 1977 by R.K.
Tulachandra in India as a Manipur
separatist organization, originally
representing the Naga, Kuki, and Meitei,
although evolving into a predominately
Meitei organization, its goal is to create
an independent state in northeastern
India.
PFLP-General Command (GC): founded by
Ahmed Jabril in 1968 as a splinter of the
PFLP, its goal was the destruction of
Israel and liberation of Palestine. During
the 1970s, PFLP-GC became staunchly
opposed to Arafat, Fatah, and the PLO.
Based in Lebanon, PFLP-GC has links
with Hamas and continues its attacks
against Israel.
Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation
of Palestine (PDFLP): see Democratic
Front for the Liberation of Palestine
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP): see Al-Jabha ash-Sha'abiya liTahrir Falastin
Popular Resistance Committees (PRC):
founded by Jamal Abu Samhadana in
Gaza in 2000, comprising secularists and
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religious Palestinians, PRC is committed
to Israeli destruction and Palestinian
liberation.
Popular Struggle Front (PSF): see Jabhat alKifah al-Sha'bi
Progressive Buddhist Karen National
Organization: see Democratic Karen
Buddhist Army
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA):
see Irish Republican Army
Provos: see Irish Republican Army
Puerto Rican Resistance Movement:
founded in 1981 and considered to be a
Puerto Rican separatist movement. Little
is known about this movement, which
has been inactive since 1981.
Quebec Liberation Front: see Liberation
Front of Quebec
Quebec National Liberation Movement:
founded in 1995 by Raymond
Villeneuve, a former member of FLQ, its
purpose is the continuation of FLQ’s
goal of Québécois separatism.
Quwat Badr, “Badr Force:” founded around
2001 in the West Bank and Gaza, its
goal is the liberation of Palestine but is
no longer active and likely merged with
a larger terrorist organization.
Real IRA: see Oglaigh Na hEireann
Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA): see
Oglaigh Na hEireann
Red Eagles: see Martyr Abu-Ali Mustafa
Brigades
Republic of New Africa (RNA): began
following the Detroit Conference of
Militant African-American Nationalists
in 1968. Based on communist ideology,
its goal was to gain Black sovereignty
over Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana,
Mississippi, and South Carolina.
Currently, the RNA works as a nonviolent political organization.
Resistenza Corsa: see Accolta Nazinuale
Corsa
Revenge Hawks of Apo: see Apo'nun
Intikam Sahinler

Revolutionary Eelam Organization: see
Eelam Revolutionary Organization of
Students
Revolutionary Justice Organization: see
Hezbollah
Revolutionary Organization of Socialist
Muslims: see Fatah al-Qiyadah alThawriyyah
Revolutionary Outburst Movement: see
Harakat al-Madd al-Thawri al-Arabi
Riyad us-Saliheyn Martyrs' Brigade: also
known as Riyadus-Salikhin
Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion
of Chechen Martyrs and Riyadh-asSaliheen; founded around 2002, its goal
is to establish an independent Chechen
Islamic state.
Riyadh-as-Saliheen: see Riyad us-Saliheyn
Martyrs' Brigade
Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance: see
Riyad us-Saliheyn Martyrs' Brigade
Russian Nat Bolshevist Party (NBP): a
Russian nationalist organization founded
by Eduard Limonov in 1993, NBP is
anti-capitalist, anti-Semitist, antiWestern, and opposes Vladimir Putin. It
is active throughout the former Soviet
Union, aligning itself with multiple
Russian causes.
Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs: see
Riyad us-Saliheyn Martyrs' Brigade
Salah al-Din Battalions: also known as Salah
al-Din Brigades; began in 2000 as the
militant branch of the PRC, which is
committed to the destruction of Israel
and liberation of Palestine.
Salah al-Din Brigades: see Salah al-Din
Battalions
Saraya al-Quds, “al-Quds Brigades:” also
known as Jerusalem Battalions, al-Quds
Battalions, Sayf al-Islam Brigades, AlQassam, and Jerusalem Brigades;
founded around 1979 as a militant
branch of PIJ, its goal is the liberation of
Palestine.
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Sardinian Autonomy Movement (MAS): a
Sardinian separatist organization
founded in Italy around 1971, its goal is
to establish an independent Sardinia.
MAS is suspected of being reestablished
in 2002 and has been inactive since.
Save Kashmir Movement: founded in 2002
in India as a Kashmiri separatist
organization but appears to have been
inactive since 2002.
Sayf al-Islam Brigades: see Saraya al-Quds
SENRAK: the first of several Tripura
resistance groups founded around 1965
in retaliation against migrants settling in
reserved tribal areas. SENRAK was
neutralized in 1968.
Shahin: also known as Falcon: founded in
Iran around 1992 as a Kurdish separatist
organization, Shahin has been inactive
since 1992.
Shamil People’s Front: founded in 1990 by
Avars in Russia, while little information
of them is available, many Avars are
active separatists possibly contributing
to the pursuance of sovereignty from
Russia and Chechnya.
Shanti Bahini: founded as the military
branch of the Lamba faction following a
split in the PCJSS in 1983, its goal is to
gain independence in the Chittagong Hill
Tracts and expel the Bengali Muslims
from the region.
Sharq azat Turkistan, “East Turkistan
Liberation Organization (ETLO):” also
known as Dogu Turkistan Kurtulush
Orgutu; founded around 1998 by Uyghur
separatists, its goal is to establish an
Islamic East Turkistan in China’s
Xinjiang province.
Sinh National Alliance (SNA): a Sindhi
separatist organization founded in 1988,
active in Pakistan and led by M. G.
Syed, SNA has uses terrorism as a
primary tactic in its quest for Sindhi
Independence.

Social Democratic Front of Tripura (SDFT):
a Tripura separatist organization and
splinter of NLFT, possibly founded
during the 1990s, its goal was the
liberation of the tribal areas in
northeastern India and creation of an
independent state of Tripura, although
rumored as having more to do with
organized crime. SDFT is no longer
active.
Socialist Party of National LiberationProvisional: see Partit Socialista
d’Alliberament Nacional-provisional
Somali Coast Liberation Front: see Front for
the Liberation of the French Somali
Coast
Southern Sudan Independence Movement
(SSIM): founded by Riak Machar in
1991 as a breakaway faction of SPLA.
Although it moved towards secession
from Sudan, in 1996 SSIM signed the
Sudanese Peace Pact, subsequently
integrating with Sudanese forces to form
the Southern Sudan Defense Force
(SSDF).
Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR):
founded by Arbi Barayev in Russia in
1996. Its goal is to establish an
independent Chechen Islamic state.
Sri Nakharo: founded in 2001 as a splinter
of Mujahideen Pattani, active in northern
Malaysia and southern Thailand, its goal
is to establish an independent Malay
state of Pattani, but appears inactive
since 2001.
Sudan Liberation Army (SLA): see
Sudanese Liberation Movement
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA):
also known Sudan People's Liberation
Movement; an ethnic-Dinka movement
founded by John Garangg in 1983, in
opposition to Sudanese enforcement of
Sharia law, waging a military campaign
as well as committing terrorism, its goal
was to unite and democratize Sudan. In
1991, a faction broke off to form SSIM,
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and by 2005, SPLA recognized a peace
agreement and now works as a political
organization.
Sudan People's Liberation Movement: see
Sudan People’s Liberation Army
Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM): also
known as Sudan Liberation Army
(SLA): formed in the Sudan in 2003 as a
continuation of the DLF and led by Mini
Arkoi Minawi, SLM replaced DLF
separatism in favor of democratization.
Sword of Islam: founded around 1998 by
Chechen separatists, its goal was to
liberate Chechnya and establish an
Islamic state but has been inactive since
2001.
Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization
(TELO): also known as Tamil Liberation
Organization; founded Sri Lanka in 1974
by Selvarajah Yogachandran and
Nadarajah Thangathurai, its goal was to
establish an independent Tamil state. In
the late 1980s, LTTE killed most of the
TELO, leading to its disintegration.
Tamil Liberation Organization: see Tamil
Eelam Liberation Organization
Tamil New Tigers: founded in 1972 by Sri
Lankan separatists, its goal was to
establish an independent Tamil state,
Tamil Eelam. In 1976, it became the
LTTE.
Tantra Jihad Islam (TJI): founded in
Thailand in 1993 by factionalized
members of BRN and PULO, little
information about them is available, TJI
likely shares BRN’s and PULO’s goal of
establishing an independent Pattani state
in southern Thailand and northern
Malaysia.
Tanzim, “Organization:” founded in Israel in
1993 by Marwan Barghouti and other
factionalized members opposed to the
autocratic control of al-Fatah, it pursues
Palestinian liberation while opposing the
Palestinian Authority (PA).
Tehrik Ul-Furqaan: see Jaish-e-Mohammed

Terra Lliure (TL), “Free Land:” also known
as Terra Uivre; founded during the
1970s in Spain by Catalan separatists.
TL has been inactive since the 1990s.
Terra Uivre: see Terra Lliure
Terrorist Group of Assam: see Bodo
Liberation Tigers
The Federated Niger Delta Izon
Communities: an Ijaw separatist
organization founded in Nigeria in 1998,
the Ijaw movement is pursuing selfdetermination and sovereignty over
Ijawland the Niger-Delta.
The Islamic Resistance: see Hezbollah
Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC): founded in
1970 by Sonam Topgyal, Tenzin Geyche
Tethong, Tenzin N. Tethong, and Lodi
G. Gyari, TYC is an international
organization seeking Tibetan
independence from China. TYC began
using terrorism in 1977, although it is
not their primary focus, and it is unclear
whether they still use violence.
Tripura Humkurai Sepoy (THS): a Tripura
separatist organization and splinter of
NLFT, possibly founded during the
1990s, its goal was the liberation of the
tribal areas in northeastern India and
creation of an independent state of
Tripura, although rumored as having
more to do with organized crime. THS is
no longer active.
Tripura Liberation Organization (TLO): a
Tripura separatist organization founded
in India in 1992 as a splinter of ATTF,
its goal was the liberation of the tribal
areas in northeastern India and creation
of an independent state of Tripura but is
no longer active.
Tripura Lion Force (TLF): a Tripura
separatist organization and splinter of
ATTF, possibly founded during the
1990s, its goal was the liberation of the
tribal areas in northeastern India and
creation of an independent state of
Tripura, although rumored as having
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more to do with organized crime. TLF
no longer exists.
Tripura National Army (TNA): a Tripura
separatist organization and splinter of
ATTF, possibly founded during the
1990s, its goal was the liberation of the
tribal areas in northeastern India and
creation of an independent state of
Tripura, although rumored as having
more to do with organized crime. TNA
no longer exists.
Tripura National Liberation Front (TNLF): a
Tripura separatist organization and
splinter of NLFT, likely founded during
the 1990s, its goal was the liberation of
the tribal areas in northeastern India and
creation of an independent state of
Tripura, although rumored as having
more to do with organized crime. TNLF
is no longer active.
Tripura National Sengkrak Force (TNSF): a
Tripura separatist organization and
splinter of NLFT, possibly founded
during the 1990s, its goal was the
liberation of the tribal areas in
northeastern India and creation of an
independent state of Tripura, although
rumored as having more to do with
organized crime. TNSF is no longer
active.
Tripura National Volunteer Force (TNVF):
see Tripura National Volunteers
Tripura National Volunteers (TNV): also
known as Tripura National Volunteer
Force (TNVF); a Tripura separatist
organization originally founded in India
by Amra Bengali in 1978, revived by
Bijoy Harankhwal in 1982, and also
thought to have been revitalized in 1999,
its goal was the liberation of the tribal
areas in northeastern India and creation
of an independent state of Tripura.
Tripura National Volunteers (TNV):
founded by B. K. Hrangkhawal in India
in 1978, its goal was the liberation of the
tribal areas in northeastern India and

creation of an independent state of
Tripura but disintegrated in the 1980s;
many members joined other Tripura
movements.
Tripura Regimental Force (TRF): a Tripura
separatist organization and splinter of
NLFT, possibly founded during the
1990s, its goal was the liberation of the
tribal areas in northeastern India and
creation of an independent state of
Tripura, although rumored as having
more to do with organized crime. TRF is
no longer active.
Tripura Resurrection Army (TRA): a
Tripura separatist organization founded
in India in 1994 by Dhananjoy Reang, a
former leader of TNV and NLFT, its
goal was the liberation of the tribal areas
in northeastern India and creation of an
independent state of Tripura but
surrendered to authorities in 1997.
Tripura Tribal Action Committee Force
(TTACF): a Tripura separatist
organization and splinter of NLFT,
possibly founded during the 1990s, its
goal was the liberation of the tribal areas
in northeastern India and creation of an
independent state of Tripura, although
rumored as having more to do with
organized crime. TTACF is no longer
active.
Tripura Tribal Democratic Force (TTDF): a
Tripura separatist organization and
splinter of NLFT, possibly founded
during the 1990s, its goal was the
liberation of the tribal areas in
northeastern India and creation of an
independent state of Tripura, although
rumored as having more to do with
organized crime. TTDF is no longer
active.
Tripura Tribal Volunteer Force (TTVF): a
Tripura separatist organization and
splinter of NLFT, founded around 1995,
its goal was the liberation of the tribal
areas in northeastern India and creation
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of an independent state of Tripura,
although rumored as having more to do
with organized crime. TTVF is no longer
active.
Tripura Tribal Youth Force (TTYF): a
Tripura separatist organization and
splinter of ATTF, possibly founded
during the 1990s, its goal was the
liberation of the tribal areas in
northeastern India and creation of an
independent state of Tripura, although
rumored as having more to do with
organized crime. TTYF no longer exists.
Tripura Young Rifle (TYR): a Tripura
separatist organization and splinter of
ATTF, possibly founded during the
1990s, its goal was the liberation of the
tribal areas in northeastern India and
creation of an independent state of
Tripura, although involved with on
organized crime. TYR no longer exists.
True IRA: see Oglaigh Na hEireann
United Front for the Independence of
Pattani: see Barisan Bersatu Merdeka
Pattani
United Liberation Front of Asom: see
United Liberation Front of Assam
United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA):
also known as United Liberation Front
of Asom: formed in 1979 in Assam,
India, its goal is to establish an

independent communist state in
northeastern India.
United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF):
founded by Chittagong separatists in
Bangladesh in 1998, comprising
members of the Hill Women’s
Federation, Hill People's Council, and
Hill Student Council, and has links to
PCJSS, its goal is to gain independence
in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.
United People's Democratic Solidarity
(UPDS): founded in 1999 by Assam
separatists, primarily comprising the
Karbi tribe, it seeks to establish a
sovereign tribal state in northeastern
India.
Ushtria Clirimtare E Koseves (UCK): see
Kosovo Liberation Army
Warring Ijaw Youths: see Egbesu Boys
Yaketi Nishtimani Kurdistan (PUK),
“Patriotic Union of Kurd:” formed in
1975 as a splinter group of the KDP, its
goal was to establish a sovereign
Kurdish state. PUK is now a legitimate
political organization in Iraq.
Yoruba O'odua Peoples' Congress: see Odua
People's Congress
Young Liberators of Pattani: established
around 2002 in Thailand, its goal is an
independent Malay state of Pattani but
appears inactive since 2002.

* Groups seeking autonomy are not included in the dependent variable; however, this glossary
includes the descriptions of some autonomy seeking groups whose information pertains to
movements included in the dependent variable.
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APPENDIX C: Countries and Minority Populations
Afghanistan
Hazaras
Pashtuns
Tajiks
Albania
Greeks
Angola
Berbers
Bakongo
Cabinda
Ovimbundu
Argentina
Indigenes
Jews
Australia
Aborigines
Azerbaijan
Armenians
Lezgins
Russians
Bangladesh
Biharis
ChittagongHill Tribes
Belarus
Poles
Russians
Bhutan
Lhotshampas
Bolivia
Indigenes
Bosnia
CroatsMuslims
Serbs
Botswana
San Bushmen
Brazil
AfroBrazilians
Indigenes
Bulgaria
Roma
Turks

Burma
Hill Tribes
Kachins
Karens
Mons
Rohingya
Shans
Zomis
Burundi
Hutus
Cambodia
Vietnamese
Cameroon
Bamileke
Kirdis
Westerners
Canada
Fr. Canadians
Indigenes
Quebecois
Chad
Southerners
Chile
Indigenes
China
Tibetans
Turkmen
Colombia
Blacks
Indigenes
Costa Rica
AntilleanBlacks
Croatia
Roma
Serbs
Cyprus
TurkishCypriots
Czechoslovakia
Hungarians
Slovaks
Czech Republic
Roma

Slovaks
Dem. Rep/Congo
Hutus
Luba
Lunda
Ngbandi
Tutsis
Djibouti
Afars
Dominican Rep.
Haitian Blacks
Ecuador
Blacks
Indigenes
El Salvador
Indigenes
Eritrea
Afars
Estonia
Russians
Ethiopia
Afars
Amhara
Eritreans
Nilo-Saharans
Oromo
Somalis
Tigreans
Fiji
East Indians
Fijians
France
Basques
Bretons
Corsicans
Non-FrenchMuslims
Roma
Georgia
Abkhazians
Adshars
SouthOssetians
Russians
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Ghana
Ashanti
Ewe
MossiDagomba
Greece
Roma
Guatemala
Indigenes
Guinea
Fulani
Malinka
Susu
Guyana
Africans
East Indians
Honduras
Black
Karibs
Indigenes
Hungary
Roma
India
Assamese
Bodos
Kashmiris
Mizos
Nagas
Santals
ScheduledTribes
Sikhs
Tripuras
Indonesia
Acehnese
Chinese
East Timorese
Papuans
Iran
Arabs
Azerbaijanis
Bakhtiari
Baluchis
Kurds

Turkmen
Iraq
Kurds
Israel
Arabs
Palestinians
Italy
Roma
Sardinians
SouthTyroliennes
Cote d'Ivoire
Lebanese
Japan
Koreans
Jordan
Palestinians
Kazakhstan
Germans
Russians
Kenya
Kalenjins
Kikuyu
Kisii
Luhya
Luo
Maasais
Rendille
Somalis
Turkana
Kyrgyzstan
Russians
Laos
Hmong
Latvia
Russians
Lebanon
Druze
Maronite
Christians
Palestinians
Liberia
AmericoLiberians
Lithuania
Poles

Russians
Macedonia
Albanians
Roma
Serbs
Madagascar
Merina
Malaysia
Chinese
Dayaks
East Indians
Kadazans
Mali
Tuareg
Mauritania
Blacks Moors
Kewri
Mexico
Mayans
Indigenes
Zapotecs
Moldova
Gaguaz
Slavs
Morocco
Berbers
Saharawis
Namibia
Basters
EastCaprivians
Europeans
San Bushmen
New Zealand
Maori
Nicaragua
Indigenes
Niger
DjeremaSonghai
Hausa
Tuareg
Nigeria
Ibo
Ijaw
Ogani

Yoruba
Pakistan
Baluchis
Mohajirs
Pashtuns
Sindhis
Panama
Blacks
Chinese
Indigenes
Papua N. Guinea
Bouganvillean
Peru
AfroPeruvians
Indigenes
Philippines
Igorots
Moros
Republic/Congo
Lari
M’Boshi
Romania
German
Magyars
Roma
Russia
Avars
Buryat
Chechens
Ingush
Karachay
Kumyks
Lezgins
Roma
Tatars
Tuvinians
Yakut
Rwanda
Hutus
South Korea
Honamese
Senegal
DiolasCasamance
Sierra Leone
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Creoles
Limba
Mende
Singapore
Malays
Slovakia
Hungarians
Roma
Somalia
Issaq
South Africa
Asians
BlackAfricans
Coloreds
Europeans
Xhosa
Zulus
Spain
Basques
Catalans
Roma
Sri Lanka
Indian Tamils
Ceylon Tamils
Sudan
Darfur BlackMuslims
Nuba
Southerners
Switzerland
ForeignWorkers
Jurassians
Syria
Alawi
Kurds
Taiwan
Aboriginal
Taiwanese
MainlandChinese
Taiwanese
Tajikistan
Russians
Tanzania

Zanzibaris
Thailand
Chinese
MalayMuslims
Northern-Hill
Tribes
Togo
Ewe
Kabre
Turkey
Kurds
Roma
Turkmenistan
Russians
Uganda
Acholi
Ankole
Baganda

Kakwa
Karamojong
Konjo
Langi
Lugbara
Nyarwanda
United Kingdom
AfroCaribbeans
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Ukraine
Crimean
Russians
United States
AfricanAmericans
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Indigenes
Soviet Union
Armenians
Estonians
Georgians
Germans
Jews
Letts
Lithuanians
Moldavians
Tatars
Ukrainians
Uzbekistan
Russians
Tajiks
Venezuela
Blacks
Indigenes
Vietnam
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Chinese
Montagnards
Germany
Turks
Yugoslavia
Croats
Hungarians
KosovoAlbanians
Roma
Serbs
Slovenes
Zaire
Bakongo
Kivu
Lingala
Zambia
Bemebe
Lozi
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Dūrī, ‘Abd al-‘Azīz. (1987). The Historical Formation of the Arab Nation: A Study in Identity
and Consciousness. London: Croom Helm.

132

Earth Trends. (2003). Population, Health, and Human Well-Being—Australia. Retrieved
January 28, 2009, from
http://earthtrends.wri.org/pdf_library/country_profiles/pop_cou_036.pdf.
Economagic. (n. d.). Czech Republic - Standardised unemployment, Rate, Total (all ages), Total
(male & female), Eurostat, Seasonally adjusted, not working day adjusted, percentage of
civilian workforce: Percent. Retrieved January 29, 2009, from
http://www.economagic.com/em-cgi/data.exe/ecb/STS-M-CZ-S-UNEH-RTT000-4-000m.
Elias, A. (2008). Minority Nationalist Parties and European Integration: A Comparative Study.
London: Routledge.
Eta in Pictures. (2006, March 22). BBC News. Retrieved February 22, 2009, from
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_pictures/4833854.stm.
Eurofound. (2007, Aug. 27). EurLIFE – Unemployment rate. Retrieved January 29, 2009,
fromhttp://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/qualityoflife/eurlife/index.php?template=3&r
adioindic=17&idDomain=2.
Feldmann, A. E., & Perälä, M. (2004). Reassessing the Causes of Nongovernmental Terrorism in
Latin America. Latin American Politics & Society, 46(2), 101-132.
Feldman-Savelsberg, P. (2006). Bamiléké. In Encyclopedia of Sex and Gender. (Vol. II, pp. 314322). New York: Springer.
Ferracuti, F. (1990) “Ideology and Repentance: Terrorism in Italy.” Comp. in Origins of
Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind. Reich, W. (Ed.).
Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press.

133

Fleming, M. (1982). “Propaganda by the Deed: Terrorism and Anarchist Theory in Late
Nineteenth-Century Europe.” Comp. in Terrorism in Europe. Alexander, Y. & Meyers,
K. A. (Eds.). New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Forces de Libération Africaines de Mauritanie. (n. d.). Retrieved January 29, from
http://members.lycos.co.uk/flamnet/.
Fox, J. (2003). Trends in Low Intensity Ethnic Conflict in Democracies States in the Post-Cold
War Era: A Large N Study. Review of International Affairs, 2(3), 54-70.
Front pour la Restauration de l’Unite et la Democratie (FRUD) (Djbouti), Groups – AfricaDormant. (2008). In Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism. Retrieved January 28,
2008, from http://www.janes.com/extracts/extract/jwit/jwit0021.html
Garmendia, V. (1985). “Carlism and Basque Nationalism.” Comp. in Basque Politics: A Case
Study in Ethnic Nationalism. Douglass, W. A. (Ed.). Reno, ND: Associated Faculty Press,
Inc. and Basque Studies Program.
Geertz, C. (1995). “Thick Description.” Comp. in Readings in the Philosophy of Social Sciences.
Martin, M., & McIntyre, L. (eds.) pp. 213-31.
Gibson, J. W. (1994). Warrior Dreams: Paramilitary Culture in Post-Vietnam America. New
York: Hill and Wang.
Global Goods Partners. (2008). Karen Women’s Organization. Retrieved January 29, 2009, from
http://www.globalgoodspartners.org/cbo/KWO/.
GlobalSecurity.org. (2005). Mujahideen Pattani Movement [BNP]. Retrieved February 2, 2009,
from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/bnp.htm.
GlobalSecurity.org. (2007, Oct 24). Military: Darfur Liberation Front Sudan Liberation
Movement (SLM) Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).

134

Retrieved February 2, 2009, from
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/darfur.htm.
Goldenstaier, M. Z., & Epstein, Z. D. (n. d.). Ra’am-Ta’al (United Arab List).Retrieved January
29, 2009, from Trinity College, Government of Israel: The Political System Web site:
http://st2010.trincoll.edu/~zepstein/new_page_15.htm.
Goulbourne, H. (2001). Race and Ethnicity: Critical Concepts in Sociology. New York
Routledge.
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies. (2008). Transnational and NonState Armed Groups. Karen National Union (KNU). Retrieved from Harvard University,
Program of Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research: http://www.armedgroups.org/6/section.aspx/ViewGroup?id=65.
Gregory, S. (2003). France and the War on Terrorism. Terrorism & Political Violence, 15(1),
124-147
Guinea Facts and Figures. (2008). In MSN Encyclopedia. Retrieved January 29, 2009, from
http://encarta.msn.com/fact_631504775/guinea_facts_and_figures.html
Gurr, T. R. (1990). “Terrorism in Democracies: Its Social and Political Bases.” Comp. in Origins
of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind. Reich, W. (Ed.).
Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Gutiérrez, N. (1999). Nationalist Myths and Ethnic Identities: Indigenous Intellectuals and the
Mexican State. Lincoln [Neb.]: University of Nebraska Press.
Hale. (2004). Explaining Ethnicity. Comparative Political Studies, 37(4), 458-485.

135

Heiberg, M., O'Leary, B., & Tirman, J. (2007). Terror, Insurgency, and the State: Ending
Protracted Conflicts. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Hepburn, A. (1987). Arthur Griffith and the Advanced-Nationalist Press (Book Review).
American Historical Review, 92(2), 425-425.
Hobsbawm, E. (1994). The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991. New York:
Pantheon Books.
Hoffman, B. (1995). “Holy Terror: The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious
Imperative.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 18: 271-284.
Hoffman, B. (1998). Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press.
Hooper, J. (1995). The New Spaniards. New York: Penguin Pub.
Horowitz, D. L. (2000). Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
HRC. (2005, May 19). Ingush-Osetian conflict of 1992: Roots and Evolvement (May 2005). HR
News. Retrieved January 29, 2009, from
http://www.memo.ru/eng/memhrc/texts/5prigor1.shtml.
Htya, S. (2005). Economic Report on Burma, 2004/05. Federation of Trade Unions-Burma
(FTUB), Economic and Research Department. Retrieved January 29, 2009, from
http://www.ftub.org/files/Reports/Economic%20Report%202004-05.pdf.
Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 1993 - Albania, 1 January
1993. Online. UNHCR Refworld. Retrieved January 28, 2009, from
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/467fca6d35.html.
Ijaw Youth Council Worldwide. (2008). Retrieved February 2, 2009, from
http://www.iycworldwide.org/.

136

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Angola: Whether the Front for the Liberation of the
Cabinda Enclave-Cabinda Armed Forces (FLEC-FAC) has a political wing and an
operational wing; the description of identification cards issued by the various FLEC
factions since 1990 , 19 February 2001. AGO36441.E . Online. UNHCR Refworld.
Retrieved January 28, 2009, from http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3df4bdf810.html.
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Iran: Status of the Azeri (Azari) National Council (
1998 to February 2001) , 14 February 2001. IRN36277.E . Online. UNHCR Refworld.
Retrieved January 28, 2009, from http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3df4be454.html.
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Nigeria: Egbesu "Boys" or "cult" including
membership requirements; whether forced recruitment is practiced and, if so, whether a
person can move within Nigeria to avoid this group , 25 May 2000. NGA34309.E
. Online. UNHCR Refworld. Retrieved February 4, 2009, from
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6ad6e18.html.
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Nigeria: Ijaw organisations, including the Ijaw
National Congress (INC), and the Izon Communities Ughelli, their objectives, when they
came into existence, areas in which they are active, membership and leadership
structure, 1 July 1998. NGA29703.E. Online. UNHCR Refworld. Retrieved February 4,
2009, from http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6ac85c.html.
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Nigeria: The Chikoko Movement, including date of
founding; structure; leadership/goals and objectives; membership cards and treatment of
members , 19 April 2000. NGa34057.E . Online. UNHCR Refworld. Retrieved February
4, 2009, from http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6ad6ec.html.

137

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Nigeria: The Chikoko Movement, including when
and where formed, activities, membership cards, reaction of authorities, and when
established in Aleibiri, Bayelsa State , 11 May 2000. NGA34342.E . Online. UNHCR
Refworld. Retrieved February 4, 2009, from
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6ad6e5c.html.
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Nigeria: The Ijaw Youth Movement (IYM); date
founded, names of executive members, location of headquarters, description of
membership cards and its relationship to the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) and the Egbesu
Boys; information on IYC membership cards (1999-2000) , 24 December
2003. NGA42304.E . Online. UNHCR Refworld. Rerieved February 4, 2009, from
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Turkey: Update to TUR32884.E of 7 October 1999
on the treatment of Uighurs and ethnic Chinese; Dogu Turkistan Association, Dogu
Turkistan Kurtulush Orgutu and Khazak Vakfi; a meeting in Sultan Ahmet Square
(Istanbul) in April 2000 (2000-2002) , 22 April 2002. TUR38425.E . Online. UNHCR
Refworld. Retrieved February 2, 2009, from
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3df4beb60.html.
Index Mundi. (2008). Burma Unemployment rate. Retrieved January 29, 2009, from
http://www.indexmundi.com/burma/unemployment_rate.html.
Index Mundi. (2008). Eritrea Population. Retrieved January 29, 2009, from
http://indexmundi.com/eritrea/population.html.
Instituto Nacional de Estadística de España. (2009). Retrieved January 29, 2009, from
http://www.ine.es/en/inebmenu/mnu_educa_en.htm.

138

International Labor Organization. (2009). ILO Bureau of Statistics. LABORSTA. Retrieved
January 28, 2009, from http://laborsta.ilo.org/.
International Refugee Rights Initiative. (2009). Retrieved January 28, 2009, from
http://www.refugee-rights.org.
Isichei, E. A. (1997). A History of African Societies to 1870. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Islam, R. (2003). “Revisiting the East Asian Model of Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction:
A Labour Market Perspective”. Paper presented at the Economics for the Future
Conference being organized by the Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge, 17-19
September 2003. Retrieved January 27, 2009, from
http://www.pakistaneconomist.com/issue2000/issue37/i&e5.htm.
Jewish Virtual Library (2009). Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Retrieved January 30,
2009, from http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/plo.html.
Jobs and Skills Programme for Africa. (1989). Generating employment and incomes in Somalia:
Report of an inter-disciplinary employment and project-identification mission to Somalia
financed by the United Nations Development Programme and executed by ILO/JASPA.
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Jobs and Skills Programme for Africa.
Johnstone, F. A. (1976). Class, Race and Gold. A Study of Class Relations and Racial
Discrimination in South Africa. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Karadjis, M. (2000). Bosnia, Kosova & the West. Sydney: Resistance Books.
Katzner, K. (1995). The Languages of the World. (3rd Ed.). New York : Routledge.

139

Kell, T. (1995). The Roots of Acehnese Rebellion, 1989-1992. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern
Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University.
Kenrick, D. (1998). Historical Dictionary of the Gypsies (Romanies). Lanham, MD., London:
The Scarecrow Press, Inc.
Khalistan Commando Force. (2008, July 21). In Sikhi Wiki: Encyclopedia of the Sikhs. Retrieved
February 2, 2009, from
http://www.sikhiwiki.org/index.php/Khalistan_Commando_Force.
Khalistan Liberation Force. (2008, July 21). In Sikhi Wiki: Encyclopedia of the Sikhs. Retrieved
February 2, 2009, from
http://www.sikhiwiki.org/index.php?title=Khalistan_Liberation_Force.
Kirby, E. J. (2001, Aug 21). Swiss rolling stone returns home. BBC News. Retrieved January 29,
2009, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1502641.stm.
Knox, M. (2000). Hitler's Italian Allies: Royal Armed Forces, Fascist Regime, and the War of
1940-43. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konrad, K. (1990). “Ideology and Rebellion: Terrorism in West Germany.” Comp. in Origins of
Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind. Reich, W. (Ed.).
Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Kurlansky, M. (1999). Basque History of the World: The Story of a Nation. New York: Penguin
Publishers.
Lalaguna, J. (2001). A Traveller’s History of Spain. 5th Ed. Judd, D. (Ed.). Northampton, NY:
Interlink Books.
Laqueur, W. (1999). The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction. Oxford,
NY: Oxford University Press.

140

Lecours, A. (2007). Basque Nationalism and the Spanish State. Reno, NV: Univ. of Nevada
Press.
Lee Shin-wha & Collier, K. (1994, July 1). Tripuras in India. (Updates by Khosla, D., &
Boomgaard, M. C.). Asylumlaw.org. Retrieved February 2, 2009, from
http://www.asylumlaw.org/docs/showDocument.cfm?documentID=762.
Lee, J. (1989). Ireland, 1912-1985: Politics and Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Lewy, G. (2000). The Nazi Persecution of the Gypsies. Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press.
Libyana. (n. d.). The Berbers. Retrieved January 28, 2009, from
http://www.libyana.org/people/berber/main.htm.
Linter, B. (2007, Sep 8). Who’s who in Thailand Muslim insurgency. Asia Times. Retrieved
February 2, 2009, from http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/II08Ae01.html.
Lustick, I. S. (1993). Unsettled States, Disputed Land: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria,
Israel and the West Bank-Gaza. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Lynch, J., & Myrtle, H. (n. d). Ireland: society & economy, 1929-49. Retrieved from University
College Cork, Multitext Project in Irish History:
http://multitext.ucc.ie/d/Ireland_society__economy_1912-49.
Lyovin, A. V. (1997). An Introduction to the Languages of the World. Oxford, NY: Oxford
University Press.
Maasia Environmental Resource Coalition. (2003). Retrieved January 28, 2009, from
http://www.maasaierc.org/.
MacDonald, N. (1987). Homage to the Spanish Exiles. New York, NY: Insight Books.

141

Mackerras, C. (1994). China's Minorities: Integration and Modernization in the Twentieth
Century. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.
Mahmood, K. (2006). Indonesia: Government to Hold Talks with Aceh Rebels. Islam Online.
Retrieved January 28, 2008, from http://www.islamonline.net/english/news/200010/29/article10.shtml.
Marcus, R. (1993). Violence against women in Bangladesh, Pakistan, Egypt, Sudan, Senegal and
Yemen. (Report No 10). Report prepared for Special Programme WID, Netherlands
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DGIS). Retrieved January 28, 2009, from
http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:1AXbqCCG6M8J:www.bridge.ids.ac.uk/reports/re1
0c.pdf+Sindhiani+Tehreek+Party,+1990&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=3&gl=us&client=firefoxa.
Marshall Cavendish Corporation. (2001). Peoples of Africa. New York: Marshall Cavendish.
McKinnon, S., & Silverman, S. (Eds.). (2005). Complexities. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Minorities at Risk Project, Assessment for Kewri in Mauritania, 31 December 2003. Online.
UNHCR Refworld. Retrieved February 2, 2009, from
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/469f3ab22.html.
Minorities at Risk Project, Assessment for Shans in Burma, 31 December 2003. Online. UNHCR
Refworld. Retrieved Februaruy 2, 2009, from
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/469f3a6211.html.

142

Minorities at Risk Project, Assessment for Southerners in Chad, 31 December 2003. Online.
UNHCR Refworld. Retrieved January 28, 2009, from
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/469f3a671e.html.
Minorities at Risk Project, Chronology for Avars in Russia, 2004. Online. UNHCR Refworld.
Retrieved January 28, 2009, from http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/469f38d08.html.
Minorities at Risk Project, Chronology for Baganda in Uganda, 2004. Online. UNHCR
Refworld. Retrieved January 30, 2009, from
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/469f38ebc.html.
Minorities at Risk Project, Chronology for Jurassians in Switzerland, 2004. Online. UNHCR
Refworld. Retrieved February 2, 2009, from
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/469f38e32.html.
Minorities at Risk Project, Chronology for Malay-Muslims in Thailand, 2004. Online. UNHCR
Refworld. Retrieved February 9, 2009, from
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/469f38e71e.html.
Minorities at Risk Project, Chronology for Ijaw in Nigeria, 2004. Online. UNHCR Refworld.
Retrieved February 2, 2009, from http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/469f38c49.html.
Minorities at Risk Project, Chronology for Papuans in Indonesia, 2004. Online. UNHCR
Refworld. Retrieved January 28, 2009, from
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/469f389b1e.html.
Minorities at Risk Project, Chronology for Sindhis in Pakistan, 2004. Online. UNHCR Refworld.
Retrieved February 4, 2009, from http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/469f38c8c.html.

143

Minorities at Risk Project, Chronology for South Tyrolians in Italy, 2004. Online. UNHCR
Refworld. Retrieved February 2, 2009, from
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/469f38a91e.html.
Minorities at Risk Project. (2005). Minorities at Risk Dataset. College Park, MD: Center for
International Development and Conflict Management. Retrieved January 27, 2009, from
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/.
Mitchell, B. R. (2007). International Historical Statistics. Africa, Asia and Oceania 1750-2005.
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Mitchell, B. R. (2007). International Historical Statistics. Europe 1750-2005. Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Mitchell, B. R. (2007). International Historical Statistics. The Americas 1750-2005.
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Mongabay.com (n. d.). Ivory Coast – The Economy. Retrieved January 29, 2009, from
http://www.mongabay.com/reference/country_studies/ivory-coast/ECONOMY.html.
Movimiento Estudiantil Chicano de Aztlán. (2008). Retrieved January 28, 2009, from
http://www.nationalmecha.org/about.html.
Muro, D. (2005). Nationalism and Nostalgia: The Case of Radical Basque Nationalism. Nations
and Nationalism, 11(4), 571.
Muro, D., & Quiroga, A. (2005). Spanish Nationalism - Ethnic or Civic? Ethnicities, 5(1), 9-29.
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. (2008). Global
Terrorism Database [statistics]. Retrieved January 27, 2009, from
http://www.start.umd.edu/data/.
National Council of La Raza. (2009). Retrieved January 28, 2009, from http://www.nclr.org/.

144

National Education Association of the United States. (1921). The Journal of the National
Education Association. Washington: The Association.
National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus. (2008). Retrieved January 28, 2009,
from http://belstat.gov.by/homep/en/main.html.
Nauphal, N. 1997. “Post-War Lebanon: Women and Other War-Affected Groups”.International
Labour Organization (ILO) Programme on Skills and Entrepreneurship/Training for
Countries Emerging from Armed Conflict, Geneva.
O’Ballance, E. (1990). The Cyanide War: Tamil Insurrection in Sri Lanka 1973-88. London,
England: Brassey’s (UK).
Organization of American States. (1981, June 30). Chapter IX: Economic and Social Rights
(OEA/Ser.L/V/II.53 doc. 25). Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Republic of
Nicaragua. Retrieved January 28, 2009, from
http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/Nica81eng/chap.9.htm.
Olson, J. S. (1996). The Peoples of Africa: An Ethnohistorical Dictionary. Westport, Conn:
Greenwood Press.
Oromo Liberation Front. (2005). Received February 2, 2009, from
http://www.oromoliberationfront.org/.
Oyebade, A., & Alao, A. (1998). Africa After the Cold War: The Changing Perspectives on
Security. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.
Ozkirimli, U. (2000). Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction. (Forward by Halliday,
F.). New York: St. Martin’s Press.

145

Payne, S. G. (1985). “Navarra and Basque Nationalism.” Comp. in Basque Politics: A Case
Study in Ethnic Nationalism. Douglass, W. A. (Ed.). Reno, ND: Associated Faculty Press,
Inc. and Basque Studies Program.
People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD). (2008). In Espionage Information. Retrieved
January 28, 2009, from http://www.espionageinfo.com/Pa-Po/People-AgainstGangsterism-and-Drugs-PAGAD.html.
Pérez-Agote, A. (2006). The Social Roots of Basque Nationalism. (Watson, C. & Douglass, W.
A., Trans.). Reno, ND: University of Nevada Press.
Pluchinsky, A. D. (1992). “An Organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany’s Red
Army Faction Terrorist Group (1972-91)” Comp. in European Terrorism Today &
Tomorrow. Alexander, Y. & Pluchinsky, A. D. (Eds.). New York, NY: Brassey’s (US),
Inc.
Pluchinsky, D. (1982) “Political Terrorism in Western Europe: Some Themes and Variations.”
Comp. in Terrorism in Europe. Alexander, Y. & Meyers, K. A. (Eds.). New York: St.
Martin’s Press.
Pluchinsky, D. A. (1998). Terrorism in the Former Soviet Union: A Primer, A Puzzle, A
Prognosis. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 21(2), 119-147.
Polity IV Project. (2007). Polity2. Integrated Network for Social Conflict Research. Retrieved
January 29, 2009, from http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm.
Population Statistics. (2006). Retrieved January 28, 2009, from http://www.populstat.info.
Porta, D. (1995). “Left-Wing Terrorism in Italy.” Comp. in Terrorism in Context. Crenshaw, M.
(Ed.). University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.

146

Post, J. M. (1990). “Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological
Forces.” Comp. in Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of
Mind. Reich, M. (Ed.). Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Quintana, B. B., & Floyd, L. G. (1972). ¡Qué Gitano! Gypsies of Southern Spain. Spindler, G. &
Spindler, L. (Eds.). New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.
Reinares, F. & Jaime-Jeménez, O. (2000). “Countering Terrorism in a New Democracy: the Case
of Spain.” Comp. in European Democracies against Terrorism: Governmental Policies
and Intergovernmental Cooperation. Reinares, F. (Ed.). Burlington, VT: Dartmouth
Publishing.
Republic of Uganda Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development. (2006). Labour
Market Information Status Report for Uganda. (LMIS Project). Retrieved January 28,
2009, from http://www.afristat.org/contenu/pdf/lmis/lmis_status_ug.pdf Retrieved
January 30, 2009, from http://pards.org/2005/Uganda(Acholi)AtRisk.doc.
Rimanelli, M. (1992). “Foreign Comrades in Arms: Italian Terrorism and International Ties
(1968-91)” Comp. in European Terrorism Today & Tomorrow. Alexander, Y. &
Pluchinsky, A. D. (Eds.). New York, NY: Brassey’s (US), Inc.
Ross, J. I. (1999). “Beyond the Conceptualization of Terrorism: A Psychological-Structural
Model of the Causes of this Activity.” Comp. in Collective Violence: Harmful Behavior
in Groups and Government. Summers, C. & Markusen, E. (Eds.). New York: Rowen and
Littlefield.
Rotberg, R. I. (1998). Burma: Prospects for a Democratic Future. Cambridge, Mass: The World
Peace Foundation and Harvard Institute for International Development.

147

Roux, C. (n. d.). Case Synthesis – Corsica. Retrieved February 2, 2009, from
http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:5vO56FUzox0J:peacecom.spri.ucl.ac.be/internal/W
P2/QCA/SCDs%2520final/Compl._info_Corsica.doc+Ghjustizia+Paolina&hl=en&ct=cln
k&cd=6&gl=us.
Ryter, L. (1998). Pemuda Pancasila: The Last Loyalist Free Men of Suharto’s Order. Indonesia,
66, 45-73.
Sabbagh-Khoury, A. (n. d.) The Palestinians in Israel: Historical, Social and Political
Background. Mada al-Carmel. Retrieved January 28, 2009, from http://www.madaresearch.org/programs/information_background_eng.pdf.
Samady, S. R. (n. d.d). Education for Palestine Refugees. UNESCO. Retrieved January 28, 2009,
from http://www.unesco.org/education/pdf/SAMADY.PDF.
Sandler, T, & Enders, W. (2007). Applying Analytical Methods to Study Terrorism.
International Studies Perspectives, 8(3), 287.
SarDesai, D. R. (2003). Southeast Asia, Past & Present. Boulder Colo: Westview Press.
Sarsur, I. (2008, February 4). United Arab List – Ta’al (Ra’am-Ta’al). Yedioth Net News.
Retrieved January 29, 2009, from http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L3500226,00.html.
Schmid, A. P., Jongman, A., & Stohl, M. (2005). Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors,
Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature. New Brunswick, N.J.:
Transaction.
Scoville, J. G. (1985). The labor market in prerevolutionary Iran. Economic Development and
Cultural Change, 34(1), 143-55.

148

Second Carlist War. (2005). In Nation Master Encyclopedia. Retrieved February 20, 2009, from
http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Second-Carlist-War.
Seminaire National sur Population et Developpement: Cote d'Ivoire, Abidjan, 13-18 decembre
1982. United Nations. Economic Commission for Africa [ECA]. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,
ECA, 1984 Jan. :37-62.
Senegal – Political Parties. (2009). Encyclopedia of the Nations. Retrieved January 27, 2009,
from http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Africa/Senegal-POLITICAL-PARTIES.html.
Shabad, G. & Llera Ramo, F. J. (1995). “Political Violence in a Democratic State: Basque
Terrorism in Spain.” Comp. in Terrorism in Context. Crenshaw, M. (Ed.). University
Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Slavic Research Center. (n. d.). Soviet Economic Statistical Series. Retrieved January 29, 2009,
from http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/database/SESS.html#USSR-S4.
Smith, A. D. (1981). “The Crisis of Dual Legitimation.” Comp. in Smith, A. D., & Hutchinson,
J. (Eds.). (1994). Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press Smith, A. D. (1991).
National Identity. Reno: Univ. of Nevada Press.
Smith, A. D. (1991). National Identity. Reno: Univ. of Nevada Press.
Smith, A. D. (2003). Chosen Peoples. New York: Oxford University Press.
Smith, A. D., & Hutchinson, J. (Eds.). (1994). Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Smith, M. K. (2003). Issues in Cultural Tourism Studies. London: Routledge.
South Asia Forum for Human Rights. Dislocating Women and Making the Nation. Amnesty
International, Press Release [News Service No: 197]. Retrieved February 2, 2009, from
http://www.safhr.org/refugee_watch17_1.htm.

149

Sprinzak, E. (1990). “The Psychological Formation of Extreme Left Terrorism in a Democracy:
The Case of the Weathermen.” Comp. in Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies,
Theologies, States of Mind. Reich, W. (Ed.). Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University
Press.
Stanton, E. F. (2002). Cultures and Customs of Spain. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. (2009). Retrieved January 29, 2009, from
http://portal.statistics.sk/showdoc.do?docid=359.
Statistical, Economic, and Social Research and Training Centre for Islamic Countries. (2008).
Retrieved January 28, 2009, from http://www.sesrtcic.org/.
Steinberg, D. I. (2001). Burma, the State of Myanmar. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown
University Press.
Stuligross, D. (2008). Resources, representation, and authority in Jharkhand, India. Asia Pacific
Viewpoint, 49(1) pp 83-97.
SudanJEM. (2009). Retrieved February 2, 2009, from http://www.sudanjem.com/2009/jem/en/.
Tan, A. T. H. (2007). A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia. Elgar original
reference. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
The National Centre for Languages. (2008). An ethnographic project focusing on Somalia.
(Arthur, J.). Retrieved January 27, 2009, from
http://www.cilt.org.uk/commlangs/liverpool.rtf.
Tibetan Youth Congress. (2009). Retrieved February 2, 2009, from
http://www.tibetanyouthcongress.org/.
Tiro, H. T. (1985). The Price of Freedom: The Unfinished Diary of Tengku Hasan di Tiro.
150

Totoricaguena, G. (2004). Identity, Culture, and Politics in the Basque Diaspora. Reno, ND:
University of Nevada Press.
Trend, J. B. (1944). The Civilization of Spain. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Tripura Police. (2009). Militancy. Retrieved February 2, 2009, from
http://tripurapolice.nic.in/amilitancy.htm#b7.
United Nations Data. (2009). Illiteracy rates by sex, aged 15+, per cent (UNESCO estimates).
Retrieved January 27, 2009, from http://data.un.org/.
United Nations Data. (2009). Unemployment by sex, rates (%) and number (thousands)
(ILO/SYB). Retrieved January 28, 2009, from
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=ILO&f=srID:4680.
United Nations Data. (2009). Unemployment rates. Retrieved January 28, 2009, from
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=GenderStat&f=inID%3A121.

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affair. (2007). SUDAN: Veteran
Darfur leader blames conflict on marginalization. Humanitarian News and Analysis.
Retrieved February 2, 2009, from http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=75170.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2004). Uganda. Retrieved January 28,
2009, from http://www.unctad.org/sections/ldc_dir/docs//lldc-uga.pdf.
United Nations Development Programme. (1993). Human Development Indicators. Retrieved
January 28, 2009, http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr_1993_en_indicators2.pdf.
United Nations Development Programme. (2007/2008). Human Development Reposts. Retrieved
January 28, 2009, from http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev/.

151

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Institute for Statistics. (n. d.d).
Adult illiteracy for population aged 15 years and above, by country and by gender 19702015. Retrieved January 29, 2009, from
http://www.uis.unesco.org/en/stats/statistics/literacy2000.htm.
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Institute for Statistics. (n. d.d).
Regional adult illiteracy rate and population by gender 1970-2015. Retrieved January 29,
2009, from http://www.uis.unesco.org/en/stats/statistics/literacy2000.htm.
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. (1994, Oct.) Statistics on
Adult Illiteracy: Preliminary Results of the 1994 Estimations and Projections. (STE-16):
Paris, France. Retrieved January 28, 2009, from
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0010/001055/105526Eb.pdf.
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. (1996 Oct. 9). Report of the
Committee of Non-Governmental Organizations. (E/1996/102/Add.1/Corr.1). New York:
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA).
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization: Asia and the Pacific. (2009).
Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific 2007. Retrieved January 28, 2009, from
http://www.unescap.org/STAT/data/syb2007/15-Employment-syb2007.asp.
United Nations. (1994). Statistical Yearbook. New York: United Nations.
United Nations. (1993). Statistical Yearbook. New York: United Nations.
United Nations. (1988). Statistical Yearbook. New York: United Nations.
United Nations. (1984). Statistical Yearbook. New York: United Nations.
United Nations. (1983). Statistical Yearbook. New York: United Nations.

152

United Nations. (1979). Statistical Yearbook. New York: United Nations.
United Nations. (1970). Statistical Yearbook. New York: United Nations.
United Nations. (1964). Statistical Yearbook. New York: United Nations.
United Nations. (1963). Statistical Yearbook. New York: United Nations.
United Nations. (1960). Statistical Yearbook. New York: United Nations.
United Nations. (1956). Statistical Yearbook. New York: United Nations.
United Nations. (1949/50). Statistical Yearbook. New York: United Nations.
United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, Burma (Myanmar): Information
on the Chin National Front / Chin National Army, 26 February
2004. MMR04001.ZMI. Online. UNHCR Refworld. Retrieved January 28, 2009, from
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/414ee2e24.html.
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2008). Civilian labor force, employment, and
unemployment published by originating country, 1960-2007. Retrieved January 28, 2009,
from ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/ForeignLabor/lfcompendiumt03.txt.
United States Committee for a Free Lebanon. (1997-2009). Retrieved January 28, 2009, from
http://www.freelebanon.org.
United States Department of State. (1997). The Harakat ul-Mujahidin. Patterns of Global
Terrorism, 1999. Retrieved February 3, 2009, from
http://www.milnet.com/tgp/data/hua.htm.
United States Department of State. (1999). Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999. Africa Overview.
Retrieved January 28, 2009, from http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/terror_99/africa.html.

153

United States Department of State. (2005). Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). Fact Sheet.
Retrieved January 28, 2009, from http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm.
United States Department of State. Annual Report on International Religious Freedom, 2004. (S.
Prt. 108-59). Retrieved January 29, 2009, from
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/109/20429.pdf.
United Nations Office of Special Advisor on Africa. (2007 Dec.). Fourth Edition of African
NGOs: Kuru Development Trust. Retrieved January 28, 2009, from
http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/ngodirectory2/dest/countries/printNGO.asp?lang=ENG&c
ountry=3&ngo=BOT18.
Upadhyay, R. (2005, Nov 15). TRIPURA BLEEDS - In the Crossfire of Mainstream Political
Parties and Virulent Ethnic Conflict. [Paper no. 1613]. South Asia Analysis Group.
Retrieved February 2, 2009, from
http://www.saag.org/common/uploaded_files/paper1613.html.
Van Den Berghe, P. (1987). The Ethnic Phenomenon. New York: Praeger.
Waal, F. (1989). Peacemaking among Primates. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
White, J. R. (2002). Terrorism: An Introduction. 3rd Ed. Belmont, CD: Wadsworth Thomson
Learning.
Widianti, E. (2006). The Ulama in Aceh in Time of Conflict, Tsunami and Peace Process: an
Ethnographic Approach. Retrieved from OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Center. (ohiou1150410650)

154

Winslow, R. (n. d.). Angola. Crime and Society: a Comparative Criminology Tour of the World.
Retrieved January 28, 2009, from http://wwwrohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/rwinslow/africa/angola.html
World Bank. (2009). World Development Indicators (WDI) dataset.
World Sindhi Congress. (2009). Retrieved January 28, 2009, from
http://www.worldsindhicongress.org/.
World Statesmen.org. (n. d.). Global Terrorist Organizations. Retrieved February 2, 2009, from
http://www.worldstatesmen.org/Terrorist.html.
Yahye, M. M. (2007, July 1). How to Tackle Unemployment in Somalia. Marka Cadeey News.
Retrieved January 27, 2009, from
http://www.markacadeey.com/maqaalo/maqaal_yaxya_20070701.htm.
Young, J. (2006). Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia: The Tigray People's Liberation Front, 19751991. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
Zulaika, J. (1985). “The Tragedy of Carlos.” Comp. in Basque Politics: A Case Study in Ethnic
Nationalism. Douglass, W. A. (Ed.). Reno, ND: Associated Faculty Press, Inc. and
Basque Studies Program.

155

